TRINIDAD MANAOIS-SALONGA AND ISAIAS REYES SALONGA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. IMELDA V. NATIVIDAD AND MARCIANO NATIVIDAD, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the
Court of Appeals but certified here by that court on the ground that
the question involved is purely legal.

The record shows that on November 12, 1954, plaintiffs filed a
complaint against the defendants Imelda V. Natividad and Marciano
Natividad, the latter being “joined in this suit as husband of the
former”, to collect the sum of P10,000 with interest, plus moral
damages, attorney’s fees and costs. The complaint is based upon a
promissory note dated March 5, 1954 executed by defendant Imelda V.
Natividad in favor of plaintiff Trinidad M. Salonga in the following
tenor:

“For consideration received, I promise to pay Mrs.
Salonga the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on or before March
28, 1964.

		(Sgd.) Imelda V. Natividad
Witnesses:
	(Sgd.) Illegible
	(Sgd.) Illegible”

Answering the complaint, defendants, through counsel, admitted the
execution of the promissory note by defendant Imelda V. Natividad. They
claimed, however, that said defendant had already paid the amount of
P1,000.00 of the indebtedness. They, likewise, expressed willingness to
pay the balance of P9,000,00 but pleaded for time to comply with said
obligation in view of business reverses and the fact that defendant
Imelda V. Natividad had been ill of tumor and was confined in a
hospital.

At the hearing held on November 17, 1955, plaintiffs admitted, the
payment of P1,000.00 and the defendant Imelda V. Natividad “confessed
judgment assuming the payment of the balance of P9,000.00.” On that
same date, the lower court rendered a decision as follows:

“After hearing the argument of both parties in this
case, the Court finds that the complaint is based on a promissory note
on a loan of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos without any interest and
the defendant admitted that the accounting having been paid thereon is
the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos which is also admitted by
the plaintiff.

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
condemning the herein defendant to pay. Nine Thousand (P9,000.00) Pesos
without interest as there is no such thing stated in the promissory
note signed by the defendant, to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of Two
Hundred (P200.00) Pesos and’ to pay the costs.”

After the above decision had become final and executory, or on
January 3, 1956, plaintiffs moved to execute the judgment. The motion
was granted, but the writ of execution issued by the clerk of court,
ostensibly pursuant to the dispositive part of the judgment, referred
only to defendant Imelda V. Natividad to the exclusion of her husband.
On January 16, 1956, after the writ was returned unsatisfied,
plaintiffs filed with the court an ex parte motion for
correction of a clerical error in the decision. It was argued that the
word “defendant” in the dispositive part of the judgment should have
been in plural or “defendants” since the case was lodged against the
defendant spouses and not merely against one of them. Plaintiffs thus
prayed for the issuance of another writ of execution which would
include defendant Marciano Natividad therein.

Acting upon the motion, the trial court on January 31, 1956 issued the following order:

“Finding the motion of Atty. Salonga &
Associates, in representation of the plaintiffs, dated January 16, 1956
to be well taken, this Court hereby amends its decision dated November
17, 1955 in the sense that the word defendant in the second (2) line as
well as in the fourth (4) line of second, (2) paragraph thereon should
be changed to ‘defendants’. Let another writ of execution be issued so
as to include the husband of the defendant, Imelda Natividad for the
enforcement of the judgment in this case.”

On September 14, 1956, defendant spouses, by counsel, filed a
petition to set aside the alias writ of execution on the grounds that
plaintiffs’ ex parte motion for correction of the supposed
clerical error was filed out of time, and that original decision which
referred singularly to defendant Imelda V. Natividad was correct as the
latter’s husband was merely joined in the suit as such husband and the
complaint was based on a promissory note executed solely by defendant
Imelda V. Natividad. On September 19, defendant Marciano Natividad
alone and by new counsel, lodged a verified petition to set aside the
court’s order of January 31, 1956, to recall the writ of execution
thereunder and to lift the garnishment effected on his salary in
pursuance thereof. This defendant’s petition alleged that plaintiffs’
complaint states no cause of action against him, the same being based
upon the promissory note executed by his wife alone; that the decision
plaintiffs sought to amend had become final and executory; and that the
amendment thus prayed for was not merely to correct a clerical but a
substantial error. Defendant Marciano Natividad also contended that the
amendatory order was unwarranted as it aimed to make him solidarily
liable with his wife for a debt incurred exclusively by the latter
without his knowledge’ and consent, and that the obligation involved in
the promissory note is not a proper charge against the conjugal
partnership.

