SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ AND ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS. OLGA RAMISCAL REPRESENTED BY ENRIQUE MENDOZA, RESPONDENT.
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De la Cruz versus Ramiscal
The Case
This is a petition for review brought by spouses Elizabeth and Alfredo de la Cruz against Olga Ramiscal, the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City. Ramiscal sued the spouses for demolition of a structure they had built on a narrow strip of her property, which they used as their pathway to a public highway. The spouses insist they were given that passage by agreement, or that they are entitled to it as a legal easement of right of way, or that Ramiscal is barred by laches from reclaiming it. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole law of easements of right of way, both voluntary and legal, together with the procedural rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and the equitable doctrine of laches.
Procedural History
Ramiscal filed a complaint for demolition of an illegally constructed structure before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 91. After trial, the Regional Trial Court ruled in her favor, ordering the spouses to demolish the structure built along the pathway and to pay attorney's fees. The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that court dismissed the appeal because they failed to file their appellants' brief within the reglementary period. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The spouses then came to the Supreme Court through a petition for review, and the Court denied the petition, affirming both the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Facts
Olga Ramiscal owns a parcel of land at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue in Murphy, Quezon City. At the back of her property lies a lot registered in the name of Concepcion de la Peña, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz, and occupied by the spouses. The dispute concerns a strip of Ramiscal's land, 1.10 meters wide and 12.60 meters long, which the spouses used as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, and which they enclosed with a gate, fence, and roof.
In 1976, Ramiscal leased her property, including the building on it, to Phil. Orient Motors. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its adjacent property to San Benito Realty. A relocation survey and location plan of both contiguous properties was then prepared, and it was only then that Ramiscal discovered that the pathway occupied by the spouses was part of her land. Through counsel, she demanded that they demolish the structure. Her letter went unheeded, and the barangay conciliation failed, so she filed the complaint.
The spouses admitted using the strip but claimed it was with Ramiscal's knowledge. They alleged that in 1976 they had asked her for an easement on the eastern side of her property toward Boni Serrano Avenue, and that she instead offered them the 1.10-meter passageway along the northern side toward 18th Avenue, which they accepted. They said they signed a waiver of the eastern easement, and that the perimeter wall was built at a 1.10-meter offset to provide their passageway. Ramiscal, for her part, showed that the lot of Concepcion de la Peña already had a 1.50-meter wide alley, identified as Lot 1-B-1, serving as passageway from the portion occupied by the spouses to Boni Serrano Avenue.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellants' brief on time.
- Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a voluntary easement of right of way granted by the respondent.
- Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 of the Civil Code.
- Whether or not the respondent is barred by laches from closing the pathway used by the petitioners.
Applicable Provisions
Article 613 of the Civil Code defines an easement or servitude:
Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
This fixes the nature of the right the spouses claim and identifies which estate must bear the burden.
Article 619 of the Civil Code classifies easements by their source:
Article 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
This frames the two theories of the spouses, a voluntary grant or a legal easement.
Article 649 of the Civil Code governs the legal easement of right of way:
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
This is the provision under which the spouses claim a compulsory passage, and its requisites decide the case.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal was properly dismissed. The notice to file brief was received on 12 March 1998 by the office of the spouses' former counsel, as shown by the registry return card, so that when new counsel filed the appellants' brief on 30 April 1998, the 45-day period had already expired. The Court stressed that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card, which prevails over a self-serving written note of a party's office. The Court also reminded that the right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural, or inherent right but a statutory privilege, available only if granted by statute and exercised in the manner the law prescribes.
On the second issue, the Court held that no voluntary easement was granted. The spouses produced no document evidencing any agreement, and the alleged arrangement was made only with a foreman, Mang Puling, who had no authority to bind Ramiscal. The 1.10-meter offset of the perimeter wall did not by itself prove an agreement, and a letter from the counsel of Phil. Orient Motors advising the closure of the pathway implied that it was the lessee, not Ramiscal, that had tolerated the use.
On the third issue, the Court held that the requisites of a legal easement under Article 649 were not present. The property occupied by the spouses had an adequate outlet to a public highway, Boni Serrano Avenue, through the existing 1.50-meter wide alley, Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Peña. Any isolation was caused by the acts of de la Peña herself, who built houses on that alley, and the law does not compel a right of way where the isolation results from the owner's own acts. The Court added that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough; there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity. It further noted that the spouses failed to prove ownership or any real right over the supposed dominant estate, since the title remained in the name of Concepcion de la Peña and no deed of sale was produced.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that laches did not bar Ramiscal. Laches requires knowledge of the defendant's acts and delay in asserting one's rights, and both were lacking, because Ramiscal discovered the encroachment only in 1995 through the relocation survey and filed her complaint in the same year after her demand and the failed barangay conciliation.
Doctrine
A voluntary easement of right of way must be established by competent evidence, and a foreman has no authority to bind the owner in a transaction affecting real property. A legal easement of right of way under Article 649 requires, among others, that the dominant estate be surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway, that the proper indemnity be paid, and that the isolation not be the result of the owner's own acts. Mere convenience is not enough; there must be a real necessity. Only the owner, or one holding a real right over the immovable, may demand the easement. Laches requires knowledge of the defendant's acts and unreasonable delay in asserting one's rights, and it does not run where the owner acts promptly upon discovery. Finally, the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, exercised only in the manner and within the period prescribed by law.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirmed the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, and ordered the spouses to demolish the structure, with costs against them.
Remember This
Remember the line that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to justify a right of way; there must be a real necessity. Examiners use this case for the requisites of the legal easement of right of way under Article 649, for the rule that isolation caused by the owner's own acts defeats the easement, and for the statutory character of the right to appeal.