G.R. No. 13891. October 31, 1960
JOAQUIN ULPIENDO, VICENTE JOVES, DALMACIO DABURAL, CATALINA DOYANEN AND JOSE RAGUDO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ARMANDO LIM AND PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDE…
PADILLA, J.:
Relations under the provisions of sections 2, 12 and 13, Republic Act No. 1267,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1409.
On 20 August 1956, Vicente Joves, Joaquin Ulpiendo, Jose Layno, Dalmacio
Dadural, Jose Regudo and Catalina Doyanen filed a petition, dated 17 August 1956
in the Court of Agrarian Relations praying for their recognition as tenants in
certain agricultural lands owned by the respondents Armando Lim and Pedro de la
Cruz; a division of the produce of their respective landholdings on the sharing
basis of 70-30; and for the execution of an appropriate tenancy contract on the
same yearly sharing basis until changed by the petitioners at their option. They
further prayed for an interlocutory order directing the respondents or any
person in their behalf not to molest or prevent the petitioners from tending the
growing crops in their respective landholdings and harvesting them (CAR Case No.
197-T [567], Annex A). After hearing, on 22 July 1957 the Court rendered
judgment, the dispositive part of which is, as follows:
(a) Finding that there has existed agricultural tenancy relationship
between respondents Armando Lim and Pedro de la Cruz on one hand and each of the
petitioners, Vicente Joves and Joaquin Ulpiendo on the other after the
agricultural year 1954-1955; Jose” Ragudo as tenant since March, 1956;(b) With respect to Catalina Doyanen, the Court finds that she has
been tenant in her own right since 1953. Likewise, the Court finds that Dalmacio
Dadural has been tenant in his own right since 1953;(e) With respect to Jose” Layno, the Court finds that he has been tenant in
his own right over the land occupied by him since May, 1954.(d) There being no cause or causes of ejectment having been proven,
as provided for in sees. 49 and 50 of R.A. 1199, the herein respondents Armando
Lim and Pedro de la Cruz, are hereby ordered to maintain peacefully petitioners
Vicente Joves, Joaquin Ulpiendo, Jose Layno, Dalmacio Dadural, Jose Ragudo and
Catalina Doyanen as tenants on their respective landholdings which are parts of
the Hacienda situated in the municipalities of San Manuel and Mon-cada, Province
of Tarlac (Sec. 7, R. A. No. 1199);(e) That the palay deposited with the respondent Armando Lim’s
bodega in the amount of 53 cavans and 42 kilos of palay is hereby ordered to be
delivered to Joaquin Ulpiendo; the amount of 64 cavans and 38 kilos of palay
deposited with Armando Lim’s bodega should be delivered to Dalmacio Dadural; the
amount of 49 and 15 kilos of palay deposited with Armando Lim’s bodega is hereby
ordered to be delivered to Vicente Joves; the amount of 50 cavans and 13 kilos
of palay deposited with Armando Lim’s bodega should be delivered to Jose” Layno;
the amount of 60 cavans and 43 kilos of palay deposited with Armando Lim’s
bodega should be delivered to Jose Ragudo; the amount of 59 cavans and 9 kilos
to Catalina Doyanen. Failure on the part of Armando lim to deliver to, upon
demand by, the herein petitioners the amounts of palay herein mentioned, said
Armando Lim is required to pay the petitioners their equivalents in Philippine
tender and in accordance with the nearest Naric’s or Facoma’s quotation of palay
prices at the time of payment;(f) The claim of the respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is hereby denied;(g) The relief prayed for by the petitioners that the Court should
require the respondents to execute a written contract as regards their
agricultural tenancy relationship particularly the sharing ratio is hereby
denied. Agricultural tenancy relationship can be established either verbally or
in writing, expressly or impliedly. (Annex E.)
