G.R. No. 137000. August 09, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS.
PURISIMA, J.:
Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of
the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles,
against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came
to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for
and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested
by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on
Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
“A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the
impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce
documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father… and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the
contrary notwithstanding.On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important
documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to
confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal
and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship”.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for
re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco
Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066
before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship
but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC,
reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
“Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above
table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066.
The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents
already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but
likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any
new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character
or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the
dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.xxx xxx xxx
“WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and
issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation
to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission
in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.SO ORDERED.”[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to
run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a
Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2)
she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino
citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that,
she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a
Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of
Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private
respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted
facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau
of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or
subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by
the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said
acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a
Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent
to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election
of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of
her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian
citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the
Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:
“xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
xxx”
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934
in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and
Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens
of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined
Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in
the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By
virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5]
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus
soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the
private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced
her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner
cited private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on
September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on
March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one
years of age or more;(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by
virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his
nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount
to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held
that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a
certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions
of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.[8]
As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application
for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of
the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration,
and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano,
were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent
had dual citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to
run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
“SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx”
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court
clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
on dual allegiance.[9]
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting
laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer
to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual
allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification.”
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did
not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it
is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship.[10] The
filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.[11] This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992,
private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled,
as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid
acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole
process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as
an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned,
i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases
hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,[13]
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in
that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied
in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao,
the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship.
It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier
or simpler.[14] Indeed, there
appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission
on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue
of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in
these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.
However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits,
the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
[1] Rollo, p. 31.
[2] Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[3] 141 SCRA 292, 367.
[4] Article III, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[5] Article IV, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
- Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[6] 185 SCRA 703.
[7] G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999.
[8] Commonwealth Act 63, Section 1.
[9] ”Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
[10] Mercado vs. Manzano, supra.
[11] Ibid.
[12] 41 SCRA 292, supra.
[13] 51 SCRA 248.
[14] Moy Ya Lim Yao, supra, pp. 366-367.