PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO DAGAMI, APPELLANT.

Alberto Dagami versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Alberto Dagami, a criminal prosecution for rape. The appellant, a barangay tanod and neighbor of the victim, was charged with having carnal knowledge of a married woman by means of force, intimidation, and threat, at gunpoint, in the early morning of October 31, 1991, in Palo, Leyte. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it is a compact illustration of how the Supreme Court treats the elements of force and intimidation in rape, of how it weighs the so-called sweetheart defense, and of the correct penalty and civil liability where the crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua. It also shows the procedural route by which a case reaches the Supreme Court not by ordinary appeal but by certification from the Court of Appeals.

Procedural History

An Information for rape was filed against the appellant on the basis of the criminal complaint of the victim. The appellant pleaded not guilty, and trial proceeded in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Palo, Leyte. On July 3, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant as principal of the consummated offense of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, a handgun. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it imposed an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, ordered him to indemnify the victim thirty thousand pesos, and ordered him to acknowledge and support the offspring resulting from the illegal act.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 26, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment in three respects: it imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, increased the indemnity to fifty thousand pesos, and deleted the order for recognition and support. Because the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals did not enter judgment; instead, it certified the case to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, and elevated the entire records. The case thus reached the Supreme Court by certification, not by ordinary appeal.

Facts

Thirty-six-year-old AAA lived in a farm in a barangay of Palo, Leyte, with her three children. Her husband was then serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison for homicide. In the early morning of October 31, 1991, while AAA and her children were sleeping in the sala, she was awakened by a noise in the kitchen. She lifted the mosquito net to check, and by the light of a kerosene lamp she recognized the appellant, a neighbor, standing at the kitchen doorway. He pointed a short firearm at her and warned her not to shout or she would be killed.

The appellant grabbed her hand and pulled her to the kitchen floor. She fell face down; he turned her over, straddled her legs, and poked the gun against her abdomen when she struggled. He raised her duster to her neck, stripped off her underwear, fondled her, and took off his shorts, keeping the gun pressed against her chest so that she could not cry out. He then mounted her, pinned her arms, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push-and-pull movements. Afterwards he stood up, warned her at gunpoint not to divulge the incident or he would kill her, jumped out of the window, and disappeared. AAA, trembling and in a daze, could only cry.

That afternoon she went to her father and revealed her ordeal. The following day, accompanied by her father, she reported the incident to the barangay captain, the appellant's brother, who told them to lodge their complaint with the police. On November 2, 1991, she was examined at the Tacloban City Medical Center. The medico-legal report noted a contusion on the right forearm, abrasions on the chest and left anterior axillary line, and, on pelvic examination, abrasions on the labia minora and fourchet with erythema and superficial lacerations, with no spermatozoa seen. The examining physicians testified that the injuries could have been caused by force, friction, and struggle. On November 6, 1991, AAA reported the incident to the police.

The appellant denied the charge and claimed that he and AAA were lovers, that they had sexual intercourse three times in her house beginning September 1991, and that she fabricated the rape charge to save herself from shame and from the wrath of her husband. He presented corroborating witnesses, including one who claimed to have seen the two in compromising situations and another who testified that AAA's mother beat her on the day in question. AAA, recalled in rebuttal, indignantly denied the affair and the alleged pregnancy, and said her youngest child was born in 1995 and was fathered by her husband.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of rape beyond reasonable doubt despite the allegedly uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the evidence that he and the complainant were lovers.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in condemning the appellant to recognize the offspring resulting from the illegal act.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for new trial or re-trial.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as then in force, defines and penalizes rape:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The Information charged rape through force, intimidation, and threat, so the first circumstance is the operative element the prosecution had to establish.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code governs the application of indivisible penalties:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

This provision is why the Court of Appeals corrected the trial court: rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, so the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the element of force and intimidation, the test is whether the threat produces a reasonable fear in the victim's mind that it will be carried out if she does not yield. The Court quoted its own ruling:

The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.

Here the appellant was armed with a handgun and threatened to kill AAA if she resisted, yet she still struggled. Her testimony described the grabbing, the pulling to the kitchen, the ravishment, and the threat afterwards. The contusion on her forearm, the abrasions on her chest, and the redness of her genitalia were eloquent physical evidence of force, and her constant crying during her testimony added poignancy to verity. The Court also held that the prosecution's case was not enfeebled by the non-presentation of AAA's mother or of the husband's letter, since the choice of witnesses belongs to the prosecutor, and the presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the evidence is equally accessible to the defense. Medical findings are merely corroborative; the credible testimony of the victim, standing alone, suffices for conviction.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the sweetheart defense. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof, and since the appellant admitted carnal knowledge, he bore the burden of proving his defense by clear and convincing evidence. He failed. AAA adamantly denied the affair, and the corroborating testimonies were neither credible nor convincing, one of them being inconsistent with the appellant's own account of when the courtship began.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the order for recognition and support of the offspring was incongruous and properly deleted.

On the fourth issue, the Court found no error in the denial of the motion for new trial or re-trial, the conviction resting on credible evidence.

Doctrine

First, in rape through force or intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the threat need only produce a reasonable fear that it will be carried out; resistance unto death is not required, and the law does not impose on the victim the burden of proving resistance. Second, physical evidence of force speaks louder than words, and the victim's credible testimony, even without medical findings, is sufficient for conviction. Third, the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, especially where the accused admits carnal knowledge. Fourth, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty which, under Article 63, must be applied regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, so the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the appellant of rape and imposing reclusion perpetua, with an indemnity of fifty thousand pesos to the victim, and deleted the order for recognition and support.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Examiners use this case to test the elements of force and intimidation, the treatment of the sweetheart defense, and the rule that reclusion perpetua, being indivisible, bars the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.