APOLONIO NICDAO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

The Government Service Insurance System has appealed the decision of
the Manila court of first instance requiring it to give Apolonio Nicdao
the retirement benefits of Republic Act 660 as amended.

He is not entitled to retirement, maintains the appellant, because
he was not in the Government service on June 16, 1951, when Act 660
took effect.

According to the Manila court, “Apolonio Nicdao worked as a
blacksmith in the Bureau of Public Works continuously from 1921 to
1941. From June 4, 1947 to September 30, 1949, he was again employed in
the Bureau of Public Works as a blacksmith with a salary of P5.50 a
day. On October 1, 1949, he was laid off due to lack of funds. On March
16, 1950, he worked again in the same bureau and as a blacksmith at the
same rate of P5.50 a day, until March 31, 1950 when he was again laid
off due to lack of funds.” Said court also found that he filed an
application for retirement under Act No. 2589, which application was
granted by the Office of the President on October 11, 1955.

There is no denying that Republic Act 660 applies only to those in
the Government service at the time of its enactment, with some
exceptions mentioned in the Act itself. But Nicdao contends (and the
court below maintains) that he was in the service on June 16, 1951,
and/or that he belongs to one class of exceptions.

Basis of his first contention is the approval of the retirement on
October 11, 1955. If I was retired on October 1955, argues Nicdao, that
means I was in the service up to that time. But the President’s approval said, “retired effective on the day
following his last day of service”— which was April 1, 1950. Obviously,
Nicdao could not be in the service in 1951, because he was retired in
1950. To uphold his contention, would entail payment of salary up to
October 1955. In administrative practice, there is nothing unusual in
the approval of a retirement or resignation effective months or years
before.

Even admitting for the sake of argument, says Nicdao, that I was
separated from the service in April 1950, my case falls under section
26 of Republic Act 660 that extends the position was benefits thereof
to “any officer or employee whose position was abolished” before June
16, 1951.

The contention is untenable. When he was “laid off” for lack of
funds, his position was not “abolished”. In fact in 1950, he was again
employed after he had been “laid off” a few months before (1949)—which
could not have been done if his position had been “abolished” when he
was laid off in 1949.

In this connection the official statement of the Bureau of Public Works on the matter (Exh. 3) reads:

“* * * He (Nicdao) was laid off not due to the
reorganization under Republic Act No. 422 nor due to the elimination of
his position and salary under Republic Act No. 563, because he was last
assigned to work on special project (project No. 1010-844, Marking and
Crating of 10 steel towers 110 ft.) with a limited appropriation of
only P2,800.00. Simultaneously, said project was finished and funds
exhausted on March 3I, 1950, hence his lay-off from the service on
April 1, 1960.”

But the strongest argument of appellant rests on Sec. 12 (a) of Republic Act 660 which requires as a condition sine qua non, three years continuous service immediately before retirement.
From the service records of Nicdao, as hereinbefore related he can not
be held to have rendered such three-years continuous service.

Before concluding, we may advert to appellee’s motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. We find that his
computation is based on the service of copy of the decision on the Government Corporate Counsel—not
on actual receipt thereof by Atty. Leovigildo Monasterial and/or Atty.
Panganiban, both of the Government Service Insurance System. The
records show that the Government Corporate Counsel never filed its
appearance for the respondent-appellant. All pleadings for respondent
had always been signed by said two attorneys. In fact as early as
October 18, 1957 (before the decision in November 9, 1957), the
Government Corporate Counsel had filed a “manifestation” that his
office was not appearing for the G. S. I. S. and that the latter’s
counsel of record were Attorneys Monasterial and Panganiban.

Wherefore, the judgment is revoked, and the Government Service Insurance System is absolved from Nicdao’s claims. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.