AIR FRANCE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE EMILIO L. LEACHON (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 224) AND LUMEN POLICARPIO, RESPONDENTS.
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Air France Philippines versus Leachon
The Case
This is a petition for review brought by Air France Philippines against Judge Emilio L. Leachon of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, and against the private respondent Lumen Policarpio. The airline asks the Supreme Court to annul two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which dismissed its petition for certiorari as having been filed out of time. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the inviolability of the reglementary periods for filing a petition for certiorari, and on why the Court will not bend procedural rules to rescue a litigant whose own neglect produced the delay.
Procedural History
The story begins in the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, where Lumen Policarpio sued Air France Philippines for damages. That case was dismissed with prejudice after the parties entered into an amicable settlement. More than fourteen years later, Policarpio filed a new complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, alleging that the airline reneged on its obligation under the settlement. Air France moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and prescription. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated October 28, 1996, and denied reconsideration in a later order. Air France then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, which the appellate court dismissed for failure to attach an affidavit of service and a written explanation, and for failure to state the docket number of the case below in the caption. Instead of moving for reconsideration of that dismissal, Air France filed a second petition for certiorari assailing the very same trial court orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed this second petition as filed late, and denied reconsideration. Air France then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45.
Facts
Sometime in 1980, Lumen Policarpio filed a complaint for damages against Air France Philippines before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City. On December 2, 1980, the parties entered into an amicable settlement embodied in a document entitled Release and Quitclaim. On the strength of that document, they filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice.
On March 25, 1995, after a lapse of more than fourteen years, Policarpio filed another complaint for damages, this time before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, alleging that the airline had reneged on its obligation under the 1980 Release and Quitclaim. Air France moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and prescription. Policarpio opposed the motion, arguing that because the airline never submitted the notarized Release and Quitclaim as ordered by the Caloocan court, no compromise judgment was ever issued, so there was no final judgment on the merits and res judicata had not set in.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and denied reconsideration. Air France's first petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals was dismissed for procedural defects. Rather than seek reconsideration and cure those defects, the airline abandoned that petition and filed a second one assailing the same orders. By then, the period for filing had already lapsed, and the appellate court dismissed the second petition as late.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the second petition for certiorari as having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court should relax the procedural rules on the period for filing a petition for certiorari in the interest of substantial justice.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction in the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
This provision fixes the sixty-day period that the airline failed to observe, and its use of the words not later than sixty days from notice is the textual anchor of the Court's ruling that the period is inflexible.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the second petition was indeed filed out of time. The Court computed the periods both ways. Under the old rules, the airline had ninety days from notice, or until August 21, 1997, to file its petition. Under the 1997 Rules, even liberally pegging the sixty-day period from July 1, 1997, the date the new rules took effect, the airline had only until September 1, 1997. It filed only on September 12, 1997. The Court also stressed that by abandoning its first petition without seeking reconsideration, the airline allowed the very trial court orders it was assailing to become final and executory.
On the second issue, the Court refused to relax the rules. It declared that procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing an appellate petition are generally inviolable, and that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. The Court may veer away from the general rule only if the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious, and here the occasion did not warrant relaxation. The Court explained the textual basis of the period's rigidity:
The use of the words not later than sixty days from notice emphasizes the inflexibility of the period fixed for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Doctrine
A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the period for filing a petition for certiorari is fixed and inflexible, and the Supreme Court has not even been given authority to grant extensions of it. Second, appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege, so parties who seek to avail of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Third, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment appealed from final and executory. Fourth, the Court may relax procedural rules only if, in its assessment, the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious, and it will not do so where the delay springs from the litigant's own procedural lapses. These rules all hang on the words of Section 4, Rule 65, which fixes the period at not later than sixty days from notice.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against Air France Philippines, so the airline lost and the dismissal of its second petition for certiorari stood.
Remember This
Memorize the line that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well. Examiners use this case to test the inflexibility of the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, and the limits of the substantial justice exception.