ERLINDA REYES AND ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, PRESIDING, BRANCH 49, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY; SPOUSES BERNARD AND FLORENCIA PE…

Reyes versus Ortiz

The Case

This is a consolidated petition for declaratory relief, certiorari, and prohibition brought by Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo, joined later by other occupants of the Tala Estate, against Judge Belen Ortiz of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and the private respondents who sought their eviction. The petitioners asked the Supreme Court to declare null and void the ejectment proceedings before the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and the recovery of possession case before the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, on the ground that these proceedings violated a preliminary injunction issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in a reversion case involving the same estate. The case matters because it settles two things every bar candidate must know: that a court order is not a proper subject of declaratory relief, and that no court may interfere by injunction with the proceedings of a court of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction.

Procedural History

The first case was a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership filed by respondent Segundo Bautista against spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Matienzo spouses moved to suspend the proceedings, invoking the injunction issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in the reversion case. The Caloocan City Regional Trial Court denied the motion, and later denied the motion for reconsideration. Trial on the merits then began.

The second and third cases were ejectment complaints filed by spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl against Erlinda Reyes and against Sergio Abejero before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 49, which were consolidated. Erlinda Reyes moved to suspend or dismiss the cases, again citing the injunction, but the court required her to submit a position paper and thereafter rendered a decision ordering her to vacate the property. Reyes appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which granted execution pending appeal.

Instead of filing motions for reconsideration and petitions for certiorari in the proper courts, the petitioners filed directly with the Supreme Court a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari, and prohibition. A separate petition raising the same objections to four other ejectment cases was later consolidated with it, but that second petition was withdrawn and became final and executory. What remained for resolution was the first petition.

Facts

The parcels of land in dispute form part of the Tala Estate, situated between Caloocan City and Quezon City and covering more than seven thousand hectares. The petitioners were occupants of separate home lots in Camarin, Caloocan City. The private respondents claimed to be registered owners of the lots occupied by the petitioners and sought their ouster.

On December 27, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of Lands, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against Biyaya Corporation and the Registers of Deeds, seeking to void the transfer certificates of title over the Tala Estate and to have the land reverted to the State and awarded to the actual occupants. The petitioners were members of associations that intervened in that case. On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction freezing ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City.

Despite that injunction, the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court denied the Matienzo spouses' motion to suspend the recovery case, and the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court proceeded with the ejectment cases and ordered Erlinda Reyes to vacate. The petitioners then came directly to the Supreme Court, insisting that the injunction divested the Caloocan courts of jurisdiction and that the refusal to suspend amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 may be used to assail court orders denying a motion to suspend proceedings.
• Whether or not the petitioners properly resorted directly to the Supreme Court instead of filing a motion for reconsideration and a petition for certiorari in the proper lower courts.
• Whether or not the Caloocan City courts committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to suspend their proceedings on account of the injunction issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
• Whether or not a pending action for annulment of title or ownership ipso facto suspends an ejectment proceeding.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. -- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

This provision defines the exclusive subjects of declaratory relief, and the Court uses it to show that a court order is not among them.

Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of said motion.

This provision fixes the remedy and the period that the petitioners should have observed instead of filing a declaratory relief directly with the Supreme Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition for declaratory relief cannot be countenanced. Under Section 1 of Rule 63, the subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or a statute, executive order, regulation, or ordinance. The Court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the express mention of one thing excludes all others, and held that any other matter is deemed excluded. A court order is not one of the subjects that may be examined under Rule 63, and the orders denying the motions to suspend proceedings were therefore improper subjects of the petition.

On the second issue, the Court held that the proper remedy of Erlinda Reyes was to file a motion for reconsideration and then a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 65, while Rosemarie Matienzo should have filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Both petitions had to be filed within sixty days from notice of the denial. The Court stressed the principle of the hierarchy of courts and noted that Matienzo had allowed the sixty-day period to lapse and used the declaratory relief as a belated substitute for a lost certiorari remedy. The Court also observed that a declaratory relief may be treated as a petition for prohibition only where the facts show entitlement to the writ, which the petitioners failed to allege.

On the third issue, the Court held that the injunction was not addressed to the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court. Its language mentioned only the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City. More importantly, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that a pending civil action for ownership, such as annulment of title, shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding, because the issue in ejectment is possession while the issue in annulment is ownership.

Doctrine

First, the subjects of a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive: only a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or a statute, executive order, regulation, or ordinance may be the subject of the action. A court order or decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief.

Second, the denial of a motion to suspend proceedings is properly challenged by a motion for reconsideration and then by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, filed within sixty days from notice, and filed with the Regional Trial Court if it relates to an act of a municipal trial court, or with the Court of Appeals if it relates to an act of a Regional Trial Court, in observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Third, no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.

Fourth, a pending action for annulment of title or ownership does not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding, because ejectment concerns possession while annulment concerns ownership.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners lost; the proceedings in the recovery case and the ejectment cases were left undisturbed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a court order is not a proper subject of declaratory relief, and that no court may interfere by injunction with a court of coordinate jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the exclusive subjects of Rule 63, the correct remedy and period under Rule 65, and the hierarchy of courts.