EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENT.

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan^[1]
gravely abused its discretion when it issued its Resolution dated July
28, 1998 denying his demurrer to evidence and the subsequent Resolution
dated December 17, 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. 23069.^[2]

The factual background of this case is set out herein:

On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an information^[3]
with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with
the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the same day, a second information^[4]
was filed charging petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. These informations were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively.

Criminal Case No. 23070 was raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Acting upon a motion for reinvestigation filed by
petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion to
withdraw the information^[5] , which motion was eventually granted by the Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1996.^[6]

Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. 23069 was assigned to the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also filed a motion for reinvestigation
with the court on May 8, 1996, to which the prosecution objected. On
June 18, 1996, the court issued a resolution deferring action on
petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation until compliance by the
prosecution with the court’s resolution of March 20 and 28, 1996,
requiring the amendment of the information so as to indicate the
“office-related” character of the crime charged. On November 8, 1996,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an ex-parte motion^[7] for the admission of an amended information which reads –

That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking
advantage of his official functions, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and
threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about
the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises
Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a privilege
speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said
accused.

In its resolution^[8] of January 30, 1997, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,^[9]
praying that the court reconsider its admission of the amended
information. He claimed that the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos.
23069 and 23070 arose out of the same incident; that considering that
the latter case had already been dismissed by the court on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction over the same since the crime charged was
not “office-related,” the same ruling should apply to the former case.
After the prosecution had filed its comment,^[10] the First Division issued a resolution^[11]
on April 25, 1997, denying petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation of
Criminal Case No. 23069 and his motion for reconsideration. With
regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan held that –

In criminal cases, the court’s jurisdiction in the first instance is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information. The
complaint or information must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law for such acts fall within the jurisdiction of the
court in which the complaint or information is presented. If the facts
set out in the complaint or information are sufficient to show the court
in which the complaint or information is presented has jurisdiction,
then the court has jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil 366; Magay
vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456; Enerio vs. Alampay, 64 SCRA 142).

A perusal of the Amended Information in the instant case readily shows
that the felony allegedly committed was “office-related,” hence, within
the jurisdiction of this court. It is alleged therein that accused
mayor committed the crime of grave threats when he levelled and aimed
his gun at and threatened to kill private complainant Simeon Legazpi
during a public hearing about the pollution which resulted from the
operation of Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after said
complainant rendered a privileged speech critical of the abuses and
excesses of the administration of the accused. As the local chief
executive, the health and sanitation problem of the community was one of
the accused’s main concern[s]. Thus, accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing.
It is apparent from the allegations, that, although public office is not
an element of the crime of grave threat[s] in abstract, as committed by
the accused, there is an intimate connection/relation between the
commission of the offense and accused’s performance of his public
office.

Moreover, accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the
municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response
to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the
mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The ruling in Criminal Case No. 23070 relied upon by the accused will
not apply in this case, because the offense involved there was [a]
[v]iolation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. It is an essential element
of said offense that the act of the accused in causing undue injury to
any party including the Government or the giving to any party of
unwarranted benefits, advantage or perference was done in the course of
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function. The
ponente, the Hon. Jose S. Balajadia, however, found the said
circumstance not obtaining in the said case (Crim. Case No. 23070)
because the incident complained of took place after the public hearing
when the accused was not anymore performing any of his official
administrative functions. The difference lies in the fact that in the
case at bar (grave threats), said condition is not a component element.
All that the law requires for the crime to be within the jurisdiction
of this court is the fact that the felony was committed “in relation to
his office” (not during the discharge of his official function).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and on the further ground that accused’s primary
intent in pleading a reinvestigation is the determination of the
“office-related” character of the crime, which is now passed upon, his
Motion for Reinvestigation is hereby DENIED due course. His Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated January 30, 1997 is
likewise DENIED for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above cited ruling, but the Sandiganbayan denied the same in its resolution^[12] dated June 18, 1997. Thus, petitioner was prompted to file a petition for certiorari^[13]
with this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s April 25, 1997 and
June 18, 1997 resolutions, which case was docketed as G.R. No. 130231.
However, in our resolution^[14]
dated September 22, 1997, we dismissed the petition “for failure to
sufficiently show that the questioned [resolutions were] tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.”

Thus, the trial of Criminal Case No. 23069 proceeded. On May 19, 1998,
after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence^[15]
on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had
committed the crime charged in the information and that the act
complained of took place while he was performing his official functions.

In a resolution^[16] dated July 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. The resolution states that –

xxx xxx xxx

The accused herein is charged with having threatened to kill Simeon
Legaspi by pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. There is evidence on
record that the acts were indeed committed. Regardless of whether or not
the pistol was cocked, the pointing of a firearm at a person in a
hostile manner is an act demonstrating an intent to inflict harm to that
person. Whether or not the accused Mayor was in the performance of his
proper duties when he pointed the .45 caliber pistol is not a proper
issue of jurisdiction for this Court since all illegal acts are never
proper acts of one’s public office. What is at evidence is that an
ordinary citizen was not in a position to convoke the Sanggunian Bayan
nor to preside over the same, much less to interfere with the
legislative proceedings of the Municipal Council which, because he as
mayor, the accused could and did, even if unlawfully.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the Sandiganbayan in its December 17, 1998 resolution^[17] explaining that –

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, an illegal act is not an official act; rather the question boils
down to whether or not the acts attributed to the accused herein were
performed by him in the occasion of either the performance of his duties
or of his assertion of his authority to do so. Were the rule to be
otherwise, the Sandiganbayan would never have jurisdiction of criminal
acts of public officers since these acts would never be the performance
of official duties or be official acts, although they might be in the
occasion thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner asks this Court to set
aside the July 28, 1998 and December 17, 1998 resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 23069. In addition,
petitioner prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin public respondent from
further proceeding with said case until this petition has been resolved.^[18]

The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Comment^[19] on April 22, 1999. On May 18, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to resolve^[20]
his application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction in order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further
proceeding with the case, which prayer he reiterated in a subsequent
motion^[21] filed with this
Court on July 22, 1999. On September 6, 1999, the Court denied
petitioner’s July 22, 1999 motion for lack of merit.^[22] Petitioner filed a Reply^[23] on December 6, 1999. The prosecution and the defense then filed their respective Memorandums on March 16, 2000^[24] and on March 30, 2000,^[25] respectively, after which the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Petitioner sets forth the following issues for the Court’s resolution –

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23069
FALLS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION.

