YALE LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER VS. PEDRO CARAGAO, THE HEIRS OF GREGORIO BATACLAN, APOLINARIO BATACLAN, ZENAIDA BATACLAN, NAPOLEON BATACLAN, HERMINIA ANCIRO, FRANC…

Yale Land Development versus Caragao

The Case

This is Yale Land Development Corporation against Pedro Caragao and the heirs of Gregorio Bataclan, among others. The petitioner, Yale Land Development Corporation, had earlier asked the Supreme Court to review an adverse ruling, and that petition was denied. What now confronts the Court is not the merits of the land dispute at all, but a cluster of procedural motions filed after that denial: a motion to set aside the resolution denying the first motion for reconsideration, a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, and a motion to refer the matter to the Court En Banc. The case matters because it fixes the rules on how the Court classifies its own issuances — decision, signed resolution, or minute resolution — and because it enforces the settled prohibition against second motions for reconsideration.

Procedural History

The main petition of Yale Land Development Corporation was denied due course by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 21, 1998. The petitioner filed a first motion for reconsideration, which the First Division denied with finality in a resolution dated January 18, 1999. Undeterred, the petitioner filed three matters: a motion to set aside the January 18, 1999 resolution, a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration together with that second motion, and a motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc. The petitioner argued that the motion for reconsideration should have been acted upon by the members of the former Second Division sitting as a Special Division, because the October 21, 1998 issuance was in truth a decision and not a mere resolution. The Court deliberated and resolved the motions in this decision, with separate opinions from Justices Melo and Kapunan.

Facts

The Court had reorganized its three divisions following the retirement of Justice Florenz Regalado and the promotion of Justice Hilario Davide, Junior, as Chief Justice. To govern the transition, the Court En Banc issued a resolution providing that motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions penned by a member while in a previous division shall be resolved by a Special Division composed of the chairman and members of that previous division. Motions for reconsideration of minute resolutions, on the other hand, shall be resolved by the member's new division.

When the Second Division denied the petitioner's main petition on October 21, 1998, it did so through an extended but unsigned resolution. The petitioner's first motion for reconsideration was then taken up by the First Division, to which the ponente had been transferred, and was denied with finality on January 18, 1999.

The petitioner then insisted that the October 21, 1998 issuance was really a decision, being two pages long, single spaced, containing nine paragraphs of about 850 words and a statement of procedural antecedents. On that premise it sought to set aside the January 18, 1999 resolution, to file a second motion for reconsideration, and to refer the matter to the Court En Banc.

Issues

• Whether or not the motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc should be denied, the First Division being the proper division to act on the first motion for reconsideration.
• Whether or not the October 21, 1998 issuance was a minute resolution rather than a decision or signed resolution, so that its reconsideration properly belonged to the ponente's new division.
• Whether or not the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration should be admitted and granted.

Applicable Provisions

The Court En Banc resolution reorganizing the divisions provides:

As a consequence of this reorganization, the cases raffled to each Member of the Court shall henceforth pertain to the Division to which such Member has been assigned: Provided, however, that motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions penned by such Member while yet a Member of a previous Division shall be resolved by a Special Division composed of the Chairman and Members of the previous division with the Chairman of the former Division as a Chairman of the Special Division.

This is the provision the petitioner invoked to claim that a Special Division of the former Second Division should have acted on its motion for reconsideration.

The same resolution continues:

Motions for reconsideration of minute resolutions of a Member's previous Division shall be resolved by his or her new Division.

This is the provision the Court applied, because the October 21, 1998 issuance was a minute resolution and so its reconsideration belonged to the First Division.

Section 2 of Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 2. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

This is the rule that barred the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc, rejecting the argument that the First Division was not the proper division to act on the first motion for reconsideration.

On the second issue, the Court held that the October 21, 1998 issuance was not a decision but an extended unsigned resolution, a minute resolution issued for the prompt dispatch of the Court's action. The fact that it contained a distinct statement of facts and law did not remove it from that category, for there is no rule prohibiting the inclusion of such a statement in a minute resolution. Minute resolutions are the product of thorough deliberation, promulgated through the Clerk of Court, and need neither the signature of the participating justices nor the certification of the Chief Justice. Being an unsigned resolution, its reconsideration was correctly assigned to the First Division under the reorganization resolution.

On the third issue, the Court refused to admit the second motion for reconsideration. The first motion had been denied with finality, and a second motion is forbidden except for extraordinary persuasive reasons, since piecemeal attack on a judgment is anathema. The second motion was a mere reprinting and refiling of the first. The Court stressed that public policy demands that judgments become final at a definite date fixed by law.

Doctrine

First, the Court has ample discretion to determine how its judgment shall be framed, and may issue minute resolutions provided a legal basis is given. An extended, unsigned resolution containing a statement of facts and law remains a minute resolution; its length does not convert it into a decision or a signed resolution.

Second, under the reorganization resolution, motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions go to a Special Division of the previous division, while motions for reconsideration of minute resolutions go to the member's new division.

Third, a second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinary persuasive reasons, and Section 2 of Rule 52 categorically provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Once a motion for reconsideration is denied with finality, that is the definite date when litigation ends and the judgment becomes final.

Disposition

The motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc was denied, and with an even vote the second motion for reconsideration was deemed denied, affirming the January 18, 1999 resolution; the petitioner lost.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an extended but unsigned resolution is still a minute resolution, and a second motion for reconsideration is barred. Examiners use this case to test the classification of court issuances and the finality of judgments.