CONRADO MAGBANUA AND ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA, THE LATTER ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND ARTEMIO TABORADA, PETITIONERS,VS.PILAR S. JUNSAY, ASSSISTED BY HER HUSBAND VICENTE JUNSAY, I…

Magbanua versus Junsay

The Case

This is an action for damages for malicious prosecution. Rosemarie Magbanua, a housemaid, and her father Conrado Magbanua sued Rosemarie's former employer, Pilar Junsay, together with police officers Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela, after Rosemarie was charged with robbery and later acquitted. The case matters because it fixes the elements of malicious prosecution and the point from which the prescriptive period for such an action begins to run.

Procedural History

The Magbanuas filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51. Pilar Junsay moved to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, but the trial court denied the motion, holding that the cause of action was malicious prosecution and that the period ran from Rosemarie's acquittal. After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint, finding neither malice nor absence of probable cause. The Magbanuas appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in full. The Magbanuas then came to the Supreme Court by appeal by certiorari.

Facts

Rosemarie Magbanua worked as a housemaid in the residence of Pilar Junsay. On or about the eighteenth of July, 1982, a robbery took place in Junsay's house at Bata Subdivision, Bacolod City. Jewelry and cash valued at twenty-nine thousand six hundred twenty-four pesos were taken. Junsay reported the robbery to the Bacolod police, and investigators Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela conducted the investigation.

Rosemarie was charged with robbery as a co-accused, together with Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo, who remained at large. The prosecution relied on an alleged confession by Rosemarie, which the defense contested as made under duress. The trial court found that Rosemarie had been physically maltreated by the investigating officers, and that her alleged admission was inadmissible against her. On the twentieth of December, 1985, the trial court acquitted Rosemarie, finding the evidence not only insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie case against her.

On the ninth of March, 1987, Rosemarie, assisted by Artemio Taborada, and her father Conrado Magbanua filed a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution against Junsay and the two police officers. They claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both held that the prosecution was not prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate Rosemarie.

Issues

• Whether or not the filing of the criminal case for robbery against Rosemarie Magbanua constituted malicious prosecution.
• Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1146 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1146. Actions to enforce a right arising from a contract or quasi-contract, or to enforce a right arising from the commission of a crime or quasi-delict, shall be brought within four years.

This provision was invoked by the respondent to argue that the action had prescribed, and its application turns on when the cause of action for malicious prosecution accrued.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no malicious prosecution. The term malicious prosecution is defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution in favor of the defendant. The Court ruled that two indispensable elements must be shown: malice and absence of probable cause. Neither was established. Junsay, as the victim of a robbery, merely reported the incident to the police, and there was no showing that she named Rosemarie as the robber. The police officers were performing their duties, and the finding of probable cause was confirmed by the City Fiscal's filing of the Information after preliminary investigation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners are not entitled to damages. Since the prosecution was not malicious and there was probable cause, the action for malicious prosecution cannot prosper. The Court also clarified that the prescriptive period for malicious prosecution is counted from the date of the acquittal, not from the date of the injury, because the cause of action does not accrue until the prosecution terminates in favor of the defendant.

Doctrine

For a malicious prosecution suit to succeed, two indispensable elements must be shown: malice and absence of probable cause. The mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. The prescriptive period for an action for damages for malicious prosecution is counted from the date of the termination of the criminal case in favor of the defendant, not from the date of the act complained of.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the complaint for damages for malicious prosecution.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that malicious prosecution requires both malice and absence of probable cause, and the prescriptive period runs from the acquittal. Examiners like to use this case to test the elements of malicious prosecution and the accrual of the cause of action under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.