THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. LEOCADIA MAURERA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, AND VICENTE TIONGSON, OBJECTOR AND APPELLEE.

This is a motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions for the reason that it had
not been presented in time. The only question presented by said, motion is
whether or not the judge of the Court of First Instance, in a land registration
case, has authority to extend the period of 30 days, for the presentation of the
bill of exceptions, by an order before said period has expired, under the
provisions of section 26 of Act No. 2347.

The pertinent facts for a consideration of that question involved in the
present case are: (1) That the decision was rendered on the 28th day of
February, 1917; (2) that the appellant received a copy of said decision on the
2d day of July, 1917; (3) that on the gth day of July the appellant presented a
motion for a new trial; (4) that on the 7th day of August the motion for a new
trial was denied^ (5) that, while the record does not show on what day the
appellant received notice of the denial of his motion for a new trial, it does
show that he must have received notice on or before the 9th day of August, for
the reason that on said date he presented an exception to the order denying his
motion; (6.) that on the 9th day of August, 1917, and at the time of presenting
his exception to the order of the court denying his motion for a new trial, he
also presented a motion praying that he be given 30 days within which to present
his bill of exceptions; (7) that on the 15th day of August, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, granted to the appellant 30 days within which to
present his bill of exceptions; and (8) that the bill of exceptions was actually
presented and filed with the clerk on the 12th day of September, 1917.

It will be seen from these facts that the bill of exceptions was actually
presented within the 30 days mentioned in the order of the judge of the 15th day
of August. If, therefore, the judge has authority to extend the period for the
presentation of a bill of exceptions in a land registration case under the
provisions of section 26 of Act No. 2347, before said period has elapsed then it
is clear that the bill of exceptions in question was presented in time.

With reference to the time within which a bill of exceptions must be
presented in a land registration case, certain rules have heretofore been
established:

(1) That the bill of exceptions must be presented within a period of 30 days
from the day on which a copy of the decision is received. (Section 26 of Act No.
2347; Lavitoria vs. Judge of First Instance of Tayabas and Director of
Lands, 32 Phil. Rep., 204; Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Director of Lands, 34 Phil. Rep., 623; Estate of Cordoba, and Zarate
vs. Alabado, 34 Phil. Rep., 920; Bermudez vs. Director of
Lands, 36 Phil. Rep., 774.) (2) That the 30 days begin to run immediately upon
the receipt of the decision, but stop running upon the presentation of a motion
for a rehearing until said motion is decided and notice thereof is given to the
appellant. (Garcia vs. Ambler and Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 81; De la Cruz
vs. Garcia, 4 Phil. Rep., 680; Santos vs. Villafuerte, 5 Phil.
Rep., 739; Paez vs. Berenguer, 6 Phil. Rep., 521; Lavitoria
vs. Judge of First Instance of Tayabas and Director of Lands, 32 Phil.
Rep., 204; Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands,
34 Phil. Rep., 623; Estate of Cordoba, and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil.
Rep., 920; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. Rep., 774.) (3) The
time (30 days) again begins to run on the day on which notice of the order
denying the motion for a rehearing is received. (4) That the presentation of the
bill of exceptions after the expiration of the 30 days, computed in the manner
above indicated, is too late and the same will be dismissed upon motion. (Estate
of Cordoba, and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil. Rep., 920;. Bermudez
vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. Rep., 774.) (5) That the Court of Land
Registration is without authority, under section 26 of Act No. 2347, to grant a
motion for an extension of the said 30 days, which is presented after the
expiration of said period. (Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil.
Rep., 774.)

In the case of Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, supra, while
this court decided that the period of thirty days within which a bill of
exceptions must be presented in an appeal from a decision of the Court of Land
Registration could not be extended upon a motion presented after the expiration
of said period, we expressly left undecided the question whether or not the
court has authority to extend said period of thirty days upon a motion made for
that purpose within said period.

In the present case a copy of the decision was received by the appellant on
the 2d day of July. His motion for a new trial was presented upon the 6th day of
July; but four days, therefore, of the thirty days had expired. Said motion was
not passed upon by the court until the 7th day of August. The time between the
6th day of July and the 7th day of August could not be counted as a part of the
thirty days. Neither did the thirty .days begin to run after the decisions of
said motion (7th day of August) until the party had received notice of the
order. While the date upon which the notice of said decision was received does
not appear of record, the appellant must have had notice on or before the 9th
day of August, the day on which he presented his exception. The thirty days then
began to run, at least, on the 9th day of August. On the same day (9th day of
August) the appellant presented a motion praying that he be given thirty days
from that date within which to present his bill of exceptions. Said motion was
granted upon the 15th day of August. Assuming that the appellant received notice
of the order of the court denying his motion for a new trial on the 9th day of
August, the time for the presentation of the bill of exceptions again began to
run on that day. Said motion was granted on the 15th day of August. At the time
of the granting of the motion for an extension of the time but ten days of the
thirty had run— four days between the time of the receipt of the decision and
the presentation of the motion for a new trial, and six days between the time of
the receipt of the order of the court denying the motion for a new trial and the
order granting thirty days within which to present the bill of exceptions.

