G.R. No. 13246. March 30, 1960
FEDERICO CALERO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EMILIA CARRION Y SANTA MARINA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
BARRERA, J.:
Case No. 31409) dismissing his complaint, on the ground of
prescription, plaintiff Federico Calero interposed this appeal directly
to this Court on questions purely of law.
On December 20, 1956, plaintiff filed with the above-mentioned court a complaint which, in part, reads:
* * * * * * *
“3. Que a principios del año de 1937, el demandante
propuso a don Enrique Carrion, padre de las demandadas, el siguiente
negocio: adquirir entre los dos una finca en la Plaza Santa Cruz, por
al precio de P250,000.00, de los cuales se pagarian P25,000.00 al
contado y el resto a plazos, en diez años; en el bien entendido de que
para pagar la suma de P25,000.00, don Enrique Carrion aportaria
P15,000.00 y el demandante aportaria los P10,000.00 restantes.“4.
Que despues de examinar la finca, don Enrique Carrion acepto la
proposicion del demandante, y le autoriza cerrar la transaccion, a
nombre de sus hijas, es decir, de las dos (2) demandadas principales en
este asunto.“5. Que en el entretanto, don Enrique Carrion se
ausento de Filipinas, continuando las negociaciones su apoderado y
administrador, don Santiago Carrion quien tambien era el apoderado y
administrador de las demandadas.“6. Que cuando se fue a
preparar la escritura de compra, don Santiago Carrion, como apoderado
de las demandadas, explico al demandante que era muy complicado
constituir una communidad de bienes en esa finca, pues habria necesidad
de rendir cuentas mensuales, y consultarse en caso de reparaciones,
mejoras, etc.“7. Que para evitar estas dificultades, don
Santiago Carrion propuso comprar la finca a nombre exclusivo de las
demandadas, con la obligacion de pagar al demandante el veinte por
ciento (20%) de los beneficios, cuando so vendiera la finca.“8.
Que el demandante acepto esa proposicion, en el bien entendido de que
la finca seria vendida tan pronto como se encontrara un comprador por
una cantidad no menor de P300,000.00.“9. Que debido a la
confianza que existia entre las partes, el demandante acepto esa
proposlcion, como ya se ha dicho, y las partes otorgaron el dia 28 de
mayo de 1937, un contrato formal, en el cual se hizo constar el ultimo
convenio celebrado por las partes, es decir, quea a la venta de la
finca situada en la Plaza Santa Cruz, las demandadas pagarian al
demandante,‘una cantidad equivalente un
veinte por ciento (20%) de cualquier cantidad que se obtenga de la
venta de los mencionados edificios y terrenos, despues de descontar el
importe total pagado por dichas demandadas.’“12.
Que la verdadera intencion de las partes al otorgar el contrato
exhibito ‘A’ era dar al demandante una participacion del veinte por
ciento (20%), en todos los beneficios, rentas y utilidades de la finca
descrita en ese contrato.“13. Que desde el año 1937 el
demandante ha hecho varias ofertas a las demandadas CARRION, para
vender esa finca al precio ofrecido por los compradores.“14.
Que ahora el demandante tiene un comprador de dicha finca por la suma
de P1,455,900.00, pero las demandadas, CARRION continuan negandose a
vender dicha finca por ese precio, a pesar de la enorme ganancia que
representa esa transaccion.“15. Que durante todo el tiempo
transcurrido desde el año 1937 hasta la fecha, las demandadas CARRION
se han lucrado con las rentas de esa finca, sin dar ninguna
participacion al demandante, quien hasta la fecha no ha recibido un
centimo de dicha finca por ningun concepto.“16. Que debido a
los actos de las demandadas CARRION, el demandante ha sufrido y sigue
sufriendo daños y perjuicios en una cantidad inestimable con certeza,
pero que por lo menos, debe ser el veinte por ciento (20%) de los
beneficios liquidos obtenidos de es finca por las demandadas CARRION.“17.
