ENGR. TEODOTO B. ABBOT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE HILARIO I. MAPAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-BR. 19, DIGOS, DAVAO DEL SUR AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Abbot versus Mapayo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Teodoto Abbot against Judge Hilario Mapayo, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, and the People of the Philippines. Abbot was charged with malversation through falsification of a public document, and when the trial court refused to dismiss the case against him, he went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with prohibition. The Court of Appeals dismissed that petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the proper forum was the Sandiganbayan. The case matters because it fixes the dividing line between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan over extraordinary writs, and because it shows how a later statute can supplant an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court.

Procedural History

Abbot was charged before the Sandiganbayan, but the case was eventually transferred to the Regional Trial Court by virtue of Republic Act Number 7975. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. During trial he filed an omnibus motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no malversation because the money had ceased to be public funds when the cashier indorsed the check to him. The trial court denied the motion, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.

Abbot then went to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari with prohibition, claiming grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Office of the Solicitor General commented that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction, since that jurisdiction was vested in the Sandiganbayan. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and it also denied reconsideration. Hence, Abbot elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, insisting that the Court of Appeals, and not the Sandiganbayan, had jurisdiction over his petition.

Facts

Teodoto Abbot was the Chief of the Irrigation System of the Mal River Project of the National Irrigation Administration in Manga, Matanao, Davao del Sur. An information was lodged against him for malversation through falsification of a public document. It was alleged that he falsified the Viability Incentive Grant payroll by making it appear that each of seven complaining witnesses received 4,500 pesos, when in truth four of them received only 1,500 pesos each and the other three received 2,000 pesos each.

Through this falsification, the prosecution said, Abbot was able to obtain 19,500 pesos, which he misappropriated to his personal use. The case was eventually transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the Regional Trial Court by virtue of Republic Act Number 7975.

At trial, Abbot sought dismissal on the ground that there was no malversation to speak of, because the money supposedly misappropriated had ceased to be part of the public fund when the cashier indorsed the check to him, and he thereafter encashed it and received the proceeds for payment to the intended beneficiaries. The trial court denied the motion and the reconsideration, prompting Abbot to seek relief in the Court of Appeals.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari with prohibition assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court.
• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over such a petition for certiorari with prohibition.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Presidential Decree Number 1606, as originally framed, delineates the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. (b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdictions; (2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdictions.

This original text, as construed in the earlier Garcia case, did not include the power to issue extraordinary writs, which is the very question at the heart of this case.

Section 4, paragraph (c) of Republic Act Number 7975, which amended Presidential Decree Number 1606 and took effect on 6 May 1995, expanded that jurisdiction:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - (c) The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibitions, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction: Provided: That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

This amendatory provision is decisive, because it was already the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense charged, and it expressly grants the Sandiganbayan the power to entertain petitions for certiorari and prohibition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly declined jurisdiction. The authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is an exercise of original jurisdiction, and it must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law; it is never derived by implication. Since the petition for certiorari with prohibition was in aid of the Sandiganbayan's appellate jurisdiction over a case that originated there, it fell within the Sandiganbayan's expanded jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. The Court recalled that in the earlier Garcia case it had ruled that the Sandiganbayan, as a court of special and limited jurisdiction, could not exercise jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto, because there was no specific statutory grant. But Congress then enacted Republic Act Number 7975, which took effect on 6 May 1995, and in Section 4, paragraph (c) thereof the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded to include petitions for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court declared that its ruling in the Garcia case was thereby supplanted, and that Republic Act Number 7975 was the law already in force at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

On the third issue, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of the petition, since both the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General were correct in concluding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the questioned petition.

Doctrine

First, the power to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is an exercise of original jurisdiction, and it must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law; it is never derived by implication. A court of special and limited jurisdiction, such as the Sandiganbayan, cannot exercise that power absent a specific statutory grant.

Second, under Section 4, paragraph (c) of Republic Act Number 7975, the Sandiganbayan now has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provided that this jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Supreme Court. This statutory grant supplanted the earlier Garcia ruling.

Third, the governing law is the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense charged. Because Republic Act Number 7975 was already in effect when the offense was committed, it controls the question of jurisdiction over the ancillary petition.

Disposition

The petition for review was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari with prohibition, as well as its resolution denying reconsideration, was affirmed, with no costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the power to issue extraordinary writs must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law, and Republic Act Number 7975 expressly conferred it on the Sandiganbayan in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Examiners like to use this case to test whether a candidate knows that the Sandiganbayan, once a court of special and limited jurisdiction without writ power, was given that power by amendment, and that the amendatory law in force at the time of the offense governs.