THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SALVADOR A. EGUIA AND SEBASTIAN LOZANO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Blackmail, in the restricted form in which the crime is punished by section
10 of the Philippine Libel Law, is the subject which this appeal brings, as a
case of first impression, to the Supreme Court for consideration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Action in this case was begun by an information filed by the Fiscal of the
city of Manila against Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano, in which it was
alleged:

“That on or about the period between July 2 and August 23, 1917, in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, said Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano,
conspiring and confederating with each other, willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally threatened one Maria S. Tuason to publish in The
Independent, a weekly newspaper edited and published in the said city of
Manila, a libel consisting of certain letters which, according to the said
defendants, would expose the name of said Maria S. Tuason to public contempt,
the said defendants promising at the same time, moved by a desire to gain, to
prevent the publication of said letters in the above-mentioned newspaper, should
the aforementioned Maria S. Tuason agree to pay them the sum of P4,000,
Philippine currency.

“Act committed in violation of law.”

Both defendants filed demurrers to the information. They contended that: (1)
The facts alleged did not constitute a crime; (2) the information did not
contain a copy of the alleged libelous letters; and (3) the information was bad
for duplicity since it charged two crimes, namely, a threat to publish a libel
and an offer to prevent the publication of a libel for a sum of money. The trial
court overruled the demurrers. The defendants demanded separate trials, which
was granted. The court rendered a single decision, convicting the defendants,
and sentencing Salvador A. Eguia to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500, and Sebastian Lozano to two months imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P400; each was to pay one-half of the costs, and in case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment as provided by law.

The defendants appeal from the judgment. The questions arising from the
various assignments of error involve the sufficiency of the information, of the
evidence, and of the penalty. Before resolving these specific points, it is
well, however, to know exactly what the applicable law is.

STATEMENT OF THE LAW.

Section 10 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) is as follows:

“Every person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him, or any
parent, husband, wife, or child of such person, or any member of his family, and
every person who offers to prevent the publication of any libel upon another
person, with intent to extort any money or other valuable consideration from any
person, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by
imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both.”

The section above quoted contemplates two offenses, one which we may
denominate “a threat to publish a libel,” and the other, “an offer to prevent
the publication of a libel.” A reading of the section further discloses that we
have in Philippine criminal law a provision, which finds no counterpart, as far
as a rather extensive investigation discloses, in the laws of any other country.
The crime, which we here call “a threat to publish a libel, is punished” in the
United States and Great Britain by the law penalizing blackmailing and
extortion.

In common parlance, blackmail and extortion are synonimous, although the
latter term may have the wider signification. Blackmail, in its metaphorical
sense, may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by an appeal to the
fears of the victim, especially extortion of money by threats of accusation or
exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime—hush money. The gravamen of the
offense is the intent to extort money or other thing of value. The extortion is
committed by obtaining property from another without his consent, induced by
wrongful use of fear. The end is the same as in crimes against property, but the
means employed are different. Indeed, certain classes of threatening letters
have been held in the United States when followed by extortion to constitute
robbery. (See Green vs. The State [1901], 157 Ind., 101; State
vs. Hammond [1881], 80 Ind., 80; Chunn vs. The State [1906],
125 Ga., 789; 8 Corpus Juris, p. 1114, citing cases; Wharton’s Criminal Law,
secs. 1087, 1990.)

OPINION.

1. Sufficiency of the information.—The information alleged that the
accused threatened to publish in a weekly periodical certain letters written by
a married lady unless she paid P4,000 to them. The defendants demurred to the
information on the ground that it did not charge a public offense and that it
did not set out the alleged libelous matter.

Defendants rely on the definition of libel contained in the first section of
the Libel Law. This section, it will be remembered, defines a libel as “a
malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” Defendants insist that as these
letters were written by the offended party, they could not constitute a libel,
as a person cannot libel himself or herself.

This argument is fallacious. The prime requisite of the crime of libel is not
necessarily the composing of the article, but the publishing of it. Thus, the
sending of love letters by one person to another is not a libel, but when some
third person obtains possession of these letters and publishes them in the
public press, it must be self-evident that such letters, innocent as they are in
themselves, would appear highly ridiculous to any one except the interested
parties. To revert to the definition of libel, relied upon by the defendants,
the publication of these compromising letters would tend to impeach the virtue
and reputation of the lady who wrote them and would thereby expose her to public
contempt and ridicule.

