LUCIANO DE LA ROSA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks a review of a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Petitioner and against Respondent. The Court hereby orders Respondent
Government Service Insurance System to immediately return and pay to
Petitioner Luciano de la Rosa, the amount of P3,045.00 which was
deducted from his retirement annuity granted him under Republic Act No.
660, as amended, with legal interests thereon from the filing of the
Petition (July 9, 1957), with costs against Respondent.”

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner Luciano de la Rosa was Chief of
Section in the Legal Aid Office of the Department of Justice. Owing to
the abolition of said office and of his aforementioned position
therein, petitioner was laid off on January 1, 1951, and given a
gratuity of P3,045, pursuant to Executive Order No. 392, and Republic
Act No. 422. On December 14, 1951, he applied for, and on June 20,
1952, he was granted, retirement under Republic Act No. 660. Pursuant
thereto, he was entitled, for the first five years, to a lump sum
payment of P6,787.80, from which the aforementioned gratuity of P3,045
was deducted by respondent herein, which paid him the balance only of
P2,864.40, upon the authority of section 26, paragraph 2, of said
Republic Act No. 660. Hence, this action for mandamus for the purpose
of compelling respondent to pay the aforementioned sum of P3,045 thus
withheld by it, with. interest and costs. In due course, the lower
court rendered the decision above referred to.

The issue in this case hinges on the interpretation of said section
26, paragraph 2, of Republic Act No. 660, which reads:

“Notwithstanding any provisions of this Act to the
contrary, any officer or employee whose position was abolished or who
was separated from the service as a consequence of the reorganization
provided for in “Republic Act Numbered Four hundred and twenty-two may
be retired under the provisions of this Act if qualified: Provided, That any gratuity or retirement benefit already received by him shall be refunded to the System: Provided, further,
That contributions corresponding to his last five years of service
shall be paid as provided in section twelve of this Act. This provision
shall also apply to any member of the judiciary who, prior to the
approval of this Act, was separated from the service after reaching
seventy years of ago and rendering at least thirty years of service and
who is not entitled to retirement benefit under any law.”

Petitioner maintains, and the lower court held, that Executive Order
No. 392—issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 422—under which he had been
laid off, and Republic Act No. 673, which appropriated the funds from
which petitioner’s gratuity of P3,045 was paid, provide that said
gratuity shall be refunded only if its recipient is reinstated in the
service, and that, not having been so reinstated, he is not bound to
refund said amount. The same issue was raised in Gabriel vs. GSIS, 103 Phil., 651; 55 Off. Gaz. (10) 1756, in which we said:

“Petitioner insists, however, that Executive Order
No. 392 and Republic Act No. 422 intended to give, to those separated
from the service under the provisions of both, a legal right to the
gratuity therein granted, ‘without any condition of refund requirement,
nor any string attached to it, in the words of petitioner; that there
is no incompatibility between the gratuity under Republic Act No. 422
and the retirement insurance benefit under Republic Act No. 660; and
that Congress intended to give both to those retired under Republic Act
No. 422.

“The question for us to determine is not whether
Republic Act No. 422 and Executive Order 392 impose any qualifications
upon the gratuity therein provided. We are here concerned with the
intent of the lawmaker in the enactment of Republic Act No. 660. The
second paragraph of section 26 thereof provides:

‘Notwithstanding
any provisions of this Act to the contrary, any officer or employee
whose position was abolished or who was separated from the service as a
consequence of the reorganization provided for in Republic Act Numbered
Four hundred and twenty-two may be retired under the provisions of this
Act if qualified: Provided, That any gratuity or retirement benefit. already received by him shall be refunded to the System. * * *.’

“It is clear from this paragraph, not only that Congress did, not
propose to give to those separated from the service under Executive
Order No. 392, in relation to Republic Act No. 422, the benefits of the
retirement insurance benefits under Republic Act No. 660, in addition,
to the gratuity received under said Executive Order No. 392 and
Republic Act No. 422, but, also, that our lawmakers intended this
gratuity to be excluded by the enjoyment of said retirement insurance benefits.

“Again,
said Republic Act No. 660 does not seek to deprive anybody of his
vested rights. However, one separated from the service under Republic
Act No. 422 is given in Republic Act No. 660 the option to
avail of the benefits of the retirement insurance provided in the
latter, subject to the condition that ‘any gratuity or retirement
benefits already received by him should be refunded to the System.’
Petitioner necessarily accepted this condition when he applied for the
benefits of Republic Act No. 660. In Mother words, it is he, by voluntarily choosing, to be under Republic Act No. 660, who divested himself of his right to said gratuity.”

This view was reiterated in Lacson vs. Auditor General, (supra, p. 921), and we find no cogent reason to depart therefrom.

Invoking the provisions of section 26, paragraph 2 of said Republic
Act No. 660, as amended by Republic Act No. 1123, petitioner-appellee
insists that the amount of his gratuity is not deductible from his
retirement benefits.

Said paragraph, as thus amended, provides:

“Notwithstanding any provisions of this Act to the
contrary, any member who was separated from the service as a
consequence of the reorganization provided for in Republic Act Numbered
Four hundred and twenty-two or as a consequence of the elimination of
his position and salary in Republic Act Numbered Five hundred
sixty-three, known as the General Appropriation Law for the fiscal year
nineteen hundred and fifty-one, or by operation of any future
Reorganization Act, may be retired under the provisions of this Act if
qualified: Provided, That the period during which such an
officer or employee had been out of the service as a result of said
reorganization, from the date of his separation to the date of his
reinstatement or re appointment on or before December thirty-one,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one, shall be considered as leave of
absence: Provided, further, That any gratuity or retirement benefit already received by him shall be refunded to the System: Provided, furthermore,
That contributions corresponding to his last five years of service
shall be paid as provided in section twelve of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred and eighty-six, as amended. This provision shall
also apply to any member of the judiciary who, prior to the approval of
this Act, was separated from the service after reaching seventy years
of age and rendering at least thirty years of service and who is not
entitled to retirement benefit under any law.”

Petitioner-appellee specifically relies upon the first proviso, to
the effect that the employee separated from the service, as a
consequence of a reorganization, shall be considered as being on leave
of absence from the date he has been out of the service, as a result of
said reorganization, to his reinstatement or reappointment on or before
December 31, 1951. This proviso has nothing to do, however, with the
matter of refund of gratuity to the System. Besides, petitioner applied
for the benefits of Republic Act No. 660 on December 14, 1951, and he
received his retirement benefits under the provisions thereof on June
20, 1952, or long before the approval of Republic Act No,
1123, on June 16, 1954, which took effect only “upon its approval
(Section 10), and, hence, had no retroactive effect. Assuming, for the
sake of argument only, that the effect of said proviso was to require a
refund only in case of reinstatement of the employee therein alluded
to—on which we do not express any opinion—the aforementioned amendment
by Republic Act No. 1128, would, at best, tend to show that, prior
thereto, the refund would be compulsory even without such
reinstatement. In short, the proviso tends to defeat petitioner’s
pretense.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the petition
in this case hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.