III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.^[26]

With regard to the first issue, petitioner claims that the elements
constituting the crime of grave threats have not been proven. He
insists that the prosecution had not established that his act of
pointing a gun at complainant Simeon Legaspi, assuming that it had
actually occurred, constituted grave threats.^[27]
However, quite to the contrary, the Sandiganbayan found that the
prosecution’s evidence, standing unrebutted by any opposing evidence,
sufficiently established the crime charged.^[28]

The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not
be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the
prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether or not such
evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has
been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction.^[29] Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice. For the special civil action of certiorari to lie, it is crucial that

…there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,
the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries
of both civil law and common law traditions. To warrant the issuance
of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of
jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or
grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must
be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law. xxx ^[30]

When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy.^[31]
Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to
evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the
accused may file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court rendered
after such trial.^[32] In the
present case, we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has
gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s demurrer to
evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution’s evidence
satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged.
Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the
pleadings of petitioner that would show otherwise.

Coming now to the second issue, petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the crime was not
committed in relation to his office. He contends that it has not been
established that the crime charged was committed by him while in the
discharge of or as a consequence of his official functions as municipal
mayor. Additionally, he claims that public office is not an essential
ingredient of the crime of grave threats, which may be committed by a
public officer and a private individual alike, with the same facility.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the
present case.^[33]

It is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over a
controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the
final determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent
legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. A recognized exception to this rule is when the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate upon actions pending before its enactment. However, where such
retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the
jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending prior
to their enactment.^[34]

The original information in Criminal Case No. 23069 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on December 1, 1995, whereas the amended information was
filed with the same court on November 8, 1996 and admitted by the
Sandiganbayan on January 30, 1997. The applicable law at this time
would be Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7975 (RA 7975),^[35] which took effect on May 16, 1995.^[36] Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975, provides that –

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, xxx

xxx xxx xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the crime charged must be either one of those mentioned
in paragraph (a) abovementioned or one committed by a public officer in
relation to his office. The Court has held that an offense is deemed to
be committed in relation to the accused’s office when such office is an
element of the crime charged^[37]
or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of the official functions of accused. This was our ruling in Cunanan
v. Arceo^[38] wherein the Court explained several decisions dealing with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Court held –

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term “offense committed in
relation to [an accused’s] office” by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an
exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo
[108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is
that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
accused’s office if “the offense cannot exist without the office” such
that “the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.” In
People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that “although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in
[the] abstract,” the facts in a particular case may show that

“x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected
with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. x x x“

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.^[39]
In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that
the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official
functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed
the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a
gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after
the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged
is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April
25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the “accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing”
and that “accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the
municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response
to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the
mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech.” Thus, based
on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] The assailed resolutions
were issued by the First Division composed of Presiding Justice Francis
E. Grachitorena and Justices Catalino R. Castaneda, Jr. and German G.
Lee, Jr. However, by the time the December 17, 1998 Resolution was
issued, Justice Lee, Jr. was replaced by Justice Gregory S. Ong.

^[2] Rollo, 8.

^[3] Records, vol. II, 2-A – 2-B.

^[4] Rollo, 73.

^[5] Ibid., 100-101.

^[6] Ibid., 87-90.

^[7] Records, vol. 1, 100-101.

^[8] Rollo, 118.

^[9] Ibid., 119-122.

^[10] Ibid., 123-124.

^[11] Ibid., 126-132.

^[12] Ibid., 134-136.

^[13] Records, vol. I, 307-424.

^[14] Ibid., 476.

^[15] Ibid., vol. II, 6-18.

^[16] Rollo, 49.

^[17] Ibid., 50.

^[18] Ibid., 44.

^[19] Ibid., 182-193.

^[20] Ibid., 194-200.

^[21] Ibid., 203-208.

^[22] Ibid., 209.

^[23] Ibid., 220-225.

^[24] Ibid., 228-238.

^[25] Ibid., 241-280.

^[26] Ibid., 256.

^[27] Ibid., 256-259.

^[28] Ibid., 49.

^[29] Tan v. Court of Appeals,
283 SCRA 18 (1997). See also Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 328
(1998); People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).

^[30] Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).

^[31] Morales v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 211 (1997).

^[32] Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA
677 (1986), citing People v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 162 (1982);
Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324 (1979); People v. Romero, 22 Phil 565.

^[33] Rollo, 260-272.

^[34] People v .Cawaling, 293
SCRA 267 (1998); Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997); People
v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996), citing People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600
(1976) and People v. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968).

^[35] Entitled “AN ACT TO
STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED. Approved on March 30, 1995.

^[36] Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

^[37] People v. Cawaling, supra.

^[38] 242 SCRA 88 (1995).

^[39] People v. Cawaling,
supra., citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408 (1995); Tamano v.
Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998); Chico v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33
(1998); Cunanan v. Arceo, supra.