The general rule is that the complaint or information for libel must set out
the particular defamatory words as published, and a statement of their substance
and effect is usually considered insufficient. For instance, it is necessary to
set out the threatening letter according to its tenor. But this is not precisely
a prosecution for libel. The crime of “threatening to publish a libel,” while
covered by a section of the Libel Law, is of an entirely different character
from the usual conception of the crime of libel. From the very nature of the
crime charged, it is clearly seen that to require an information to set forth
the alleged threatened libel would usually amount to asking the performance of
the impossible. The menacing libel has not as yet been published ; it may be in
the possession of the person threatening to publish it, or it may only exist in
the imagination of a perverted mind. In either case, it would be impossible to
set out the matter threatened to be published. In the present instance, the fact
that the letters which the defendants threatened to publish were seized before
the institution of these proceedings does not change the rule in regard to the
pleadings.

A common law crime which is somewhat akin to the offense now before us is
that called “threats,” and here it has been held that the indictment need not
set out the exact words of the threat, it being sufficient that the substance be
stated with certainty. Again, as to the offense of “obscenity,” it has been held
that an indictment for using obscene language need not set forth the language
used. Inde’ed, for the information to reproduce a letter in haec verba
would be equivalent to publishing it—would be to permit of the very thing which
the law is trying to avoid, the exposure to the public gaze of matter
essentially private in nature. The purposes of the law should be effectuated,
not frustrated.

We agree with counsel for appellant that “the procedure in the present case
was admirably adapted to protect the feelings of the offended party, and this
motive seems to have been the guiding principle of the entire case.” The record
should be kept pure, if possible.

The constitutional principle “that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him” is relied upon. This court has repeatedly held in cases, which have
received the approval on appeal of the United States Supreme Court, that the
complaint or information is not defective if it sets forth the alleged crime in
such a manner that a person of ordinary intelligence can tell with what he is
charged. The information herein is sufficient to put men capable bf devising an
intricate blackmailing scheme on notice of what crime they are charged.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence.—The true facts are believed to be
the following:

Maria S. Tuason, the offended party, is a married woman living in the city of
Manila. For nineteen years she and her husband have been separated, her husband
during these years living outside of the Philippine Islands. In the year 1915,
Salvador A. Eguia and his wife resided for several months in the house of Mrs.
Tuason. As Mrs. Tuason was sick at this time and as she had complete confidence
in Eguia, she gave the key to her post office box into his keeping. During this
period, Mrs. Tuason wrote a number of letters, rather amorous in nature, to a
Dr. Harmer in France, and gave them to Eguia to mail.

About the first of July, 1917, Mrs. Tuason received an anonymous letter which
read:

“A number of your love letters addressed to Harmer are to be published in
The Independent in the form of a story. I am a sincere friend of yours
and I inform you of this in order that you may take proper steps to avoid your
name being exposed to public contempt, I happened to discover this in a visit I
made this morning in the office of said newspaper.”

Later on, Maria Paves, a friend of Mrs. Tuason, came and told her that she
had been approached by certain persons who had some letters of Mrs. Tuason’s
which they would sell to her for P10,000 and that if she did not buy these
letters they would be published in “The Independent.” After some negotiations
between the parties, the price of the letters was reduced to P4,000. Mrs. Tuason
made arrangements to meet one of the go-betweens, who it later turned out was
Sebastian Lozano, in front of “El Centro Escolar” and go with him to the Luneta
and there receive the letters in return for the P4,000. She reported the matter
to the police and on the day named went to the rendezvous. Detectives followed
her and remained near by. A calesa was seen driving up and down Calle Azcarraga
in front of “El Ceritro Escolar.” After this calesa had passed up and down three
times, Mrs. Tuason went up to the vehicle. The cochero then told her that she
was not to proceed to the Luneta as had been agreed upon but was to go to some
house. This she refused to do and so the plan fell through. Maria Paves told
Mrs. Tuason that the owners of the letters had learned that she had reported the
matter to the police and that they had decided not to have any further dealings
with her.

Mrs. Tuason later went to a friend of hers and told him that she needed
assistance. He recommended one Villaba, who was working for him and who was
acquainted with Eguia. Villaba at first did not care to have anything to do with
the matter but was finally persuaded to lend his aid. He was given a free hand
and told to do whatever he thought best. He called up the police authorities and
told them of his plan and secured permission to go ahead. Villaba then went to
see Eguia and told him a story to the effect that Mrs. Tuason had offered him a
thousand pesos if he would get the letters. Eguia pretended to know nothing
about the letters and Villaba said he would go and see Lozano. Eguia objected
strongly to this and said he would introduce Villaba to Lozano. Eguia finally
did introduce Villaba to Lozano and then Villaba repeated his story to Lozano
and added that he would try to get P4,000 from Mrs. Tuason, and that then Lozano
could threaten him with some weapon and he would deliver the money to him in
exchange for the letters. Lozano was to hold back one of the letters, however,
to give to Villaba in order that Villaba could get something for it. Lozano and
Eguia agreed to this scheme and were to deliver the letters on the Luneta at
8.30 p. m. Villaba reported this to the police and they went to the “Manila
Hotel” to lay their plans. Villaba was to meet Lozano at the Rizal Monument on
the Luneta, so the police agreed that they would station men at the hotel and
around the Luneta, all of whom were to have binoculars, and that Villaba was to
lift his hat as a signal to them that the letters were in the possession of
Lozano.