Que el demandante ha requerido a las demandadas CARRION a rendir
cuentas de la Administracion de esa finca, a lo cual tambien se han
negado.“18. Que si vende esa finca ahora en la cantidad de
P1,455,900.00, las demandadas CARRION tendrian un beneficio liquido de
P1,205,900.00, o sea, la diferencia entre el precio de venta antes
mencionado y los P250,000.00 pagados por dicha finca; y por
consiguiente, el demandante tendria derecho a percibir la suma de
P241,180.00, o sea, el veinte por ciento (20%) de los benneficios
obtenidos, de conformalidad con el contrato exhibito ‘A’ de esta
demanda.“19. Que las demandadas CARRION se han negado a
rendir cuentas de los beneficios obtenidos de dicha finca y a pagar la
participacion del demandante, a pesar de los repetidos requerimientos
de dicho demandante.
* * * * * * *
“POR TANTO, el demandante ruega al Hon. Juzgado se sirva dictar sentencia:
“(A)
Ordenando a las demandadas CARRION que rindan cuenta completa y
detallada de los ingresos y gastos de la finca mencionada en el exhibit
‘A’ desde el dia 28 de mayo de 1937 hasta fecha de la venta, entregando
al demandante un veinte por ciento (20%) del producto liquido de dichas
cuentas, en pago de los daños y perjuicios ya sufridos hasta la fecha;“(B)
Ordenando a las demandadas que vendan esa fincai descrita en el
exhibito ‘A’, por un precio no menor de P1,455,900.00 en el plazo de
tres (3) meses, o de lo contrario paguen al demandante la cantidad de
P241,180.00, que representa el veinte por ciento (20%) de los
beneficios obtenidos, con sus intereses legales desde esta fecha hasta
su complete pago.”
On February 2, 1957, defendants Emilia Carrion, Maria Carrion, Jose
Falco, and Manuel Perez Guzman (the last two as husbands, respectively,
of the first two), filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that (1)
the complaint states no cause of action, and (2) the plaintiff’s cause
of action, if any, is barred by the Statute of Limitations (Sec. 1[e],
Rule 8, Rules of Court). To this motion, plaintiff filed an opposition
on March 16, 1957. On June 1, 1957, the court required plaintiff to
amend his complaint, in an order which, in part, reads:
“* * * inasmuch as plaintiff concedes in his answer
(opposition) to the motion to dismiss that ‘* * * por tratarse de una
obligacion sin plazo fijo, este debe ser determinado por el Hon.
Juzgado’, it is plaintiff’s duty to amend his complaint to this effect,
because there is nothing either in its allegations or in its prayer
asking that this Court fix a reasonable period for the sale of the said
property with a view to having defendants comply with their obligations
under the parties’ aforesaid agreement.“* * * defendants’
obligation has not even become demandable in view of the suspensive
condition found in the parties’ agreement.“WHEREFORE, it is
ordered that plaintiff amend his complaint within twenty (20) days from
notice hereof, failing which the same will be dismissed.”
Complying with the above order of the court, plaintiff, on June 15,
1957, filed an amended complaint which is identical to the original
complaint, except that it contained the following new Paragraph 15 and
a new prayer, to wit:
“15. Que el contrato exhibito ‘A’ no establece un
plazo determinado para la venta de la finca descrita en el mismo
contrato, aunque la intencion de que hubiera un plazo es evidente de la
naturaleza, circunstancias y condiciones del mismo contrato; y el Hon.
Juzgado debe señalar dicho plazo, de acuerdo con el articulo 1197 del
nuevo Codigo Civil.”“POR tanto, el demandante ruega al Hon. Juzado se sirva dictar sentencia:
“(A)
Señalando un plazo do tres (3) meses para que las demandadas CARRION
vendan la finca descrita en el exhibito ‘A’ al precio mas alto en el
mercado, pero no menos de la oferta actual de P1,456,900.00;“(B)
Ordenando a las demandadas CARRION que paguen al demandante el veinto
por ciento (20%) de los beneficios obtenidos en la venta de dicha
finca; * * *.”
On July 18, 1957, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, on the
grounds that (1) the amended complaint states no cause of action, (2)
the plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, is barred by the Statute of
Limitations (Sec. 1[e], Rule 8, Rules of Court), and (3) the
plaintiff’s original complaint being without cause of action, it cannot
be amended and/or cured by said amended complaint which changes
plaintiff’s theory of the case. In connection with the second ground
mentioned, defendants stated:
“Plaintiffs right of action accrued in the year 1937
when the first of plaintiffs alleged various offers to defendants to
sell the property at the price offered by buyers was refused by
defendants (Pars. 13 and 14 of Complaint). It is patent, therefore,
that plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, prescribed in the year 1947,
that is, ten (10) years from the year 1937. Considering that
plaintiff’s complaint was filed on December 21, 1956, plaintiff’s cause
of action if any, is obviously unenforceable and barred by the Statute
of Limitations.”
