PABLO DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
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Dela Cruz versus Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
The Case
This is the case of Dela Cruz versus Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari brought by a police officer, SPO4 Pablo dela Cruz, against the Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines. The petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of the crime of homicide for the shooting death of a military chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel Vicente Garabato, Junior, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction while increasing the penalty and deleting the award of attorney's fees. The case matters to the reviewee because it gathers in one decision the settled rules on the credibility of witnesses, the weakness of denial and alibi, the requirements of alibi as a defense, the doctrine of res gestae, the strict requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, and the civil liability that follows every felony.
Procedural History
The petitioner was initially charged with homicide in an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Information was later amended to charge murder, alleging conspiracy with an unknown person and the qualifying circumstance of treachery. At his arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, and trial ensued.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City, found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, not murder, holding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered him to pay actual damages, indemnity for death, attorney's fees, and the costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for homicide but modified the penalty, holding that the trial court erred in appreciating voluntary surrender because that circumstance must be spontaneous and unconditional, conditions it found absent. The appellate court increased the penalty to an indeterminate term of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as medium, maintained the total amount of one hundred eighty-two thousand, nine hundred twelve pesos as actual damages and indemnity, and deleted the award of attorney's fees. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
Facts
On the afternoon of June 16, 1993, the victim, a military chaplain, was at Marcel Drive in Sangandaan, Quezon City, where he was building a house. He sat in the driver's seat of his Ford Fiera, which was parked in front of the petitioner's house, while two workers he had hired, Mario Mascardo and Abundio Tad-y Benito, unloaded construction materials. The petitioner, a police officer standing at his garage, confronted the victim because the vehicle blocked his driveway, and he shouted invectives at him. The victim moved the vehicle backward, but another vehicle behind it prevented him from clearing the way completely, so he drove it forward about fifteen meters and later parked it further at the side of the road, opening the petitioner's driveway.
Moments later, the petitioner drove his jeep out with his two children on the backseat and again accosted the victim. The two workers, standing behind the Ford Fiera, then heard successive gunshots and saw smoke coming from the side of the petitioner's jeep, with the petitioner seated in the driver's seat still holding his gun pointed toward the Ford Fiera. The petitioner alighted, walked toward the victim, reloaded his gun with another magazine, and shot him again before leaving the scene. The victim was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The medico-legal officer found that he sustained six gunshot wounds over his head and body, four of them fatal, and concluded that he died of hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.
Police investigation followed, and two teams were dispatched to track down the petitioner, who reportedly fled to Mindoro Oriental on the night of the incident. On June 19, 1993, the petitioner gave himself up to the Chief of Police of Sangandaan Police Station in the presence of a tabloid reporter and with the assistance of his counsel, and he turned over his service firearms. At the police station, the two workers positively identified him as the person who shot the victim. For his part, the petitioner interposed denial and alibi, claiming that at the time of the shooting he was at the Gagalangin Health Center in Tondo, Manila, to fetch his wife, a midwife employed there, and that they were to proceed to Baclaran Church to hear mass. A defense witness, Ricardo Cuadra, testified that he saw the shooting and that the assailant was not the petitioner.
Issues
- Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of homicide was proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering his defenses of denial and alibi and his challenge to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
- Whether or not the statement of the bystanders at the scene identifying the petitioner as the assailant was properly admitted as part of res gestae.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
- Whether or not there is an evidentiary basis for the award of damages and attorney's fees.
Applicable Provisions
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
This provision is the basis for holding the petitioner civilly liable for the death of the victim once his criminal liability for homicide was established.
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
In case of death, the indemnity shall be not less than Three Thousand Pesos, even though the deceased was not earning any income, and the offender shall also be liable for the damages caused to the injured party.
This provision supports the award of indemnification for consequential damages arising from the crime.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
This provision fixes the civil indemnity for death, which the Court applied at the increased amount of fifty thousand pesos.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The determination of the credibility of witnesses belongs to the trial court, which is in the best position to observe their demeanor, and its findings are entitled to great respect and even finality when affirmed by the appellate court. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, Mario Mascardo and Abundio Tad-y Benito, who were with the victim when he was shot and who positively identified the petitioner, and their testimonies were corroborated by the investigating officer. The Court held that the relationship of the two workers to the victim did not render their testimonies incredible, since no ill motive was ascribed to them. It also held that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. On alibi, the Court ruled that for it to prosper, the petitioner must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The distance between Sangandaan, Quezon City and Tondo, Manila did not preclude the possibility of his presence at the scene. The Court further held that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies pertained to minor details, and that the maxim that a witness false in one thing is false in all things is not a strict legal maxim in our jurisprudence, neither a test of credibility nor a positive rule of universal application. The non-presentation of the firearm was not a prerequisite for conviction.
On the second issue, the Court found no reversible error in the admission of the bystanders' statement as part of res gestae. The trial court had reasoned that res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The Court noted that all the elements were established: the killing was a startling occurrence, the statements were made within several minutes after the victim was shot, and they concerned the occurrence and its immediately attending circumstances, the identity of the assailant being material and vital information. In any case, the positive identification by the two eyewitnesses was sufficient to establish guilt.
On the third issue, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals. When the petitioner went to the Sangandaan Police Station, he did so purportedly to clear his name, not to submit himself to the authorities and assume responsibility for the death of the victim. To be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender must be spontaneous, that is, the accused unconditionally submits himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his criminal culpability or because he wants to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. The evidence did not show that the petitioner acknowledged his guilt or wished to spare the authorities the task and expense of his arrest.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the award of actual damages of one hundred thirty-two thousand, nine hundred twelve pesos was proper, since the prosecution presented receipts of expenses incurred by the victim's heirs for funeral and burial expenses. The indemnity for death of fifty thousand pesos was also proper. The Court, however, made a minor correction on the penalty imposed by the appellate court.
Doctrine
First, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, unless they are arbitrary or material facts and circumstances have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.
Second, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Third, for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Fourth, res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
Fifth, voluntary surrender, to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, must be spontaneous, meaning the accused unconditionally submits himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his criminal culpability or because he wants to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
Sixth, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and the civil liability includes indemnification for consequential damages under Article 104, as well as the civil indemnity for death under Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for homicide, with the penalty corrected and the civil liability for actual damages and indemnity sustained.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing is that alibi must show not only that the accused was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene, and that voluntary surrender must be spontaneous and unconditional. Examiners like to use this case on the credibility of eyewitnesses, the weakness of denial and alibi, the requisites of res gestae, and the appreciation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.