THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ELIAS CUETO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

In the general election held on June 6, 1916, Elias Cueto, now the defendant
and appellant, was an election inspector for an election precinct in the
municipality of Tiaong, Province of Tayabas. For the position of municipal
president of this municipality, two gentlemen named Mayo and Magbiray were
candidates. Toribio Briones, a qualified elector, belonged to the Mayo party. He
was given a slip containing the slate of candidates of the Mayo faction for the
different offices, such as is circulated at election time, and, with this in his
possession, entered the polling place. Being a disabled person, because of
failing sight and rheumatism in his hand, although still able when necessary to
read and write, Briones secured the assistance of Cueto to prepare his ballot.
Instead, however, of copying the name of Mayo, the candidate for municipal
president found on the slip of paper, for whom Briones desired to vote, Cueto
inserted the name of Magbiray. When once outside the dark booth, Briones noticed
that his ballot contained the name of Magbiray and, on his objecting, a new
ballot with the name of Mayo was prepared for him by the election inspector.

On these facts, which we find supported by the proof, Cueto was charged with,
and convicted of, a violation of the Election Law, and sentenced to two months
imprisonment and to pay the costs. This statement, with the addition of what is
hereafter said, disposes of the sole assignment of error by the appellant.

The Philippine Bill and subsequent Acts of Congress conceded to qualified
persons the high prerogative of suffrage. To carry out this purpose, the
Election Law was carefully drafted and enacted, and then revised by the
Philippine Legislature. Its primal feature was to allow the citizen to vote
secretly for whom he pleased, free from improper influences. As was well said in
the instructive decision in Gardiner vs. Romulo ([1914], 26 Phil., 521,
550):

“The purity of elections is one of the most important and fundamental
requisites of popular government. To banish the spectre of revenge from the
minds of the timid or defenseless, to render precarious and uncertain the
bartering of votes, and lastly, to secure a fair and honest count of the ballots
cast, is the aim of the law. To accomplish these ends, Act No. 1582 was enacted.
This law requires that only qualified electors shall be admitted to the polls;
that they shall vote in absolute secrecy, and that the returns shall be justly
compiled and announced. In its essential details, this law is a counterpart of
the ballot laws almost universally adopted within comparatively recent times in
the United States, and is generically called by text-writers the Australian
ballot law.

* * * * * * *

“* * * The central idea of the Australian ballot law, as so often expressed
in the cases, is to shroud the marking of the ballots in absolute secrecy. All
the efforts to secure a free and untrammeled expression of the elector’s will
lead up to and depart from that point.”

The accused, as already remarked, was an election inspector. To hold this
office it was necessary for him to have certain qualifications. He had to be a
qualified elector of his precinct, of good character, not convicted of an
offense involving moral turpitude, and able to read, write, and speak either
English, Spanish, or the local dialect understandingly. The accused took an
oath, honestly and justly to administer his duties according to the Election Law
without prejudice or favor toward any person, candidate, party, society, or
religious sect. One of his functions was, in conjunction with another inspector
(the accused, however, violated this provision of the law by acting alone), to
prepare ballots for disabled persons. The law made it his duty, and his duty
only, with another inspector, to ascertain the wishes of the disabled voter and
to prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form according to his wishes.
(See sections 417-424, 453, Administrative Code of 1917.)

The election inspector in giving assistance to a disabled voter has but one
function to perform, namely, the mechanical act of preparing the ballot. The
exercise of any discretion as to the selection of candidates for the voter
assisted is prohibited to the marker, and the substitution of his own for the
voter’s choice in such selection is a flagrant violation of an official trust.
(Patton vs. Watkins [1901], 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. St. Rep., 43; Board
vs. Dill [1910], 26 Okla., 104; Ann. Cas. [1912] B, 101; Re
Prangley, 21 Ont. L. Rep., 54.) An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot
the name or names expressly indicated by the voter is guilty of a fraud
practiced against the voter and thus of a violation of the penal provisions of
the Election Law. (U. S. vs. De la Serna and Callet [1909], 12 Phil,
672.)

