PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C. LAMANGAN IN THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS …

Mijares versus Marcos Estate

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Priscilla Mijares, Loretta Ann Rosales, Hilda Narciso, Sister Mariani Dimaranan, and Joel Lamangan, suing in their own behalf and on behalf of the class plaintiffs who won a human rights judgment in the United States against the Estate of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The petitioners sought to enforce that foreign judgment in the Philippines, but the Makati trial court dismissed their complaint for non-payment of what it computed to be a filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos. The case matters because it fixes the procedural rule for enforcing a foreign judgment in our courts, and because it shows that even a sympathetic cause must travel through the letter of the law.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed a complaint for enforcement of the foreign judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Marcos Estate moved to dismiss on the ground that only Four Hundred Ten Pesos had been paid in docket and filing fees. The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice, holding that the action was capable of pecuniary estimation and that the filing fee should be computed under the schedule for money claims, yielding approximately Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the judge denied it. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the Supreme Court, assailing both orders and praying for reinstatement of the complaint. The Commission on Human Rights was permitted to intervene in support of the petition.

Facts

On 9 May 1991, ten Filipino citizens filed a complaint before the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Marcos Estate, each alleging human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture, and rape at the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. They invoked the Alien Tort Act and sued on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed, or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. The class was estimated at approximately ten thousand members, so joinder of all was impracticable.

The District Court certified the case as a class action and created three sub-classes of torture, summary execution, and disappearance victims. After trial, the jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages. On 3 February 1995, the District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on 17 December 1996, and no petition for certiorari was taken to the United States Supreme Court.

On 20 May 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Makati trial court for enforcement of the Final Judgment, invoking the rule on foreign judgments. The Marcos Estate moved to dismiss, raising the insufficiency of the filing fees. The trial court agreed that the action was capable of pecuniary estimation and dismissed the complaint, and it denied reconsideration. Hence the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is an action capable of pecuniary estimation for purposes of computing the filing fee.
• Whether or not the filing fee for such an action is governed by the schedule for money claims against an estate not based on judgment.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the computed filing fee.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7, paragraph (a) of Rule 141, as relied upon by the trial court, provides:

For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is: x x x For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00 - P 10.00.

This is the provision the trial court used to arrive at the Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Peso fee, and the Court holds it inapplicable because the claim is based on a judgment.

Section 7, paragraph (b) of Rule 141, invoked by the petitioners, provides:

For filing 1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated--- P 600.00 2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure which shall be governed by paragraph (a) above--- P 600.00 3. All other actions not involving property--- P 600.00 In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.

The Court considers this provision but finds that the action is not one for real property, so the real action clause does not govern.

Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

This defines the nature and effect of the foreign judgment the petitioners seek to enforce, and the limited grounds on which it may be resisted.

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, on the jurisdiction of first level courts, provides:

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged x x x.

This answers the fear that treating the action as capable of pecuniary estimation would throw it into the first level courts, which are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that an action to enforce a foreign judgment is capable of pecuniary estimation. The subject matter is the foreign judgment itself, and its enforcement will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money. The Court acknowledges that the proposition is counter-intuitive but insists on strict scrutiny, since for all practical purposes the matter is estimable down to the last cent.

On the second issue, the Court holds that the filing fee is not governed by the schedule for money claims against an estate not based on judgment. The complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, and the provision makes no distinction between a local and a foreign judgment. As the Court puts it, where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. The Court also notes that the action is not a real action, so the assessed value clause does not apply.

On the third issue, the Court holds that the trial court committed clear and serious error in dismissing the complaint on the basis of a fee computed under an inapplicable provision. The Court explains that a foreign judgment, whether in rem or in personam, may be repelled only on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact, and that an action is usually necessary precisely to give the losing party that opportunity. The matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, not the facts from which it prescinds. The Court declines to issue a limited ruling based on the special circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, and instead lays down a general guidepost.

Doctrine

An action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is capable of pecuniary estimation, because its enforcement will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money. The filing fee for such an action is not computed under the schedule for money claims against an estate not based on judgment, since the claim is based on a judgment, and the law draws no distinction between a local and a foreign judgment. Under Section 48, Rule 39, a foreign judgment in rem is conclusive upon the title to the thing, while one in personam is presumptive evidence of a right, and in either case it may be repelled only for want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The party attacking a foreign judgment bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was granted; the challenged orders were annulled and set aside, and the complaint for enforcement of the foreign judgment was reinstated for further proceedings, with the filing fee to be computed under the correct provision.

Remember This

Memorize the line: where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish, so a claim against an estate based on a foreign judgment is not a money claim not based on judgment. Examiners use this case on filing fees, on the nature of an action to enforce a foreign judgment, and on the grounds for repelling a foreign judgment under Section 48, Rule 39.