THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SEGUNDINO ABEJERO Y CID, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Segundino Abejero y Cid was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur with the crime of robbery committed as follows:

That on or about July 5, 1967, in the night thereof, in the
municipality of Libmanan, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused herein
with intent of gain and by means of force upon things, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the Bicol Central
Academy Building through the West window and then pried open one board
flooring in said building through which the said accused passed down to
the basement of said building where the accused, without the knowledge
and consent of the owner or person in-charge of the articles therein,
take, steal and carry away the following articles, to wit:

(Here follows a list of the articles consisting of typewriter, clock,
bottles of ink, pens, postage stamps, ruled tablet paper and bond paper
with a total value of P269.) which articles all valued to a total
amount of P269.00, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party
in the said sum of P269.00 but that all subject items have been
recovered from the possession of the said accused. (Crim. case No.
5306.)

Upon arraignment on 6 November 1957, the defendant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of guilty. On 20 November 1957 the Court rendered
judgment sentencing the defendant to “an indeterminate penalty which
shall not be less than one year nor more than two years, four months
and one day, both of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs.” All the goods or articles taken by the defendant were
recovered. In imposing the penalty, the Court took into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. On 26 November 1957 the
defendant, by counsel de parte, filed a verified “motion to set
aside the judgment and change the plea of guilty to not guilty,” with
an affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the defendant attached thereto,
on the around that at the. time he entered the plea of guilty, he was
not aware of the meaning and consequence of his act; that he entered
the plea of guilty without knowing the consequent penalty to be imposed
for the crime charged; that the defendant is a minor of good moral
character; and that he is suffering from a mental defect. On 3 December
1957 the Court denied the defendant’s motion. He has appealed.

The appellant assails the refusal of the trial court to set aside its
judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for the duration stated at the
beginning of this opinion and to allow him to withdraw his plea of
guilty and enter one of not guilty.

The record shows that at
the time of his arraignment before the Court of First Instance the
appellant was assisted by, a counsel de oficio; and that he
entered a plea of guilty after the information had been read to him and
translated into the local dialect and he had been asked whether he
understood its meaning (see certificate of arraignment, transcript of
stenographic notes and minutes of the proceedings). As the appellant
was assisted by counsel, the Court was no longer in duty bound to warn
him of the seriousness and consequence of his plea.^[1]
Moreover, in his statement sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, he recounted how he had committed the crime
with which he was charged, and at the second stage of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Justice of the Peace, the latter
apprised the appellant of his right to be assisted by counsel and that
if he could not afford to engage the service of one the Court would
appoint a counsel de oficio for him, and warned him that his
plea of guilty could be taken against him at the trial of the case, but
notwithstanding such warning he insisted on entering a plea of guilty.
His Honor, the trial judge, already had performed his duty,^[2]
and the appellant cannot claim now that he had been deprived of a
fundamental right. Neither can he profess ignorance of the import of
his act when he entered a plea of guilty upon arraignment before the
Court of First Instance for he was assisted by counsel. Being a third
year high school student, the appellant cannot pretend ignorance of the
consequence flowing from his plea of guilty. His pretense that he was
suffering from a mental defect at the time of the arraignment has not
been shown. All the circumstances point out that it is an afterthrough.

The crime committed by the appellant is robbery as provided in
paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act 18. The penalty is prision correccional in its maximum, period to prision mayor
in its medium period. Having entered a plea of guilty upon arraignment
before presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, the appellant
is entitled to a mitigating circumstance. There being no aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be
imposed upon the appellant is from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to four (4) years two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, and from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days, both of prision correccional, as maximum.

The sentence appealed from is modified as above stated, with costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ,. concur.

---

^[1] People vs. Dacio, 98 Phil., 863; 62 Off. Gaz. 2515.

^[2] People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil., 138; 52 Off. Gaz. 211-212.