G.R. No. 13764. January 30, 1960
RAFAEL RUEDA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCELO JUAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. VICTORIANO C. LULUQUISIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that the decision
rendered by that court on September 13, 1954 be annulled on the ground
that it was rendered without giving him his day in court.
To this motion, Rafael Rueda filed his opposition contending that
the court has already lost its jurisdiction to act thereon and so the
motion cannot be entertained. In support of his opposition, he invoked
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition
for relief from a judgment or order of the court must be filed within
60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or order to be set
aside, and not more than 6 months after said judgment is rendered, to
be accompanied by affidavits of merit alleging facts constituting
petitioner’s defense or cause, of action, and since the motion of
Luluquisin was apparently filed beyond the periods above-mentioned,
hence the decision in question has already become binding and final and
can no longer be set aside.
On December 13, 1957, the court issued an order sustaining the
opposition and denying the motion, and when his motion for
reconsideration was denied, Luluquisin interposed the present appeal.
The circumstances under which the decision which appellant seeks, to
set aside was rendered appears in the decision itself, the pertinent
portion of which we quote:
“When this case was called for trial on September 3,
1954, Atty. Luis A. Cruz, did not appear notwithstanding that notice of
this trial had been sent to him by registered mail on August 5, 1954.
The return card, however, had not been received by this court.
Considering the lapse of time from the date of the hearing, it must be
presumed that Atty. Luis A. Cruz had received the notice to this trial,
or should have received it in the ordinary course of mail. It must be
observed that the records shows that two previous notices to Atty. Luis
A. Cruz had been returned to this court, the same not having been
received by the addressee. It would appear, therefore, that Atty. Cruz
had deliberately refused to receive the notice. The plaintiff closed
his evidence and the court considered the case submitted for decision.”
The reason now advanced by appellant for the failure of his former
counsel Luis A. Cruz to receive the several notices of hearing sent to
said counsel by registered mail and the consequent failure of appellant
to be notified of the hearing and be present at the trial is the fact
that said counsel died on April 4, 1954 for which reason said notices
were returned without the mail having been called for, but when he came
to know of his death, he immediately took steps to have the decision
set aside and the case reopened in order that he may be given his day
in court. The trial court, however, did not consider this explanation
satisfactory and denied the motion on the ground that, even if
appellant’s counsel has already died when the notices of hearing were
sent to him by registered mail, said notices which were sent to the
last known address of counsel constitute constructive notice which
binds the counsel and his client and as such failure to receive them on
that ground cannot serve as basis for the annulment of the decision.
More specifically, the court made on this matter the following comment:
“The death of Atty. Luis A. Cruz and his consequent
failure and that of the defendants to receive the notices are not
sufficient grounds for the annulment of the decision. Notices having
been sent by registered mail at the last known address of the counsel
for the defendants and having been returned to this Court, the same
constitutes constructive notice to counsel and defendants. That the
notice had not been received because of the death of Atty. Luis A. Cruz
does not make that failure a jurisdictional requisite which would annul
the decision. The notice having been sent but not having been received
by the lawyer because he is dead and as a consequence thereof
defendants had not known of the status of the case only entitles the
defendants to relief under Rule 38, Section 3. It was the duty of the
defendants to inquire into the status of the case either from their
lawyer or from the Court. The fact that they had allowed more than
three years from the date of the decision to the filing of the motion
is evidence of inexcusable negligence on their part. At any rate, the
period prescribed by Rule 38 has already lapsed, and it is now too late
to grant relief to the defendants.”
We fail to agree to the foregoing finding of the trial court for the
record shows that when the notices of hearing were sent to the former
counsel of appellant, said counsel was already dead, having died on
April 4, 1954, or about one month before the date set for the hearing
of the case. While in the ordinary course of business notice sent by
registered mail to the correct address of a lawyer may be considered as
a constructive notice that may bind him even if he fails to receive the
mail within a reasonable time from notice (Section 8, Rule 27), the
rule cannot apply when the addressee is already dead and there” is no
showing that the notice was received by a person of sufficient
discretion to receive the same in behalf of said counsel (Section 4,
Rule 27). Here there is no such showing. As a matter of fact, the two
notices sent to appellant’s former counsel were returned with the mail
unclaimed which shows that they did not reach any person of sufficient
discretion to receive the same in behalf of counsel, and appellant
could not have known within a reasonable time the death of his counsel
because while, the latter resided in Manila the former was then living
in Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. The record shows that appellant was not given
personal or constructive notice of the hearing which accounted for his
failure to appear in court.
It is a well settled rule that “no one shall be personally bound until he has had a day in court,
by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and
opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is
a judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where
justice is justly administered[1]
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1957 ed., p. 476). And
it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside
with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void
for lack of due process of law (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, supra, p. 523; Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921).
Wherefore, the orders appealed from are hereby set aside and the
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The
decision rendered by the trial court on September 13, 1954 is also set
aside. Costs against appellee.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
[1]
Ong Su Han vs. Gutierez David, 76 Phil., 546, quoting Lerma vs. Antonio, 6 Phil., 236, Muerteguy vs. Delgado, 22 Phil., 109; Lavitoria vs. Judge, 32 Phil., 204; Villegas vs. Roldan, 76 Phil., 3493