The first night Villaba went to the Luneta with Mrs. Tuason to keep the
appointment but after waiting a long time no one turned up. Villaba then left
Mrs. Tuason and went to the house of Eguia to see why Lozano had not come. Eguia
said he did not know why Lozano had not done so, but to wait until 10 o’clock,
which Villaba did. As no one had then arrived, he went again to the house of
Eguia and this time Eguia told him to meet Lozano at the Luneta the next night
at 6 o’clock.

The following afternoon Villaba and Mrs. Tuason again went to the Luneta and
after waiting for a little while they saw Lozano coming along. Villaba got out
of the calesa and went up and spoke to him. Lozano came up to the calesa where
Mrs. Tuason was and showed her a letter which she identified as hers. She then
gave the P4,000 to Villaba and Lozano said he would go and get the letters. He
left and went in the direction of Calle San Luis and returned in a few minutes
and told Villaba and Mrs. Tuason to go to a more secluded spot as they would
attract too much attention where they were. The money was handed over to Lozano.
Villaba had already given the signal to the police and when they all started to
go to another place the police came and arrested Lozano. The money (which
previously had been marked) was taken away from Lozano. Lozano was removed to
the Luneta Police Station and there searched and the letters, a toy pistol, and
a negative of one of Mrs. Tuason’s letters were found in his possession.

Lozano made a statement to the police in which he tried to lay the blame on
Eguia and to excuse himself. Eguia when arrested also made a statement in which
he tried to shift responsibility to Lozano.

The circumstances of this case are such that they lead to the irresistible
conclusion that Eguia was the prime mover in this nefarious scheme. The only
reasonable deduction is that he took the letters from the post office box of
Mrs. Tuason. He was the only person who had possession of the key to the box. He
knew that Mrs. Tuason was writing to Dr. Harmer. Not all the letters found in
the possession of Lozano were from Mrs. Tuason but all had been addressed to Dr.
Harmer. The post office box used by Mrs. Tuason was in the name of Dr. Harmer
and so if any mail was returned to Manila with his name on it, it would be put
in this box. The night on which the letters were delivered, Lozano went in the
direction of Eguia’s house to get the letters. Eguia composed the note that
fixed the price for the letters at P8,000. He entered into and agreed to the
plot made up by Villaba. He introduced Villaba to Lozano. Though Eguia never
appeared in the open he was always lurking in the background.

Defendants attack the evidence from two directions. They contend, in the
first place, that the court erred in taking into consideration against each
appellant evidence presented at the trial of the other defendant. While the
court rendered but one judgment, it is nevertheless true that practically the
same facts were adduced in the two trials. Each defendant, moreover, endeavors
to shield himself behind the acts of his codefendant. Of course, such a
contention cannot be permitted to avail for a moment, where the proof shows that
both defendants are inculpated.

We hold that Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano have been proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of a violation of section 10 of Act No. 277.

3. Sufficiency of the penalty.—The law provides a punishment of a
fine of not exceeding P2,000 or of imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or
both.

Words are inadequate to castigate the despicable acts of these men. Counsel
for Eguia apparently in full recognition of this and ashamed of the low designs
of his client, says: “It was unmanly and contemptible to attempt to extort money
from this woman, as the purchase price of her love letters which had gone astray
and place upon her greater shame than she already suffered, if she did not buy.”
Counsel for Lozano experiences the same feeling, when he says: “It must be
admitted that the appellant played an ignoble part in this matter.”

In fixing the measure of culpability, we conceive Eguia to be the master
mind, who planned and engineered the whole scheme. Lozano was merely the cat’s
paw of Eguia.

In order to prevent further occurrences of this kind, as far as may be done
by judicial action, we are all strongly of the opinion that the judgment of the
lower court must be reversed, and that the defendant and appellant Salvador
Eguia is deserving of the maximum penalty permitted by law, and accordingly is
sentenced to six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P2,000 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and that the defendant and
appellant Sebastian Lozano, while culpable in a less degree, is also deserving
of an increased penalty, and accordingly is sentenced to three months
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Each defendant shall pay one-half the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.