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment thus
rendered, except as to Jose Layno whose status as tenant was accepted by them as
held by the trial court (Annex H); the petitioners, an opposition thereto (Annex
I). On 26 November 1957 the Court modified its judgment, insofar as the
petitioners Dalmacio Dadural, Catalina Doyanen and Jose Ragudo were concerned,
by holding that they had no tenancy relation with the respondents and dismissing
their petition, but affirmed the judgment as to the petitioners Joaquin Ulpiendo
and Vicente Joves (Annex J). Both parties filed motions for reconsideration of
the last resolution just mentioned (Annexes K & L). The petitioners filed
another motion dated 14 December 1957 “to declare the resolution of November 26,
1957 null and void and/or to strike out or disregard the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of November 26, 1957, dated December 7, 1957,
and to declare the decision dated July 22, 1957 to be final and executory”
(Annex M); the respondents, a reply thereto (Annex O). After conducting a
hearing on the above mentioned motions, on 21 April 1958 the Court held that the
petitioners Joaquin Ulpiendo and Vicente Joves had no tenancy relation with the
respondents and without right to stay in their respective landholdings as
tenant; affirmed its resolution dated 26 November 1957 insofar as Dalmacio
Dadural, Catalina Doyanen and Jose Ragudo were concerned; denied the
petitioners’ various motions dated 14 December 1957 (Annex M), 18 January 1958
(Annex Q) and 25 January 1958 (Annex R); dismissed the petitioners’ complaint;
and affirmed the parts of the judgment dated 22 July 1957 and resolution dated
26 November 1957 not inconsistent with the last resolution (Annex T).
The petitioners in the court below, except Jose Layno, have filed this
petition for review of the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations set forth
in its resolutions dated 26 November 1957 (Annex J) and 21 April 1958 (Annex
T).
The petitioners raise procedural questions. On 2 August 1957 the respondents
received a copy of the decision dated 22 July 1957 (See Annexes E & F). On
15 August they filed a “petition for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration,” dated 13 August, because of lack of material time to read the
voluminous transcript of stenographic notes and for that reason they could not
readily formulate their arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration
(Annex F). On the same day, 15 August, the Court entered an order granting the
respondents “fifteen (15) days counted from today within which to file
their motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered on July 29, 1957
(should be 22) in the instant case.” (Italics supplied.) On 30 August the
respondents mailed their motion for reconsideration in the post office of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The petitioners claim that counting from 15 August, the day
the 15-day period commenced to run, to 30 August, when the respondents mailed
their motion for reconsideration, 16 days already had elapsed, and contend that
the Court already had lost jurisdiction of the case and could no longer
reconsider its decision dated 22 July.
Section 10, Republic Act No. 1267, as amended by Republic Act No. 1409,
authorizes the Court of Agrarian Relations to adopt its rules of procedure. The
pertinent part of section 1, Rule 17, of the rules of procedure promulgated and
adopted by the Court pursuant thereto, provides:
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt cf notice of the order or decision of
the Court, the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of such
order or decision, together with a proof of service of one (1) copy thereof upon
the adverse part. * * *[1]
Extensions of time to file motions for reconsideration sought before the
expiration of the original period are addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and if granted for valid and justifiable reasons, and without grave abuse,
will not be reversed on appeal.
Rule 20, as amended, of the rules of procedure of the Court of Agrarian
Relations provides:
The provisions of the Rules of Court applicable to proceedings before the
Courts of First Instance, which are not inconsistent with the preceding rules,
shall be applicable to cases pending before the Court unless, in any given case,
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, fixes a shorter period for the
filing of pleadings and other papers.
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court provides:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of
time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so
computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which
event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday
nor a holiday. (Italics supplied.)
This rule adopts the exclude-the-first and include-the-last day method for
computing any period of time.[2]
Therefore, excluding the day when the order granting their petition for
extension of time to file motion for reconsideration was entered by the Court
(15 August) and including the day the respondents mailed their motion for
reconsideration (30 August), only 15 days had elapsed. Hence, the respondents’
motion for reconsideration was filed within the extension of time granted by the
Court.
The petitioners further claim that the respondents’ second motion for
reconsideration (Annex L), dated 7 December 1957, concerning the petitioners
Ulpiendo and Joves, should not have been entertained because it was filed out of
time and that the rules of procedure of the Court of Agrarian Relations do not
allow the filing of a second motion for reconsideration except when the ground
invoked did not exist when the first motion was filed.
