PAZ SAMANILLA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. CENEN A. CAJUCOM, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal interposed by respondents Cenen A. Cajucom and Jose A.
Cajucom from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
Land Registration Case No. 210, G.L.R.O. rec. No. N-6010, requiring
them to surrender Original Certificate of Title No. 0-966 within ten
days, either to the Register of Deeds or to the Court for the
annotation of a mortgage executed by them in favor of petitioner Paz
Samanilla.

The case arose out of a petition presented by appellee Samanilla in
said registration case alleging that respondents Cajucom had executed
in her favor, on December 20, 1955, a real estate mortgage over their
rights and participation on the parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-966 to secure a loan of P10,000.00; that
sometime in February, 1956, respondents borrowed the title from her on
the excuse that they needed it to segregate from the land the portion
claimed by other persons; and that thereafter, petitioner asked for the
return of the title so that she could register her mortgage, but
respondents refused. Attached to the petition were the deed of mortgage
and the affidavits of petitioner and a certain Antonio G. Javier, who
allegedly was the one who borrowed the title from petitioner in behalf
of respondents.

Respondents opposed the petition, claiming that the mortgage in question was void ab initio
for want of consideration, and that the issues should be litigated in
an ordinary civil action. The opposition notwithstanding, the lower
court entered an order on June 12, 1956 finding the petition well-taken
and ordering respondents to surrender their title either to the
Register of Deeds or to the Court. From this order, respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to us for
raising purely question of law.

The appeal has no merit. Appellants’ sole objection to the
registration of the deed of mortgage is that the same was executed
without any consideration. But there is a legal presumption of
sufficient cause or consideration supporting a contract, even if such
cause is not stated therein (Art. 1354, New Civil Code; Rule 123, sec.
69 [r], Rules of Court). This presumption appellants cannot overcome by
a simple assertion of lack of consideration. Especially may not the
presumption be so lightly set aside when the contract itself states
that consideration was given, and the same has been reduced into a
public instrument with all due formalities and solemnities as in this
case. As held by this Court.

“Once a mortgage has been signed in due form, the
mortgagee is entitled to its registration as a matter of right. By
executing the mortgage the mortgagor is understood to have given his
consent to its registration, and he cannot be permitted to revoke it
unilaterally. The validity and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left
to the will of one of the contracting parties (Article 1254 of the
Civil Code).” (Gonzales vs. Basa, Jr., et al,, 73 Phil., 704).

To overcome the presumption of consideration, appellants must show
the alleged lack of consideration of the mortgage by preponderance of
evidence in a proper action.

Appellants assert that they cannot be compelled to surrender their
title for registration of the mortgage in question until they are given
an opportunity to show its invalidity in an ordinary civil action,
because registration is an essential element of a real estate mortgage
and the surrender of their title would complete this requirement of
registration. The argument is fallacious, for a mortgage, whether
registered or not, is binding between the parties, registration being
necessary only to make the same valid against third persons (Art. 2125,
New Civil Code). In other words, registration only operates as a notice
of the mortgage to others, but neither adds to its validity nor convert
an invalid mortgage into a valid one between the parties. Appellants
still have the right to show that the mortgage in question is invalid
for lack of consideration in an ordinary action and there ask for the
avoidance of the deed and the cancellation of its registration. But
until such action is filed and decided, it would be too dangerous to
the rights of the mortgagee to deny registration of her mortgage,
because her rights can so easily be defeated by a transfer or
conveyance of the mortgaged property to an innocent third person. In
Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co., et al. vs. Reyes, et al., 92
Phil,, 177; 48 Off. Gaz., 4365, this Court had the occasion to rule
that “if the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, the
questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are
expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It
must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be
allowed and validity or effect litigated afterwards”.

Appellants cite the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Payva, 44 Phil., 629. However, the appellee correctly points out that
the same is inapplicable to this case because the only question raised
and decided therein was whether an order of the registration court
requiring the holder of a duplicate certificate of title for the
purpose of annotating an attachment, lien, or adverse claim under sec.
72 of Act 496 is appealable or not, and we held that it was, because it
resolves important questions as to the respective rights of the
parties. It should be remembered that the Land Registration Court may
summarily pass upon the validity of adverse claims sought to be
registered under sections 72 and 110 of the Land Registration Act, if
all the parties agree to submit the precise question to the court (see
Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co. vs. Reyes, supra); and
when it is thus submitted, the losing party may appeal the court’s
ruling, as held in the Payva case. But appellants herein, by opposing
appellee’s petition on the ground that their defense of invalidity of
the mortgage sought to be registered is contentious and should be
litigated in a separate action, precisely refused to submit said
question to the Land Registration Court. The court, then, acted
correctly in ordering the recording without passing upon the validity
of the mortgage in question.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to
appellants’ right to bring a separate action to question the validity
of the mortgage in question and ask for the cancellation of its
registration. Costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.