In the case of Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, supra, we held that
the thirty days for the presentation of a bill of exceptions mentioned in
section 26 of Act No. 2347 could not be extended after the expiration of said
time. That decision was based upon the provisions of Act No. 1484, as amended by
section 26 of Act No. 2347, and upon the theory that when the time for
perfecting a’ bill of exceptions has expired, it cannot be arrested or called
back by a simple order of the court. (Credit Co. vs. Arkansas Cent. R. Co., 128
U. S., 258.) That doctrine is not necessarily controlling when the motion for
the extension of the time for the presentation of the bill of exceptions is made
before the expiration of the time. In the first .case there is no time to be
extended—the time has already expired; in the second case the time is still
running—there is time which may be extended. In such a case, we are of the
opinion and so decide that it is within the sound discretion of the court to
extend the period of thirty days for the presentation of a bill of exceptions in
a land registration case. If said motion is presented before the expiration of
the time mentioned in section 26 of Act No. 2347, computed as above indicated,
the court may then extend the time for the presentation of the bill of
exceptions. In the present case the motion having been presented before the
expiration of the thirty days the court had authority, within a sound
discretion, to grant the same.

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions, for the reasons
above given, is hereby denied. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Street, and Avanceña,
JJ., concur.

Malcolm, J., with whom concurs Fisher, J., dissenting:

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DISSENTING OPINION

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

As stated in the majority decision, the only question presented by the motion
to dismiss the bill of exceptions is whether or not a judge of first instance in
a land registration case has authority to extend the peViod of thirty days for
the presentation of the bill of exceptions, by an order, before said period has
expired, under the provision of section 26 of Act No. 2347.

Act No. 2347 is a carefully prepared revision of Act No. 496, the Land
Registration Act. Section 26 of Act No. 2347 expressly amends section 14 of Act
No. 496 by adding the following proviso: “That the period within which the
litigating parties must file their appeals and bills of exceptions
against the final judgment in land registration cases shall be thirty
days, counting from the date on which the party received a copy of the
decision.” No words could be plainer. Application is wisdom, Interpretation is
dangerous. Judicial amendment is fatal. Only note that, to emphasize intention,
the Legislature uses such emphatic words as “must” and “shall.” Of course, the
law was drafted and passed for a purpose. The laudible intention of the
Legislature was to expedite the court proceedings. A court should not make this
law a dead letter. Our only duty is to give effect to legislative intention.

In other jurisdictions, particularly California, from which so much of the
legislation of the Philippines regarding pleading and practice has been taken,
the codes, after definitely fixing certain time limits, contain provisions
permitting a judge upon good cause shown to extend the time allowed by the code.
The Philippine law, on the contrary, grants no such authority. As an example,
the Code of Civil Procedure of California allows ten days for preparing a bill
of exceptions. Section 1054 of the Code then provides as follows:

“When an act to be done, as provided in this code, relates to * * * the
preparation of statements or of bills of exceptions, or of amendments thereto,
or to the service of notices other than of appeal, the time allowed by this code
may be extended, upon good cause shown by the judge of the superior court in and
for the county in which the action is pending, or by the judge who presided at
the trial of said action; but such extension shall not exceed thirty days
without the consent of the adverse party.”

The Supreme Court of California, in construing this section, has uniformly
held that an order granting thirty days in addition to the ten days allowed for
preparing the bill of exceptions to be used on appeal from the judgment,
exhausts the power of the court to extend the time for that purpose. (Bryan
vs. Maume [1865], 28 Cal., 238; Bunnel vs. Stockton [1890], 83
Cal., 319; Cameron vs. Arcata etc. R. R. Co. [1900], 129 Cal., 279.)
The same rule applies as to the time allowed for appeal. The California Code
provides for one year for this purpose. This period the Supreme Court of
California has held is an express and peremptory limitation of time within which
the appeal must be taken and is not a flexible rule to be varied by extrinsic
circumstances. A court has no power to extend this time. (Many decisions of the
Supreme Court of California.) Until the present decision, the Supreme Court of
these Islands had also uniformly held that the bill of exceptions in the land
registration cases must be presented within a period of thirty days from the day
on which a copy of the decision is received (Lavitoria vs. Judge of
First Instance of Tayabas and Director of Lands [1915], 32 Phil. Rep., 204;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands [1916], 34
Phil. Rep., 623; Estate of Cordoba, and Zarate vs. Alabado [1916], 34
Phil. Rep., 920; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands [1917], 36 Phil. Rep.,
774.)

In view, therefore, of the easily understandable provisions of the law which
give no discretion to the courts, I must by this dissent protest against our
usurpation of legislative power tending to thei prolongation of judicial
proceedings.