NATIONAL SHIPYARD AND STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

As stated in petitioner’s memorandum in lieu of oral argument, the
question in this case is whether the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of monetary claims for overtime work.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1957, Jose Abiday and 38 other persons, all employees
of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation,—NASSCO for short—filed
with the said Court, a petition for additional compensation due to
overtime services rendered. They alleged they had been required by the
Corporation, to work, and worked, on Sundays and legal holidays, at
nighttime, and more than eight hours a day, without receiving extra
wages.

Resisting the claim, the Corporation challenged the Court’s jurisdiction.

After trial, the Court on November 22, 1957, entered an order
requiring additional compensation for such overtime work. It also
directed the Examiner of the Court to compute from the books and
records of the Corporation the amounts truly owing to each of the
claimants.

A motion for reconsideration was denied. Then on February 14, 1958,
the Court Examiner rendered a partial report. Over the Corporation’s
opposition, the Court approved such report and accordingly directed
execution of its order to pay.

Whereupon, NASSCO announced its intention to appeal for review to
this Supreme Court; and on April 2, 1958, it filed a petition (G. R.
No. L-13732) submitting the following issues:

“1. Does the Court of industrial Relations have the
jurisdiction after the passage and effectivity of the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act No. 875) on June 17, 1953, over money claim for
alleged unpaid overtime compensation? and

2. Is the “Order”
of the Court of Industrial Relations which directs the Court Examiner
to compute and report to the court the amount of overtime compensation
of the claimants a decision which becomes final when no appeal is
interposed therefrom within the reglementary period?

Denying the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, NASSCO cited
several decisions of this Tribunal which at first glance, sustained its
position. However, in view of other decisions upholding such
jurisdiction, the petition for review was on April 11, 1958, dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration failed.

Thereafter, on May 16, 1958, after the said dismissal of NASSCO’s
petition, the Court Examiner presented to the industrial Court another
partial report of the additional compensation to which the
claimant-employees were: entitled for overtime work. NASSCO filed its
opposition, but it was overruled partly because it Was filed beyond the
five-day period provided by the Rules of said Court; partly because the
matter of payment and the computation of overtime pay. had been
practically approved by the Supreme Court when it dismissed the
petition in G. R. No. L-13732; and principally because the opposition
to the Report^[1] did not rest on any valid foundation.

Consequently, on June 14, 1958, NASSCO submitted this new petition
for review by writ of certiorari, against the same parties impleaded in
G. R. No. L-13732 and raising the same question of jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court. Besides, it alleged that its opposition to the
additional Report had been set aside in pursuance of a Rule of the
Industrial Court, which—petitioner contends—is either non-existing or
illegal.

This petition was given due course because of the allegations
concerning the five-day period. Upon careful consideration, however, it
appears that the objection to the Report^[2] turned out to be without factual basis.

Realizing its slim chance to prevail on questions of fact,
petitioner finally limited its contention to the question of
jurisdiction. However, that point was the principal issue in G. R. No.
L-13732, between the same parties arising from the same particular
controversy before the Industrial Court; and we ruled by bur resolution
of April 14, 1958, that petitioner’s position on the matter had no
merit. That resolution having become final, is now the law of the case,
and the implementation of the order thereby upheld, may not be blocked
by this second petition.

At any rate, we think that this controversy between 39 employees and
the NASSCO over payment for work in excess of eight hours, including
Sundays, legal holidays and nighttime, may properly be regarded to be
within the scope of the powers of the Industrial Court, since it is
practically, a labor dispute that may lead to conflict between the
employees and the management.

If the claimants were not actual employees of the NASSCO—e. g. they
have severed their connection with it or were dismissed, but do not
insist on reinstatements—their claim for overtime compensation would
become simply a monetary demand properly cognizable by the regular
courts.

The petition for review is denied. The order appealed from is affirmed.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Montemayor and Barrera, JJ., took no part.

---

^[1] The computation of wages was inexact, and there were deductions to be made, etc.

^[2] See footnote No. 1.