Of course, an election officer is not responsible for a mere mistake in
judgment but only for a willful disregard of duty. All that the law requires of
an election officer is the exercise of prudence, of intelligent deliberation
leading him to judgment; and when he does that, although he does not live up to
the law there is no crime, because there is no criminal intent. (See 15
Cyc, p. 344, citing numerous cases.) But when, as in the instant case, the
election officer is given a specific duty to perform and, notwithstanding this
duty, deliberately disregards the wishes of the voter, criminal intent exists.
“The color of the act determines the complexion of the intent. In the
investigation of human affairs, whether connected with contract or crime, we are
constrained to infer the motive from the act. The intent to affect the result of
the election is properly presumed when unlawful acts, which naturally or
necessarily have that effect, are proved to have been intentionally committed,
or knowingly permitted, by those having charge of such elections.” (U. S.
vs. Carpenter [1889], 41 Fed., 330.) The election officer, who scorns
the law which he is sworn to enforce, undermines the entire edifice of
democratic institutions and is deserving of the severest condemnation.

In a case which was decided by the first division of this court and which,
because of the doctrine enunciated in the decision, should be known to all, Mr.
Justice Johnson said:

“Rarely are the courts called upon to decide criminal cases which show a
greater culpability on the part of an appellant than the facts in the present
case. The appellant, by his own confession, has convicted himself of an attempt
to defeat the will of the people in their participation in the affairs of their
own self-government. The people of the Philippine Islands have been granted the
right to select, by secret ballot, the men who shall make laws for them. They
have’ been given a right to participate directly in the form of government under
which they live. Such a right is among the most important and sacred of the
rights of the people in self-government, and one which must be most vigilantly
guarded if a people desires to maintain for themselves and their posterity a
republican form of government in which the individual may, in accordance with
law, have a voice in the form of his government. If republics are to survive and
if the people are to continue to exercise the right to govern themselves and to
directly participate in the affairs of their government by selecting their
representatives by secret ballot, then the maxims of such a government must be
left to the watchful care and reverential guardianship of the people. Eternal
vigilance is the price paid by a free people for a continuance of their right to
directly participate in the affairs of their government. Designing, ambitious,
corrupt, and unscrupulous politicians, if the people are off their guard, will
ingeniously and persistently encroach upon the rights of an unwary people, and
will finally undermine the very foundations of self-government and the rights of
the people. It behooves the people under a free government to prosecute to the
limit, without stint or favor, every person who attempts, in the slightest
degree, to interfere with, or who attempts to defeat, their direct
participation, by secret ballot, under the forms prescribed by law, in the
affairs of their government. If nefarious practices of officials of the
government, such as is described in the complaint in the present case, are to be
continued or permitted by those in authority, and punishment is not meted out
speedily and severely upon those who rob the people of their political rights,
the result is generally a revolution in which the people again repossess
themselves of the jewels of personal and political liberty and the right to
self-government, through blood and carnage.

“The defendant not only convicts himself out of his own mouth of an attempt
to defeat the will of the people of his district in their effort to choose their
representatives in the legislative branch of the government, but also violated
his oath of office in which he asked God to help him honestly and justly to
administer his duties as an inspector of elections without prejudice or favor
toward any person, candidate, party, society, or religious sect, which oath must
have been taken freely or without evasion or mental reservation whatsoever.
(Section 516, Act No. 2657; section 419, Act No. 2711.) In addition to
convicting himself of an attempt to violate the rights of the people, together
with the violation of a solemn oath, he also convicts himself of the
falsification of a public document, and might be punished for the latter offense
in a manner very much more severe than for the crime for which he is being
tried. (Articles 300 and 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712.)

“In consideration of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the
maximum penalty of the law should be imposed. Therefore, the sentence of the
lower court is hereby revoked, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
defendant and appellant be sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of one year
and to pay a fine of P500 and costs, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment for the payment of said fine.” (U. S. vs.
Iturrius [1918], 37 Phil., 762.)

The law provides as a punishment for an election officer who fails to perform
his official duties, imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one
year, or by a fine of not less than P200 nor more than P500, or both. (Section
2639, Administrative Code of 1917.) In the decision above quoted, the maximum
penalty was, for good reason, imposed. There the facts were aggravated because
the election officer had manipulated and changed the election totals. Herein,
while the inner purpose of the defendant was just as bad, the result was not as
disastrous. However, believing that either the maximum, or a penalty approaching
the maximum, should always be imposed on election officers who violate the law,
we must proceed to increase the sentence imposed by the lower court so that the
defendant and appellant shall be condemned to six months imprisonment, and to
pay a fine of P250, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with
the costs of both instances against him. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.