The pertinent part of section 1, and the whole of section 4, Rule 17, of the
rules of procedure of the Court of Agrarian Relations, provide:
Section 1. Time of Filing; When Second Motion for Reconsideration
Allowed.-* * *. Only one motion for reconsideration may be filed except
that a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed if based on a ground not
existing when the first motion was made and is filed within the time herein
provided, excluding the time during which the first motion has been pending.Sec. 4. Effect of Filing of Motion for Reconsideration; When Period to
Appeal Not Interrupted.-The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall
stay the execution of the order or decision sought to be reconsidered and shall
suspend the running of the period within which the appeal to the Supreme Court
must be perfected, Provided, however, That a pro-forma motion
for reconsideration or a second motion for reconsideration which is a
reiteration of a first motion or is founded on a ground available at the time of
the filing of such first motion will not interrupt the period of
appeal.
As already stated the respondents’ first motion for reconsideration mailed on
30 August 1957 was filed on the 15th or last day of the extension of time
granted by the Court. After receipt of a copy of the resolution of the Court
denying their first motion for reconsideration, insofar as the petitioners
Ulpiendo and Joves were concerned, the respondents’ remedy was a petition for
review in this Court within 15 days from receipt of notice of such resolution,
pursuant to sections 2, 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1409. Moreover, the ground relied upon by the respondents in
their second motion for reconsideration, that the petitioners Ulpiendo and Joves
were but “kasugpons” or helpers of their (the respondents’) tenant Mariano
Ilustri-simo, was available at the time of the filing of the first motion for
reconsideration and was but a. reiteration of the first motion. For these
reasons the trial court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the respondents’ second
mo-tioft for reconsideration as far as the petitioners Vicente Joves and Joaquin
Ulpiendo were concerned. The judgment as to them was final.
On 17 July 1958, while this case was pending decision in this Court, the
respondent Armando Lim filed a motion dated 12 July 1968, alleging that the
petitioner Ragudo had voluntarily left his landholding in March 1958 to join his
father in the latter’s farm in Palawan and that he had sold his work animal to
one Candido Gravidez. Counsel for the petitioners did not deny the abandonment
of the landholding and the sale of the work animal but objected to the dismissal
of the petition insofar as he (Ragudo) was concerned, so as not to prejudice his
right to participate and share in the produce of his landholding during the
agricultural years 1956-1957 and 1957-1958. Considering that the petitioner
Ragudo already had voluntarily left his landholding, the petition insofar as he
is concerned, should be dismissed, without prejudice to his right to receive
whatever may be due him as his share in the produce of his landholding during
the agricultural years 195&-1957 and 1957-1958.
It appearing that the respondent Pedro de la Cruz is but a mere “encargado”
or overseer of the respondent Armando Lim, the owner of the landholdings in
controversy, and the former not being the real party in interest the case
against him (Pedro de la Cruz) should be dismissed.
The findings of the Court on the petitioners Dalmacio Dadural and Catalina
Doyanen are, as follows:
After considering carefully the motion for reconsideration and the opposition
as well as the oral arguments pro and con from both sides, the Court believes
that it has to modify or reconsider its decision in some respects. This Court
has come to realize that petitioners, Dalmacio Dadural and Catalina Doyanen are
not tenants of respondents Lim by mandate of the law. This finding is
substantiated not only by the oral evidence but also documentary evidence
submitted by the respondents. The evidence disclaims these two persons, Dalmacio
Dadural and Catalina Doyanen, being tenants but mere helpers or “kasugpons” of
their deceased father and husband respectively who were the true tenants of
respondent Lim in their lifetime. While sick beginning with the year 1953, Pedro
Dadural continued to be as such tenant of Lim on his land-holding in dispute but
the farm work was done by his son, Dalmacio Dadural, petitioner herein, for and
in behalf of said tenant, Pedro Dadural. Dalmacio Dadural used to help his
father in the farm work even before the latter fell sick. On December 22, 1955,
Pedro Dadural died before the end of agricultural year 1955-1956, Immediately
after the death of Pedro Dadural, the son, Dalmacio Dadural, as heir succeeded
to the rights of his father as tenant but only up to the end of the agricultural
year in which he died according to law (Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 1199). Before the
start of the crop year for rice, 1956-1957, respondent Armando Lim advised
petitioner Dalmacio Dadural to vacate the landholding. Dalmacio Dadural did not
heed the advice, and so an action for forcible entry and detainer was filed by
respondent Lim against him in the Justice of the Peace Court, San Manuel,
Tarlac, in May, 1956. Contrary to the findings of the Court in its decision of
July 22, 1957, this action taken by the respondent is a clear indication that he
did not desire the petitioner Dalmacio Dadural to be his tenant on the
landholding of his late father. The contention of Dalmacio Dadural that he
became tenant of the respondent in lieu of his late father after the latter
became sick in 1953 is belied by Exhs. “1” and “2” attached to the records.
