HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association versus Municipality of Hagonoy

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Hagonoy Market Vendor Association against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, asking the Supreme Court to reverse the dismissal of its appeal by the Court of Appeals. The vendors assail a municipal ordinance that increased market stall rentals, claiming it was not validly enacted and is unconstitutional. The case matters because it shows, in one decision, both faces of procedural law: when strict rules may be relaxed in the name of substantial justice, and when a mandatory period may not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It is a staple for questions on the thirty-day appeal period under the Local Government Code and on the effectivity of tax ordinances.

Procedural History

The Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy enacted the assailed ordinance in October 1996. The vendors appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who dismissed the appeal as filed out of time, and denied the motion for reconsideration. The vendors then went up to the Court of Appeals, but that court dismissed the petition for review for being formally deficient, because it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The vendors moved for reconsideration, explaining that typhoon Loleng prevented them from securing the certifications, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion. The vendors thus came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

On the first of October 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted Kautusan Blg. 28, an ordinance increasing the stall rentals of market vendors. The ordinance provided that it would take effect upon approval. It was approved by the acting municipal mayor on the seventh of October 1996, and copies were given to the municipal treasurer the same day. It was later approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and it was posted from the fourth to the twenty-fifth of November 1996 in three public places: in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of the Santa Ana Parish Church, and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market. There was no newspaper of local circulation in Hagonoy, so posting was made in lieu of publication.

In the last week of November 1997, the members of the association were personally given copies of the approved ordinance and were told it would be enforced in January 1998. On the eighth of December 1997, the president of the association filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice, assailing the constitutionality of the ordinance and claiming the association was unaware of the posting.

The municipality opposed, contending that the ordinance took effect in October 1996 and that the appeal, filed more than a year later, was time-barred. The Secretary of Justice agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that the thirty-day period under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code ran from the effectivity of the ordinance, which retroacted to its approval after the required posting was complied with.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in strictly applying the rules and dismissing the petition for review for failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed resolutions.
• Whether or not the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed within the thirty-day period fixed by Section 187 of the Local Government Code.
• Whether or not the ordinance was validly enacted, considering the alleged absence of a public hearing and of posting.
• Whether or not the ordinance is void on the substantive grounds raised, including the claim of retroactive application and the limits on increases in rates.

Applicable Provisions

Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code provides:

Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings.

This provision fixes the thirty-day period from effectivity within which the validity of the ordinance may be questioned before the Secretary of Justice, and it is the ground on which the appeal was dismissed as time-barred.

Section 188 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.

This provision authorizes posting in lieu of publication where there is no local newspaper, which is exactly the situation in Hagonoy, and it bears on the vendors' claim that the ordinance was never posted.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the vendors that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of formal deficiency. The records showed that the vendors exerted due diligence to secure certified copies but failed because of typhoon Loleng, and under the circumstances the appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event, considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities.

On the second issue, however, the Court held that the petition must nonetheless be dismissed because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was already time-barred. The ordinance took effect in October 1996, and the appeal was filed only in December 1997, more than a year later. The Court stressed that the timeframe fixed by law for availing of legal remedies is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed aside, and that the periods in Section 187 are mandatory. Since the ordinance is a revenue measure and the collection of revenues is the lifeblood of the government, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures not be left uncertain for a considerable length of time.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the claim that the period should run from the personal delivery of copies in November 1997. The assertion that no public hearing was conducted was belied by the vendors' own communications, which showed they participated in the hearings held in February, July, and August of 1996. The Court explained that the views aired in public hearings are not binding on the legislative body. On posting, the records showed compliance: the ordinance was posted in three public places, validly in lieu of publication because there was no newspaper of local circulation, a fact known to and admitted by the vendors.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that even on the substantive points the petition must fail. The provisions limiting the percentage of increase apply to tax rates, not rentals, and it could not be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the markets were unreasonably classified, since the makeshift Gabaldon market was reasonably excluded from the increase.

Doctrine

First, procedural rules may be relaxed where a party fails to comply because of a fortuitous event, for litigation is not a game of technicalities. Second, the thirty-day period under Section 187 of the Local Government Code within which to appeal the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance or revenue measure to the Secretary of Justice is mandatory, counted from the effectivity of the ordinance, and is not a mere technicality. Third, where there is no newspaper of local circulation, posting in at least two conspicuous and publicly accessible places under Section 188 validly substitutes for publication. Fourth, the conduct of a public hearing satisfies the law even if the legislative body does not adopt the views aired, for such views are not binding on it.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, with no pronouncement as to costs, so the municipality prevailed and the ordinance stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the periods under Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory and that the thirty days run from the effectivity of the ordinance, not from actual knowledge of it. Examiners use this case to test whether you can distinguish a relaxable procedural rule from a jurisdictional period, and to test posting in lieu of publication where no local newspaper exists.