LOREÑO TERRY, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Loreño Terry versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the case of Loreño Terry against the People of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari assailing a decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed, with modification, an order of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, declaring the petitioner guilty of contempt of court for re-entering a lot after he had been evicted from it, and sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine, and ordering him to vacate the disputed lots. The case matters because it fixes the outer limits of a court's power to execute a final judgment by mere motion, and because it holds that there can be no contempt for disobeying an order that a court had no authority to issue. It is a study in jurisdiction lost through the lapse of time, and in the restraint with which the contempt power must be exercised.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, which decided the ejectment case in favor of Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla and against the petitioner. The petitioner did not appeal, and the decision became final. Years later, upon a motion for contempt filed by Leoncia Arcilla in the same case, the trial court, now reorganized into a Regional Trial Court, issued an order finding the petitioner guilty of contempt and sentencing him to two months imprisonment and a fine of five hundred pesos. The trial court later reduced the penalty to one month imprisonment and a fine of one hundred pesos, and ordered him to vacate the lots.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's order with modification, restoring the penalty of two months imprisonment and a fine of five hundred pesos, and likewise affirming the order to vacate. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Court required the respondent to comment on the petition, and the Solicitor General filed his comment. The Supreme Court then gave due course to the petition and reversed the Court of Appeals.

Facts

On August 13, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, in a civil case entitled Eugenio Arcilla versus Pedro Arcilla, decided in favor of Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla and against the plaintiffs and the third party defendant Loreño Terry, declaring Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla the lawful owners of two lots. The petitioner did not appeal. On November 22, 1979, the trial court issued a writ of execution against the petitioner, but the writ was not served on him, and it became stale by operation of law five years thereafter.

On December 9, 1985, more than six years after the decision became final, the trial court, now a Regional Trial Court, issued an alias writ of execution. On January 13, 1986, the deputy sheriff submitted his return stating that upon service of the alias writ he learned that the petitioner was no longer in occupation of the lots, and that the petitioner was allegedly not in possession of any declared real property. On the same date, the sheriff certified that possession of the lots was turned over to Leoncia Arcilla for and in behalf of the heirs of Pedro Arcilla.

On July 5, 1991, Leoncia Arcilla filed an action for reconveyance or annulment of sale, recovery of possession and damages against the petitioner and his wife, involving one of the lots subject of the earlier case. That action was dismissed on October 27, 1992. By filing that action, Leoncia Arcilla acknowledged that the petitioner was occupying the lots in question. On March 27, 1995, she filed a motion for contempt against the petitioner for re-occupying one of the lots. The trial court found him guilty of contempt and sentenced him, later reducing the penalty, and ordering him to vacate the lots.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner's re-entry upon the disputed lots and exercise of acts of ownership constitute indirect contempt of court.
• Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by motion, and to punish disobedience of its orders, after the lapse of the periods fixed by the rules.
• Whether or not the order requiring the petitioner to vacate the lots may be issued in a contempt proceeding.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the rule governing execution by motion within five years from finality of the judgment, as stated in the Revised Rules of Court then in force. The Court cites Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, and the rule is stated in the decision as follows:

The court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five years from finality of the decision.

This rule bears on the case because the alias writ of execution was issued six years after the decision became final, and so it was issued beyond the period allowed by the rule.

The Court also states the consequence of the lapse of that period, and the remedy that takes its place:

The judgment may be enforced after the lapse of this period and before the same is barred by the statute of limitations, by instituting an ordinary civil action.

This bears on the case because no independent action for revival of judgment was ever filed, and the trial court nonetheless proceeded by motion.

The Court further explains why the remedy must be an independent action:

The reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such action must be filed within ten years from the date the judgment became final.

This bears on the case because the original judgment had become stale ten years after its finality, and the case was a dead case when the contempt motion was filed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court resolved in favor of the petitioner. Even if it be a fact that the petitioner re-entered the lots after he was judicially evicted, there can be no contempt of court because the case below for eviction had become functus officio, that is, the court had already performed its function and lost authority over the case. The disobedience that the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willful disobedience to a valid order, for at bottom contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience.

On the second issue, the Court held that the alias writ of execution issued on December 9, 1985 could no longer be lawfully issued. The court could issue a writ of execution by motion only within five years from finality of the decision, which in this case was in 1979. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void. The interested party must file an independent action for revival of judgment. Assuming the decision became final and executory on November 22, 1979, when the original writ was issued, the court could no longer issue an alias writ by motion six years later, and the sheriff could not lawfully enforce and execute such an invalid writ. Indeed, even the original decision had become stale ten years after its finality. Consequently, when the motion for contempt was filed on March 27, 1995, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case, and its orders of March 19, 1996 and May 2, 1996 are void. There can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction. The Court stressed that the power of contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.

On the third issue, the Court held that the order to vacate the lots was improper in a judgment for contempt. The case had been stale since 1989, and it was seven long years a dead case when, in the guise of a contempt order, the trial court practically revived the judgment by ordering the petitioner to vacate the contested lots, without the institution of an independent action for revival of judgment. In contempt, the sentence is limited to the penalty prescribed in the Revised Rules of Court.

Doctrine

A final judgment may be enforced by motion within five years from its finality. After that period, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be enforced only by an independent action for revival of judgment, filed within ten years from the date the judgment became final. A writ of execution issued after the five-year period is null and void, and the sheriff cannot lawfully enforce it.

When the judgment has become stale and no independent action for revival has been filed, the court loses jurisdiction over the case, and its subsequent orders are void. There can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction, because contempt implies willful disobedience to a valid order. The contempt power must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint, and the sentence in contempt is limited to the penalty prescribed in the Rules of Court. A court may not, in the guise of a contempt order, revive a stale judgment by ordering the losing party to vacate the disputed property.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and acquitted the petitioner of the charge of contempt, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: there can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction. Examiners like to use this case on the five-year and ten-year periods for enforcing judgments by motion and by independent action, and on the rule that a stale judgment cannot be revived through a contempt proceeding.