THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NECESARIO HIJAPON @ “TETENG” AND JOSE MACALLA, JR., ACCUSED,

People versus Hijapon

The Case

This is People versus Hijapon, a criminal case on automatic review of a conviction for murder. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Necesario Hijapon, known as Teteng, and Jose Macalla, Junior, for the shooting death of Dionisio Ilustrisimo in Kalookan City. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold onto: it shows how the Supreme Court treats the testimony of a child eyewitness, and it shows how treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, so that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.

Procedural History

Both accused were charged with murder in an Information filed in February 1995 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126. Both pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial, the trial court, in a decision dated April 6, 1998, found Necesario Hijapon guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to death, ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos plus 20,000 pesos as actual expenses. The trial court acquitted Jose Macalla, Junior, for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Facts

On the evening of July 25, 1994, at about 7:30, Sharon Ilustrisimo, then eleven years old, was tending her family's store in front of their house on Julian Felipe Street, Topda Village, Kalookan City. Her father, Dionisio, was inside fixing the electric light. Three men came to the store. Sharon recognized one of them as Necesario Hijapon, whom she called Teteng. As his two companions went up the house, Teteng poked a gun at Sharon and ordered her to leave. Sensing the men were after her father, Sharon shouted a warning. Dionisio asked, "Nasaan?" and went to the door. Teteng shot him, hitting his leg. Sharon ran to the back of the store and heard several gunshots. Her brother Jomer, who was outside, ran toward the store but was blocked by a man who poked a gun at him. Dionisio was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. The postmortem findings showed four gunshot wounds on the chest and abdomen, three of them fatal.

Earlier that same morning, Fernando Marinas, a friend of the appellant and a former gangmate, was resting in a safehouse in Marikina where the group had gathered after a hold-up. He heard the appellant ask Macalla to accompany him to the house of Dionisio Ilustrisimo to kill him. The following morning, Marinas read in the papers that the man they planned to kill was indeed murdered. When he asked the appellant if Dionisio died, the appellant said yes and that he shot Dionisio because he was very talkative.

On July 29, 1994, the appellant and his gangmates were arrested by agents of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. Mercedes Ilustrisimo, the victim's wife, and her children went to Camp Crame after reading of the arrests. In a police line-up, Sharon recognized and pointed out the appellant as the one who shot her father, and Jomer identified Macalla as the man who blocked his path. Sharon and Mercedes were familiar with the appellant because he used to visit their place and drink with Dionisio and their neighbors. A week before he died, Dionisio told Mercedes that the appellant and his companions had a grudge against him, fearing he would report to the police what he knew about their participation in the death of a Caloocan City policeman. The appellant denied the charge and set up alibi, claiming he was at his house in Marikina at the time. Macalla likewise denied the charge and claimed he was in Pasig.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Sharon Ilustrisimo and Fernando Marinas.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and whether or not the penalty of death was correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7649, defines and penalizes murder. The Court quotes its penalty:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

This provision fixes the range of the penalty, which the Court uses to correct the trial court's imposition of death.

Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as an aggravating circumstance. The Court quotes it:

Article 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

This provision supplies the definition the Court applies in qualifying the killing as murder.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to Sharon's testimony. Sharon personally witnessed the killing. She positively identified the appellant as one of the three men who came to the store, saw him poke a gun at her, and saw him shoot her father at the leg from about one meter away. As she fled, she heard successive gunshots. The Court held that the absence of a gunshot wound on the victim's leg did not make her testimony unreliable, because minor inconsistencies even enhance the veracity of a witness and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed declaration. What mattered was that Sharon actually and directly saw the appellant shoot her father. The Court also noted that no ill motive could be ascribed to a twelve-year-old girl to falsely accuse her father's friend, and that Sharon's testimony alone was sufficient to convict the appellant. As for Fernando Marinas, his testimony merely divulged the appellant's motive and his invitation to Macalla, and was not indispensable to the conviction.

On the second issue, the Court agreed that the killing was murder qualified by treachery. It defined treachery as follows:

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

The Court found that the appellant and two other men purposely came to the victim's house, and that the appellant, armed with a gun, suddenly shot the defenseless victim. While Sharon may have warned her father of danger, the attack was executed in such a manner that it was impossible for Dionisio to retaliate. The number of people employed, the use of a gun, the suddenness of the attack, the number of shots fired, and the fact that the victim was unarmed all insured his instantaneous death.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in imposing death. Where the appellant and his companions were armed and far outnumbered the victim, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men were absorbed in treachery. There being no other aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and especially to insure the killing without risk to himself from any defense the victim might make. Second, when treachery is present, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men are absorbed in treachery and cannot be separately appreciated to raise the penalty. Third, the testimony of a child witness, when straightforward, categorical, and free of ill motive, is entitled to full faith and credence, and minor inconsistencies do not destroy its reliability. Fourth, the penalty for murder under Article 248, as amended by Republic Act 7649, is reclusion perpetua to death, and in the absence of any other aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Necesario Hijapon for murder but modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, so the penalty for murder drops to reclusion perpetua. Examiners like to use this case to test the absorption of aggravating circumstances in treachery and the credence given to a child eyewitness.