These Exhibits refer to the liquidation sheets had between Pedro Dadural and
respondent lim in the agricultural year 1954-1955 wherein the tenant, the late
Pedro Dadural, thumbmarked the said liquidation sheets, meaning to say, that in
spite of his illness, he was still retained as tenant by respondent Lim.
Petitioner Dalmacio Dadural acted as witness as shown by his signature on Exh.
“2”. On the succeeding agricultural year, petitioner Dalmacio Dadural again
signed for and on behalf of his father on the liquidation sheet evidenced by
Exh. “4”. Other documentary evidence whereby petitioner Dalmacio Dadural
recognized his father to be the tenant of respondent Lim comprised in Exhs. “5”,
“9”, “10”, “11” “12” “13” and “17” which are receipts (vales) or liquidation
sheets and convoy receipts. Following the provisions of law, respondent Armando
lim, however, allowed petitioner, Dalmacio Dadural, to continue the farm work on
the landholding up to the end of the agricultural year 1955-1956, by reason of
the death of petitioner’s father in December, 1955 (Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 119).
At the end of the agricultural year of rice, 1955-1956 which used to be sometime
in January or February, 1956, by virtue of the law, the tenancy relationship
between Pedro Dadural and the respondent was completely extinguished on account
of the death of the former. The heir-tenant, Dalmacio Dadural, being entitled to
succeed his father’s rights only up to the end of the agricultural year
1955-1956, which terminated in January or February, 1956, has no more
personality or connection whatsoever with the landholding of his late father.
His further stay on the landholding in dispute without the consent of respondent
Armando Lim is unauthorized. The contention of petitioner that he became the
tenant over the landholding of his father in 1953 after the latter became sick
will not hold water even if he has actually been performing all the phases of
farm work on the landholding. The provision of Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1199
referring to severance of relationship by reason of incapacity (not illness) of
the tenant whether such incapacity is absolute or temporary cannot be invoked
against the right of the tenant. The reason is that this provision of the law is
intended as a weapon for the use of the landholder if he wishes to exercise his
rights to extinguish or cut off the tenancy relationship with his tenant; there
is no compulsion under the law upon the landholding (landowner) to terminate the
relationship by reason of the incapacity of the tenant; the landholder
(landowner) may, if he so desires, waive his right especially out of charity or
benevolence during the remaining life of his ailing tenant who had served him so
well and faithfully before said tenant contracted his sickness. The Court
realizes the good intention of the landholder. Instead of severing the tenancy
relationship between Pedro Dadural and Armando Lim, the latter allowed Dalmacio
Dadural as “kasugpon” for and in behalf of the sick tenant Pedro Dadural, to
perform all the farm work.* * * * * * *
Identical with the circumstances surrounding the situation of petitioner
Dalmacio Dadural is the case of petitioner Catalina Doyanen, who should likewise
be considered or treated as intruder in tiie landholding in dispute belonging to
the respondent, Armando Hm. The evidence shows that Fernando Gasmin who was the
husband of petitioner Catalina Doyanen, was the tenant of Armando Lim. In 1953,
Fernando Gasmin became sick rendering him unable to perform farm labor. By
reason of such illness, Catalina Doyanen with the help of her children had been
doing the farm labor as “kasugpon” or helper with the consent and/or knowledge
of respondent, Armando Lim, they being members of the immediate farm household
of Fernando Gasmin. In September, 1955, Fernando Gasmin died, and petitioner,
Catalina Doyanen was allowed to continue the farm work up to the end of the
palay crop year 1955-1956, pursuant to law; thereafter she was given notice to
vacate the premises because the tenancy relationship between her husband,
Fernando Gasmin, and respondent Armando Lim, was terminated by reason of the
death of said Fernando Gasmin. Because of her defiance to such notice, Lim filed
a forcible entry and detainer action with the Justice of the Peace Court of San
Manuel, Tarlac, in May, 1956, against her. This step taken by the respondent is
a clear indication that he did not want to accept her as his tenant on the
landholding in question.The claim of petitioner Catalina Doyanen that she became the tenant of the
