ANICETO MADRID, PETITIONER, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Auditor General,
denying petitioner’s claim for back salary during the period of his
alleged illegal separation from the government service.

The essential facts of the case are not disputed and are stated in the decision of the Auditor General as follows:

“The
records disclose that Mr. Madrid (herein petitioner), at the outbreak
of the last war, was a permanent lighthouse keeper at Ungay Point,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, with a compensation of P720 per annum. After the
liberation, or more specifically on August 10, 1945, he was reappointed
to his pre-war position in an acting capacity.

“On March
14, 1946, a criminal information, for treason, was filed against him in
the People’s Court. Upon dissolution of this Court, the case was
transferred to the Court of First Instance of Albay.

“On
April 30, 1946, the Acting Collector of Customs sent Mr. Madrid a
letter informing him that his services, as lighthouse keeper of the
Bureau of Customs were, on that date, terminated—quoting the pertinent
portion of a communication from the Office of the Solicitor General,
substantially to the effect that ‘the record file of the CIC revealed
the existence of derogatory information concerning Mr. Aniceto Madrid,
Acting Lightkeeper at Ungay Point, Rapu-Rapu, Albay.’

“In
connection with termination of the services of Mr. Madrid on April 30,
1946, that Office, in a 2nd indorsement dated June 18, 1946, stated
that ‘Mr. Madrid’s separation on the strength of the report of the
Solicitor General is not irregular.’ On March 1, 1951, the Court of
First Instance of Albay unconditionally dismissed the treason case
against Mr. Madrid for failure of the prosecution to secure the
necessary evidence.

“On June 20, 1951, Mr. Madrid, thru
counsel, requested for reinstatement to his former position and for
payment of salary from May, 1946, in view of the dismissal by the court
of the criminal charge against him. Mr. Madrid had already been
reinstated in the Lighthouse Service of the Philippine Navy.”

Finding that from April 30, 1946 to June 20, 1951, or for more than
five years, petitioner did not take any step to bring up the matter to
the proper authorities, or to contest the legality of his removal, and
holding, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the cases of
Mesias vs. Jover (97 Phil., 899; 51 Off. Gaz. [12] 6171) and Unabia vs.
City Mayor et al., (99 Phil., 253), that for such failure he may be
considered as having abandoned his office, or acquiesced to his removal
and to the salary appertaining thereto, the respondent Auditor General,
on September 5, 1956, handed down the decision complained of, denying
his claim. Copy of that decision was sent by mail on November 29, 1956
to petitioner at 517 (Int. 1) Kahilom, Pandacan, Manila, in a letter of
the Bureau of Civil Service dated November 27, 1956.

About a
year later, or on November 5, 1957, petitioner asked for
reconsideration of the decision denying his claim for back salary.
Holding that the decision sought to be reconsidered has already become
final, the respondent Auditor General denied the request. Another
request for reconsideration having been also denied, petitioner filed
the present petition for review.

Petitioner’s claim was,
in our opinion, properly denied. According to the decisions cited by
the respondent Auditor General, a person claiming right to a position
in the civil service must institute the proper proceedings to assert
his right within the period of one year from the date of separation,
otherwise he will be considered as having abandoned his office, or even
acquiesced or consented to his removal, and, therefore, not entitled to
bring action for his reinstatement. (See also Abella vs. Rodriguez, 102 Phil., 543; 54 Off. Gaz. [9] 2879; Eranda et al. vs. Del Rosario et. al., 103 Phil., 489; 54 Off. Gaz. [24] 6253; Quingco et al. vs. Rodriguez et al., G. R. No. L-12144, Sept. 17, 1958; Taborada vs. City of Cebu et al., G. R. No. L-11574, Oct. 31, 1958; Pinullar vs. President of the Senate, 104 Phil, 131; 55 Off. Gaz., 3488; Roque et al. vs. President of the Senate, G. R. No. L-10949, July 25, 1958.) The rationale of this doctrine, as stated in Pinullar vs.
President of the Senate, supra, is that the Government must be
immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to
an office or a position in the civil service as against another
actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually
holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not
actually rendering service although entitled to do so.

In
the present case, petitioner was not only suspended but removed or
separated from his position as light-house keeper on April 30, 1946.
For more than five years from that date, he did not take any step to
contest the legality of his removal and exerted no efforts to have his
rights restored to him. Following the ruling of this Court in the cases
above cited, he is now barred from questioning the legality of his
separation from the service. By his failure to promptly institute the
corresponding action for reinstatement after his lay-off, he has in
effect acquiesced or assented thereto. It follows that during the
period of his lay-off he is not entitled to any salary.

It will also be noted that petitioner’s appointment, prior to his removal, was in an acting capacity.
Such being the case, his separation from the service cannot really be
claimed as illegal. His appointment was by its very nature temporary
and can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there
being no need to show that the termination is for cause. (Mendez vs. Ganzon et al., 101 Phil., 48; 53 Off. Gaz. [15] 4835; UP, et al., vs. CIR et al., 105 Phil., 848; 58 Off. Gaz. [8] 1536; see also Agapuyan vs. Ledesma, G. R. No. L-10535, April 25, 1957.)

In the light of the view we have taken of the case, it becomes
unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.

Wherefore, the decision of the respondent Auditor-General sought to be
reviewed is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs,
petitioner having been allowed to litigate in this Court as a pauper.
So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Barrera, JJ,, concur.