Sustaining the petition of defendant Marciano Natividad, the trial
court, on September 24, 1956, set aside its order of January 31, 1956
and lifted the garnishment effected on his salary. Motion for
reconsideration of this last order having been denied, plaintiffs took
the present appeal.

Passing first upon the question of the propriety of the instant
appeal, as raised by defendants-appellees in their brief, the rule is
that ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not
appealable. Otherwise, as was said in the case of Molina vs.
De la Riva (18 Phil., 571), a case could never end, for as often as an
order for execution of judgment was made it could be excepted to and
the case brought here for review. This Court, however, has held that
“where such order of execution in the opinion of the defeated party
varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence
thereof, or when the terms of the judgment are not entirely clear and
there is room for interpretation and the interpretation given by the
trial court as contained in its order of execution is wrong in the
opinion of the defeated party, the latter should be allowed to appeal
from the said order so that this appellate Tribunal may pass upon the
legality and the correctness of the said order.” (Castro vs.
Surtida, et al., 87 Phil., 166; 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 351.)
Conformably to the above doctrine and considering the circumstances of
the case, there can, we think, be no valid objection to the allowance
of the present appeal.

Going now into the question of the legality of the writ of execution
issued only against the defendant wife, Imelda V. Natividad, we find
that the trial court in rendering its decision of November 17, 1955
really intended to hold liable said defendant wife alone to the
exclusion of her husband. As stated by the court in its order of
September 24, 1956, “the defendant Marciano Natividad has not signed
the promissory note jointly with his wife and consequently cannot be
made to pay for the value of the note executed and signed by his wife.”
It is to be observed that plaintiffs’ cause of action in their
complaint was based solely upon the promissory note, which from the
allegations therein appears to be the defendant wife’s personal
undertaking. No cause of action was alleged against Marciano Natividad,
the defendant husband. Neither was there any allegations in the
complaint, that the loan was a conjugal partnership liability or, more
specifically, that it was incurred by the defendant wife with her
husband’s consent, or’ that it was used for the benefit of the family.
On the other hand, in the answer to the complaint, it is alleged that
the loan, had partially been paid by the defendant wife herself, which
allegation was admitted by plaintiffs. And at the’ hearing of the case,
it was also she “who confessed judgment assuming the payment of the
balance of P9,000.00.” In the circumstances, we do not think the
defendant husband could, together with his co-defendant wife, legally
be held liable on the promissory note in question. A judgment must
conform to the pleadings and proof.

It is argued that defendants in their answer admitted their
liability on the promissory note and further expressed their
willingness to pay the same. What appears to have actually been
admitted, however, was the existence of the indebtedness incurred by
the wife as evidenced by the note. Such an admission cannot, of course,
be enlarged so as to make the defendant husband liable for the said
indebtedness, there being nothing alleged in the complaint to hold him
so liable either personally or jointly with his, wife.

In any event, the rule is absolute that after a judgment becomes
final by the expiration of the time to appeal, no further amendment or
correction can be made by the court except for clerical errors or
mistakes. (Marasigan vs. Ronquillo, 94 Phil., 237. Taking
into account the circumstances of the present case, it is apparent that
the amendment of the judgment by making plural the Sword “defendant” in
the dispositive portion thereof would not really be a correction of a
mere clerical error. For to allow such an amendment would make the
defendant husband, Marciano Natividad, who was not included in the
judgment, or the conjugal partnership, liable for an obligation for
which the defendant wife alone has been held answerable, her authority
to bind the partnership Mot having been alleged or proved. And assuming
that the trial court erred in not holding said defendant husband liable
on the strength of the alleged admission in the answer already referred
to the error is obviously one of judgment, which can only be corrected
by appeal, and not by the recourse to the power of the court to correct
clerical errors or misprisions. (Henderson vs. Tan, 87 Phil., 466.)

In view of the foregoing, the order of the court a quo
denying plaintiffs-appellants’ motion for reconsideration dated
September 24, 1956, is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.