ROSARIO BARBACINA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICHARD GAVINO AND MA. OLIVIA AMORIN GAVINO, CIRILO FARINAS AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY AND N…
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Barbacina versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is the story of Rosario Barbacina, who claimed she had occupied a residential lot in Quezon City for more than fifty years, and who went to court to annul the titles held first by Cirilo Farinas and later by the spouses Richard and Ma. Olivia Gavino. She asked that the award of the lot by the National Housing Authority to Farinas be declared void, that the titles be cancelled, and that the lot revert to the agency so it could be awarded to her. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle for the doctrine of res judicata — bar by prior judgment — and for the rule that factual questions cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Procedural History
Rosario Barbacina filed a complaint for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92. The Gavino spouses moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, citing two earlier cases: a 1980 order dismissing her complaint for cancellation of title and nullification of deed of sale, and a 1990 decision dismissing her petition for injunction against the National Housing Authority. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, and it denied her motion for reconsideration. She appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal, finding identity of subject matter, causes of action, and parties. She filed no motion for reconsideration there. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
Facts
Barbacina alleged that she had been in public, open, and adverse possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than fifty years, even before the National Housing Authority acquired it. She applied to the agency for the award of the lot, but her application was ignored. She later discovered that the lot had been awarded to Cirilo Farinas and that a deed of sale had been executed in his favor, although he never resided on the property. A transfer certificate of title was issued in his name, bearing an annotation that the vendee must construct a residential house and complete it within one year — a condition she says he never complied with.
Farinas eventually transferred the lot to the Gavino spouses, who were issued their own title. Barbacina then sued, praying that the contract to sell and deed of sale be nullified, that both titles be cancelled, and that the lot revert to the agency for award to her.
The respondents countered that the validity of Farinas's title had already been upheld in two prior cases. In the first, her complaint for cancellation of title and nullification of deed of sale was dismissed for utter lack of merit, the court holding that Farinas's right of ownership could not be overridden by her possession and that the action to annul the title should have been filed within one year from its issuance. In the second, her petition for injunction was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The records of the first case could no longer be produced because the records of that branch were completely destroyed, but the branch clerk testified to the destruction, and the Court of Appeals in the earlier petition had itself referred to the existence of the dismissal order.
Issues
- Whether or not the questions raised by the petitioner — the qualification of Farinas as an awardee, his compliance with the annotated condition, and the award of the lot to her — are questions of fact that cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
- Whether or not the present case is barred by res judicata, that is, whether all its elements are present.
- Whether or not there is identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the present case and the prior case.
Applicable Provisions
The decision applies the doctrine of res judicata as embodied in the Rules of Court. Rule 39, Section 47 provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon the title to real estate, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the real estate; (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal status of a person, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or the administration of the estate or the personal status of the person; (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
This provision makes the prior judgment conclusive between the same parties and their successors in interest, which is exactly the situation of the Gavino spouses as transferees of Farinas.
The decision also rests on Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which limits a petition for review on certiorari to questions of law. The Court explains that a question of fact arises when doubt exists as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, and that the petitioner's issues fall squarely within that definition.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the petition raises questions of fact, which are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Whether Farinas should have been disqualified as an awardee, whether he complied with the annotated condition, and whether the lot should now be awarded to the petitioner are all matters of fact. Nevertheless, to put matters at rest, the Court proceeded to resolve the question of res judicata.
On the second issue, the Court applied the elements of res judicata: a former final judgment rendered on the merits, jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The existence of the dismissal order in the prior case was firmly established by the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, which the petitioner did not contest. The first two elements were therefore present.
On the third issue, the Court found substantial identity of parties. The Gavino spouses were merely successors in interest of Farinas, and the public officers impleaded in both cases were the authorities mandated to enforce his rights. The Court quoted with approval the rule that:
There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same or there is privity between them or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
It added that only a substantial identity is necessary, and that the addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. As to subject matter, both cases concerned the very same lot and the award of it to Farinas. As to cause of action, the Court held that causes of action are identical when there is identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both. The petitioner's five supposedly new issues all hinged on the validity of the award to Farinas, which had already been settled. Even assuming those issues were not raised before, the parties are bound not only by every matter offered and received, but by any other admissible matter which might have been offered, and by all other matters that could have been adjudged in the prior case.
Doctrine
For res judicata to apply, there must be a former final judgment rendered on the merits, the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions. Identity of parties means the same parties, or privity between them, or that they are successors in interest by title litigating for the same thing, under the same title, and in the same capacity — only substantial identity is required. Identity of cause of action exists when there is identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both; a party cannot escape res judicata by varying the form of the action. Finally, factual questions are not reviewable by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Disposition
The petition was denied for utter lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner, and the dismissal of her complaint on the ground of res judicata stood.
Remember This
Memorize the three elements of res judicata and the rule that only substantial identity of parties is required, since successors in interest and added public officers do not defeat the bar. Examiners use this case to test whether a student can distinguish a question of fact from a question of law under Rule 45, and whether a litigant may revive a settled claim by dressing it in a new form of action.