PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCELINO MARIO, ALIAS “CELINO” AND DOROTEO DULAY, ALIAS “DOROT”, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

People versus Mario

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in a murder case. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Marcelino Mario, also known as Celino, and Doroteo Dulay, also known as Dorot, for the killing of Pablo Sagaoinit in the barrio of Tebuel, in Manaoag, Pangasinan. The trial court convicted both of murder and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, and ordered them to pay indemnity jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a clean illustration of the modes of participation in a crime — principal by cooperation and principal by induction — and of how treachery is appreciated when the victim is rendered defenseless at the moment of the fatal blow.

Procedural History

The two accused were tried in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which found them guilty of murder, sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, and ordered them to pay indemnity in the sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of Pablo Sagaoinit. Both accused appealed. Marcelino Mario later withdrew his appeal, and this withdrawal was approved by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated the first of September, 1958. Doroteo Dulay remained as the sole appellant. The appeal was elevated to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the findings and the law and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Facts

On the sixth of January, 1955, in barrio Tebuel, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Consuelo Mendoza was tending her family's store and was in a lively conversation with Faustina Riola, the wife of Pablo Sagaoinit. Their talk turned to an incident at a dance in the adjoining barrio of Sapang, where one Rose had disappointed the appellant Doroteo Dulay. Pablo Sagaoinit, who was also in the store, joined the conversation and remarked that Pilo, referring to Dulay, was a little bit crazy. Marcelino Mario, Dulay's brother-in-law, overheard the remark as he entered the store, confronted Pablo, pointed his hand at Pablo's face, and warned him to remember what he had said. Mario then ran home, told Dulay what Pablo had said, and shortly thereafter Dulay returned to the store with his wife and with Mario.

On arriving, Dulay rushed at Pablo and demanded to know why Pablo had called him a little bit crazy. Pablo denied that the remark was meant for him. Unsatisfied, Dulay challenged Pablo to a sports fight and declared that it would be a fight up to death. Eligio Mendoza, the barrio lieutenant, tried to pacify him, but Dulay pushed him aside and he fell. Ildefonso Sagaoinit, the uncle of Pablo, arrived and tapped Dulay on the shoulder, admonishing him to stop, but Dulay pushed him too, and he fell.

As Ildefonso was about to get up, Dulay shouted at Mario to come and hit. Mario immediately stabbed Ildefonso in the back with his dagger. Dulay, who was behind Pablo, then grabbed Pablo's waist and placed his hands around it, pinning Pablo's arms. Mario then stabbed Pablo at the left breast above the nipple with the same dagger, inflicting a deep mortal wound three inches deep, entering between the second and third ribs very close to the edge of the sternum. Both appellants fled. Pablo Sagaoinit died as a result of the wound, while Ildefonso Sagaoinit was brought to town for medical treatment.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in holding Doroteo Dulay a principal in the commission of the crime of murder.
• Whether or not treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength may be appreciated in addition to treachery.

Applicable Provisions

Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, on the principals of a crime, provides:

Article 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been committed.

The Court uses paragraph three, cooperation by another act without which the crime would not have been committed, to hold Dulay a principal, and paragraph two, direct inducement, as an alternative ground.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, on murder, provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

Treachery is the qualifying circumstance the Court finds present, which raises the killing from homicide to murder.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Dulay is a principal in the murder. The trial court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that Dulay grabbed the waist of the deceased and placed his hands around it, thereby pinning the deceased's arms, and it was at that juncture that Mario stabbed the deceased at the left breast. Under the circumstances, Dulay cooperated in the execution of the crime by another act, without which it would not have been committed, making him a principal under paragraph three of Article 17. The Court added that, even granting for the sake of argument that he is not a principal by cooperation, he may be considered a principal by induction under paragraph two of Article 17, because he induced his co-accused Mario to stab the deceased.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was treachery. By holding the deceased's waist, placing his hands around it, and pinning his arms, Dulay employed means to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the deceased might make. The Court quoted the trial court's observation that when the deceased was killed he was in a defenseless position because his two hands were being held by Doroteo Dulay when he was stabbed at the breast by his co-accused, Marcelino Mario. The Court also quoted the rule that even though at the inception of the aggression treachery is not present, if at the time the fatal wound is inflicted the deceased is defenseless, the circumstance of treachery must be taken into account.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength may not be considered, because it is absorbed by the circumstance of treachery.

Doctrine

First, a person who cooperates in the commission of a crime by another act, without which the crime would not have been committed, is a principal under paragraph three of Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code. Holding and pinning the victim's arms so that a companion may stab him is such an act of cooperation.

Second, in the alternative, one who directly induces another to commit the crime is a principal by induction under paragraph two of Article 17. The shout of Dulay ordering Mario to hit was an inducement.

Third, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Even if treachery is absent at the inception of the aggression, it is appreciated if the victim is defenseless at the time the fatal wound is inflicted.

Fourth, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery and cannot be appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance when treachery is present.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Doroteo Dulay of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with costs against him.

Remember This

Memorize the line that one who holds the victim's arms so that another may stab him cooperates by an act without which the crime would not have been committed, making him a principal under Article 17. Examiners use this case to test the modes of participation of principals and the rule that treachery may be appreciated when the victim is defenseless at the moment of the fatal blow, while abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.