THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE GARCIA GAVIERES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person
to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or
other deadly weapon * * *.” The last mentioned term, “deadly weapon,” has been
defined as “any weapon which is likely, from the use made of it at the time, to
produce death or do great bodily harm.” (1 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p.
1219, citing demons vs. State [1904], 48 Fla. 9, quoting 2 Bish. New
Cr. Law, par. 680, and Bish., St. Crimes, par. 320.) Some statutes mention
“brass knuckles” as a weapon which shall not be carried. This Court has decided
that the phrase “or other deadly weapon” in Act No. 1780 includes arms which are
of a different class from those particularly specified in the law. (U. S.
vs. Santo Nino [1909], 13 Phil. Rep., 141.) This is the law.

When a certain club was raided, the police discovered brass knuckles
(llave inglesa) secreted in the pocket of the accused. Brass knuckles
is defined as “a weapon worn on the hand for the purposes of offence or defence,
so made that in hitting with the fist considerable damage is inflicted. It is
called ‘brass knuckles’ because it was originally made of brass. The term is now
used without reference to the metal of which it is made.” (Rawle’s Revision of
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, quoting Patterson vs. The State [1879], 3
Lea, 575.) These are the facts.

The question arises—Is “brass knuckles” a “deadly weapon ?” An inspection of
the brass knuckles in question with reference to the meaning of deadly weapon
leads us to conclude that such an implement could be used to produce great
bodily injury. The weapon can be carried for no good purpose and could only be
used for an evil purpose. The intention of the Legislature was to suppress the
habit of persons going around ready for combat. We answer the question with the
statement—brass knuckles is a deadly weapon. (State vs. Hall, 20 Mo.
App., 397, can be noted as corroborative authority.)

Counsel for appellant further relies on the following rule: “Intent is an
essential element of the offense of carrying a weapon. As the intent necessary
is generally considered to be that of going armed and of having the weapon ready
for use in case of conflict, no offense is committed where accused has no
knowledge that the weapon is on his person, or is carrying it for a harmless
purpose, such as to take it home from the place of purchase or repair.” (40 Cyc,
854.) Counsel should have continued with the next succeeding sentence of the
quotation—”The requisite intent, however, is not one to violate the law but to
do the prohibited act, as every person is presumed to know the law”— and then
should have turned the pages to read this—”In prosecutions for carrying
concealed weapons, the burden of proving the fact of concealment is upon the
state; while on the other hand, it is incumbent upon defendant to show that the
case is within one of the statutory exceptions as well as to overcome by proof
the presumptions arising from the commission of the act.” (40 Cyc, 867.) The
prosecution having proved the fact of concealment about his person of a deadly
weapon, the burden of establishing justification was on the defendant.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing the accused
to pay a fine of P10, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.