CIPRIANO E. UNSON, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. GENATO COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Unson versus Lacson

The Case

This is the second round of a long fight over a strip of public street in Manila. Cipriano Unson sued Mayor Lacson of Manila and the Genato Commercial Corporation to annul a city ordinance that withdrew a portion of Callejon del Carmen from public use and leased it to the corporation, which then built on it and blocked the exit from Unson's building. Unson won that first case before the Supreme Court, and the ordinance and the lease were declared void. The present case is about what happens next: when Unson asked the trial court to order the demolition of the building that stood on the voided lease, the corporation resisted, saying the judgment never ordered any demolition. The case matters because it fixes the reach of a final judgment — that execution carries not only what the decision says on its face but also what is necessarily included in it or necessary to it.

Procedural History

Unson first sued in the Court of First Instance of Manila and lost. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court, declared Ordinance Number 3470 and the contract of lease null and void, with costs against the respondents. That judgment became final. Unson then returned to the court below and asked for a writ of execution directing Genato Commercial to remove any construction it had made on the leased land. The corporation objected, arguing that the decision contained nothing requiring it to remove any building. The Manila court granted the writ as prayed for. Genato Commercial appealed that order to the Supreme Court, insisting on the same argument. The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Bengzon, affirmed the order of execution.

Facts

In April 1953, Cipriano Unson sued Mayor Lacson of Manila and the Genato Commercial Corporation. The City had passed Ordinance Number 3470, which withdrew a part of Callejon del Carmen from public use and converted it into patrimonial property available for lease to private parties. Under that ordinance the corporation obtained a lease of the lot and a permit to build on it. Unson owned a lot and building that abutted the callejon, and the construction shut off the exit from his building, to the great prejudice and danger of the students of the Mapa High School that occupied it. He prayed for an injunction against the construction and the annulment of the ordinance, the lease, and the building permit.

Unson lost in the Court of First Instance of Manila and appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance and the lease were inconsistent with Article 638 of the Civil Code, because the building made it impossible for the public to use the three-meter zone along the northern margin of the Estero de San Sebastian. The ordinance and the lease were declared null and void, and the judgment became final.

Unson then moved in the court below for execution, asking that Genato Commercial be directed to remove any construction it had made on the leased land. The corporation objected, saying the decision contained no order of demolition. The Manila court issued the writ, and the corporation appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not a final judgment declaring an ordinance and a lease void carries with it, by necessary implication, the demolition of the building erected under that voided lease, even if the decision contains no express order of demolition.
• Whether or not the corporation may now invoke Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code as a builder in good faith to resist the execution.

Applicable Provisions

Article 638 of the Civil Code, which the first Unson decision applied in annulling the ordinance and the lease, provides:

The banks of rivers and streams, even in case they are of private ownership are subject throughout their entire length and within a zone of three meters along their margins, to the easement of public use in the general interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.

This is the provision whose violation made the ordinance and the lease void, and therefore made the obstruction unlawful.

Article 448 of the Civil Code, invoked by the corporation, provides:

The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works.

The Court held it inapplicable because Unson is not the owner of the land.

Article 546 of the Civil Code provides:

Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

The Court held it inapplicable because Unson was never awarded possession of the callejon.

Article 548 of the Civil Code provides:

Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.

This too was held inapplicable, for the same reason that Unson was not awarded possession.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the order of execution was proper. The controlling precedent is Perez versus Evite, where a final judgment was enforced by orders that went beyond its literal text, on the principle that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also includes those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The Court explained that the first Unson decision contained no order of demolition only because the issue as framed concerned the validity of the ordinance and the lease. The parties practically conceded that if the ordinance was valid the construction stayed, but if it was invalid the contract was void and the building had no reason to continue, for it prevented the public from using the callejon. Unson's only desire was to remove the obstruction, and he could achieve it only through the annulment of the lease and the ordinance. The demolition was therefore necessarily included in the judgment.

On the second issue, the Court held that the corporation could not now claim the rights of a builder in good faith. In its answer to the complaint it raised no defense except the validity of the ordinance. It asserted nothing about its right to keep the building even if the ordinance were invalid, and it reserved no privilege to claim as a builder in good faith. Articles 448, 546, and 548 do not apply: the first speaks of the owner of the land, and Unson is not the owner, while the City of Manila did not appeal; the second and third would apply only if Unson had been awarded possession of the callejon, and he was not. The Court added that to require Unson to bring another action for the demolition of the obstruction he had already fought and defeated would be a cumbersome process.

Doctrine

A final judgment is not confined to what appears upon its face; it carries with it those matters necessarily included therein or necessary to its execution. When a lease and the ordinance behind it are declared void because the structure violates the public easement under Article 638 of the Civil Code, the demolition of that structure is necessarily included in the judgment, even without an express order. A party who litigates only the validity of the ordinance, and reserves no claim as a builder in good faith, cannot later invoke Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code to defeat execution, especially where the winning party was never declared owner of the land nor awarded possession of it.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order of execution, without costs, so that Unson may enforce the demolition of the construction on the voided lease.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but includes what is necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Examiners use this case on execution of judgments and on the finality of decisions, often paired with Perez versus Evite and Marcelo versus Mencias, and as a trap on the builder in good faith under Articles 448, 546, and 548.