PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. WILFREDO TOLENTINO Y ESPERAT AND JONATHAN FABROS Y CASTRO, ACCUSED. JONATHAN FABROS Y CASTRO, APPELLANT.

People versus Fabros

The Case

This is a criminal appeal by Jonathan Fabros, who was convicted with Wilfredo Tolentino of murder for the killing of Hernan Sagario. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the strict proof required for conspiracy: the Court acquits an accused who did not inflict any fatal wound and whose only participation was to help carry the victim's body, because the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt a prior agreement and a common criminal design.

Procedural History

Fabros and Tolentino were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 17. On arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Fabros pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on May 27, 1999, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Each was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages, exemplary damages, actual damages, and the costs. The trial court reasoned that Fabros's overt acts showed approval of the killing and concurrence with the acts of his co-accused, making him a co-conspirator equally liable.

Fabros appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In his appellant's brief, he assigned as errors the trial court's conviction of him despite the prosecution eyewitness's categorical statement that it was Tolentino who actually killed the victim, and despite Tolentino's categorical admission of guilt. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, agreed with the trial court that conspiracy had been duly proven. The appeal reached the Supreme Court as an ordinary appeal in a criminal case, which opens the entire records to review.

Facts

On the evening of February 28, 1996, in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City, Jonathan Fabros was at home with his cousins Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma. Their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them to his house across the road and revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather, saying it was the only way to free Sheila's mother from the suffering Hernan caused. Tolentino instructed Merwin to fetch Hernan's bolo, which Merwin did and gave to Tolentino. Tolentino then told them to go home and wait.

Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived and went to the kitchen to fix the bag of rice he was carrying. Moments later, Tolentino entered the house with a piece of wood, followed Hernan to the kitchen, and without a word struck him on the right side of the neck, sending him unconscious and falling face down. Tolentino then instructed Fabros and Merwin to help bring Hernan out of the house. They carried him toward a creek about seven meters away, with Tolentino holding him by the neck and Fabros and Merwin grasping his feet. At the creekside, Tolentino successively stabbed Hernan, causing instant death, and the body was thrown into the creek. The post-mortem examination disclosed that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to a stab wound penetrating the chest.

Fabros denied killing the victim and pointed to Tolentino as the assailant, while Tolentino likewise pointed to Fabros. Fabros testified that he helped carry the body only out of fear of Tolentino, who had threatened to hit him with the piece of wood, and that he ran away when he saw Tolentino stab the victim. Long after the trial court's decision had become final as to Tolentino, Tolentino executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the killing and retracting his testimony implicating Fabros.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, such that the act of Tolentino in killing the victim may be imputed to Fabros.
• Whether or not Fabros may be held liable as a principal in the murder despite the absence of proof that he personally inflicted any fatal wound.
• Whether or not the conviction of Fabros should be set aside and he should be acquitted.

Applicable Provisions

The decision states the theory of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code as follows:

In theory, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

This definition supplies the elements the prosecution must prove before the act of one conspirator becomes the act of all.

The decision also states the rule on the effect of a conspiracy once established:

Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.

This is the rule that made Fabros's conviction possible below, and its non-establishment is the reason for his acquittal.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. On the first issue, the Court held that conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish three requisites: that two or more persons came to an agreement, that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and that the execution of the felony was decided upon. The existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed; it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt and must rest on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Prior agreement or assent is usually inferred from acts showing concerted action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, and concurrence of sentiments or community of interests. But mere presence at the scene of the crime, or even knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto, is not sufficient to hold a person liable as a conspirator. The task in every case is to determine whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof reasonably yield that inference.

On the second issue, the Court noted that Fabros unquestionably did not personally inflict any of the fatal wounds; he could be held liable as a principal only if conspiracy were proven. The trial court relied on his assistance in carrying the body from the house to the river bank as proof of conspiracy, but the Court found that his fleeting participation did not indicate unity of purpose or design. The prosecution eyewitness herself testified that Tolentino struck the victim, stepped on his head, and ordered the cousins to help carry the body, and that Tolentino threatened to kill them if they did not keep quiet. The Court also stressed that an appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case to review, so that every circumstance favorable to the accused shall be considered.

On the third issue, since the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy, and neither was it able to show that Fabros was an accomplice or an accessory, the Court held that he must be acquitted on reasonable ground.

Doctrine

Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot be presumed, and it must be founded on facts, not on surmises or conjectures. The prosecution must establish the agreement, its criminal object, and the decision to execute the felony. Prior agreement may be inferred from concerted action, common design, actual cooperation, and community of interests, but mere presence at the scene, knowledge of the plan, or acquiescence is not enough. An accused who did not inflict any fatal wound can be held liable as a principal only if conspiracy is proven; absent such proof, and absent proof that he was an accomplice or accessory, he must be acquitted. Finally, an appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case to review, and every circumstance favorable to the accused shall be considered.

Disposition

The appeal was granted; Jonathan Fabros was acquitted on reasonable ground, while the conviction of Wilfredo Tolentino stood.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, for mere presence or acquiescence does not make one a conspirator. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a principal by conspiracy and a mere bystander, and the rule that an appeal opens the whole case to review in favor of the accused.