respondent (since she became the tenant of the respondent) since 1953 after her
husband became incapacitated by illness is belied by Exhibits “35” and “35-A”
attached to the records. These exhibits were acknowledged by her which plainly
show that her husband Fernando Gasmin was the tenant and not she herself to the
time of his death. To support further that Fernando Gasmin was the tenant over
the landholding in dispute are Exhibits “14”, “5” and “16” which were signed by
Domingo Gasmin, eon of Fernando Gasmin. These latter exhibits strengthen the
claim that petitioner Catalina Doyanen cultivated the landholding and dipped her
hands into the affairs of her husband with the respondent as “kasugpon” being
member of the immediate farm household of her husband. Like in the case of
Dalmacio Dadural, the provision of Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 1199 is not applicable
in favor of Catalina Doyanen because illness is not one of the causes of
severance of relationship; neither Sections 49 and 50, Rep. Act No. 1199 give
illness as one of the causes of ejectment to terminate the tenancy relationship
between Fernando Gasmin. and the respondent. Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 1199
applies to sever tenancy relationship in case of death of the tenant. (Annex
J.)
Findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations when supported by
substantial evidence are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[3]
Tenancy relationship’ is extinguished by the death or incapacity of the
tenant, although his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may
continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year.[4] Considering that, as found by the Court,
the real tenants of the respondent Armando Lim, the owner of the landhold-ings
in question, were Pedro Dadural, the father of the petitioner Dahnacio Dadural,
and Fernando Gasmin, the husband of the petitioner Catalina Doyanen; and that
upon the death of Pedro Dadural before the close of the agricultural year
1955-1956 and Fernando Gasmin in September, 1955, the petitioners Dalmacio
Dadural and Ca-talinU Doyanen were merely allowed by the respondent landowner to
continue working on the land holding of their father and husband, respectively,
the two petitioners cannot as a matter of right demand that they be recognized
as tenants by the respondent landowner. Notwithstanding the one-sided provisions
of the tenancy law in favor of the tenant, still the landowner has the right to
choose his tenant to work in his land. The amendment to section 9, Republic Act
No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the tenancy
relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between the
landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is
related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall
cultivate the land himself personally * * *,” which took effect on 19 June 1959,
cannot be applied retroactively.
Insofar as the petitioners Dalmacio Dadural and Ca-talina Doyanen are
concerned, the judgment under review set forth in the resolutions of the Court
of Agrarian Relations dated 26 November 1957 and 21 April 1958 (Annexes J &
T) is affirmed; and that part of the judgment concerning the petitioners Vicente
Joves and Joaquin Ulpiendo set forth in the last resolution of 21 April 1958,
reversing that set forth in the resolution of 26 November 1957, is set aside,
and the one set forth in the last mentioned resolution, which had become final,
stands. Petitioner Jose Ragudo’s petition for review is dismissed without
prejudice to his right to take and receive his share in the produce of his
landholding in the agricultural years 1956-1957 and 1957-1958. The case against
the respondent Pedro de la Cruz, being only a caretaker (encargado) of Armando
Lim, is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B, L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in part and set aside in part; Ragudo’s petition
dismissed without prejudice and case against De la Cruz dismissed.
[1] Amended by resolution of the Court
of Agrarian Relations dated 1 June 1957 and 1 July 1959. The original rules were
published in 52 Off. Gaz., 71. Rule 14 of the original rules was renumbered Rule
17 by amendment of 1 July 1959.
[2] Federal Films, Inc. vs.
Judge of First Instance of Manila, 78 Phil., 472.
[3] Section 13, Republic Act No. 1267,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1409; Atayde vs. De Guzman, 103 Phil.,
187; 55 Off.Gaz., 2234; Cahilo vs. de Guzman, 106 Phil., 620; 54 Off.
Gaz., (14) 2486″; Yusay vs. Alejado,107 Phil.,. 1156; 68 Off. Gaz.,
(24) 4502.
[4] Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199.