JOSE V. VILLASIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU BRANCH, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Defendant Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines, Cebu Branch,
has brought this case before this Court, on appeal from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing its counterclaim in the
above entitled case.

The same was originally instituted in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Mandawe, Cebu, on May 20, 1955. In his amended complaint, plaintiff
Jose V. Villasin sought to recover from the defendant P1,329.91, with
interest thereon, in addition to P500 as attorney’s fees and the costs
of the suit. The defendant filed an answer admitting some allegations
of the complaint and denying other allegations thereof, as well as
setting up a special defense and, also, a counterclaim for P1,273.70,
plus P500, as actual damages, and another P500, as attorney’s fees. In
due course, said court rendered a decision on March 16, 1956, finding
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the aforementioned
counterclaim and sentencing the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum
of P1,329.91, with interest thereon, and P200 as attorney’s fees, apart
from the costs.

The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in
which it filed an answer, dated April 23, 1956, in effect reproducing
that submitted in the justice of the peace court, with the counterclaim
for P1,283.10, and P500 as actual damages, aside from P500 as
attorney’s fees. After answering this counterclaim, plaintiff filed, on
March 8, 1957, a motion to dismiss the same, predicated, among other
grounds, upon “lack of appellate jurisdiction”, inasmuch as the sums
claimed in said counterclaim aggregate P2,283.10—which furnishes the
jurisdictional test, pursuant to the decisions in Soriano vs. Omila, 97 Phil., 62; 51 Off. Gaz. [7] 3465; Despo vs. Sta. Maria, 98 Phil., 305; 53 Off. Gaz., 3759 and Campos Rueda vs.
Sta. Cruz Lumber Co., 98 Phil., 627; 52 Off. Gaz. [3] 1387—thus being
in excess of the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court at that time, and, hence, beyond the appellate jurisdiction of
the court of first instance. By an order dated May 2, 1957, the motion
was granted by the latter, which, accordingly, dismissed defendant’s
counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction, upon the authority, not only of
the cases above mentioned, but, also, of Felix Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace of Camiling, 99 Phil., 698; 52 Off. Gaz., [11] 5157, and Gregorio Carlos vs.
J. P. Kiener Construction, 100 Phil., 29; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6554.
Hence this appeal, taken by the defendant, from said order.

The appeal was prematurely taken and should not have been given due
course, the order appealed from being interlocutory in nature (Caldera,
et al. vs. Balcuelba, et al., 84 Phil., 304; 47 Off. Gaz., 659; Quimosing vs.
Javien, L- 2968 (Resolution of July 19, 1949). As such, it is not
immediately appealable, for, prior to the rendition of the final
judgment, it is, at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments
as the court may deem proper (Manila Electric Co. vs. Artiaga, 50 Phil., 147; Restauro vs.
Fabrica, 80 Phil., 762). The order of May 2, 1957, did not put an end
to the litigation, for it left something else to be done on the
merits—a hearing and decision on plaintiff’s complaint (Mejia vs. Alimorong, 4 Phil., 572; Roa vs. Africa, 8 Phil., 828; Insular Government vs. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil., 187; Natividad vs. Villarica, 81 Phil., 172; Villados vs. Makaraig, 54 Phil., 901; Sancho vs. Lizarraga, 55 Phil., 601; Quimson vs. Alaminos Coop. Marketing Asso., Inc., 73 Phil., 342; Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil., 605; Sitchon, et al. vs. Sheriff of Occidental Negros and Luzon Surety Co., Inc., 80 Phil., 397; Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, G. R. No. 48102 [May 27, 1942]; and Lim vs.
Oreta, 94 Phil., 40.) The propriety or wisdom of said order or the
validity of the conclusion therein reached may not be reviewed until
after the court of first instance has passed judgment upon the merits,
of the cause of action set up in said complaint (Olsen vs. Olsen, 48 Phil., 238, 240).

“Judgment or orders subject to appeal.—No
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress
of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.” (Section 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court.)

Wherefore, the present appeal is hereby dismissed, with the costs of
this instance against defendant-appellant. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Endencia, J., reserves his vote.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.