To this motion, plaintiff filed his opposition on August 2, 1957, to
which defendants filed a rejoinder on August 8, 1957. To this
rejoinder, plaintiff filed a counter-reply on August 12, 1957.
On August 21, 1957, the court issued an order denying defendants’
motion to dismiss. From this order, defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 27, 1957, which was duly opposed by plaintiff
on September 7, 1957. On September 16, 1957, defendants filed a,
rejoinder to said opposition.
On October 1, 1957, the court issued an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on the ground of prescription, as follows:
“ORDER
“This Court has before it (1) defendants’ motion for
RECONSIDERATION of the order of this Court dated August 21, 1957, (2)
CONTESTACION DEL DEMANDANTE A LA MOCION DE RECONSIDERACION, and (3)
defendants’ rejoinder to CONSTESTACION DEL DEMANDANTE A LA MOCION DE
RECONSIDERACION.’“It is true that heretofore this Court did
not entertain ‘defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s original
complaint; that on June 1, 1957, plaintiff was given twenty (20) days
to amend his complaint; that on June 15, 1957, the amended complaint
was filed; that on July 22, 1957, defendants again put in a motion to
dismiss the said amended complaint, and that on August 21, 1957, this
Court also denied this latter motion to dismiss. Defendants, however,
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order just mentioned on
the ground that plaintiff’s action under his amended complaint has
already prescribed, and this Court has to pass upon the said motion for
reconsideration.“Concretely, defendants now contend that,
plaintiff’s action asking this Court to fix the period for the
fulfillment of defendants obligation, which is the subject matter of
his amended complaint, has already prescribed under the law and the
applicable authorities. While this Court in conscience believes that
defendants have search obligation to plaintiff under the express terms
and conditions of the parties’ agreement Exhibit A, nevertheless it
cannot ignore defendants’ aforesaid contention that plaintiff’s action
asking this Court to fix a period for the fulfillment of the said
obligation has in fact already prescribed. For one thing, this action
which may be brought under Article 1197 of the New Civil Code cannot by
said to be imprescriptible. For another, as pointed out by defendants,
in the case of Gonzales vs. Jose, 66 Phil., 369, among
others, it was pertinently held that ‘The action to ask the court to
fix the period has already prescribed in accordance with section 43 (1)
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This period of prescription is ten
years, which has already elapsed from the execution of the promissory
notes until the filing of the action on June 1, 1934.’ Inasmuch as in
the instant case, the parties’ agreement Exhibit A was executed on May
28, 1937, plaintiff’s action to fix the period for the fulfillment of
defendants’ obligation thereunder should have been filed within ten
(10) years from the date just mentioned, following the said decision
based on Section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, its relation to
Article 1116 of the New Civil Code. It is plain to see therefore that
plaintiff’s present action commenced only on December 21, 1956, is
already long barred by prescription.“At page 2 of
plaintiff’s CONTESTACION DEL DEMANDANTE A LA MOCION DE RECONSIDERACION,
the position is taken that ‘En este asunto el plazo de prescripcion
comienza cuando nace el derecho de accion. Plaintiff’s cause of action
in the present case is to have this Court fix the period which the
parties had left to conjecture in their agreement Exhibit A, and the
said cause Of action arose right after the execution of said agreement
on May 28, 1937, and lapsed ten (10) years after said date. Plaintiff
further state that ‘ademas, en nuestro asunto actual este Hon. Juzgado
ya ha resuelto que el derecho de accion ni siquiera habia comenzado”.
What this Court really said on this point in its order of June 1, 1957
is the following: ‘As just intimated, defendants obligation has not
even become demandable in view of the suspensive condition found in the
parties’ agreement’. Reference therefore is clearly made to defendants’
obligation to plaintiff under Exhibit A, and not to plaintiff’s right
to ask for the fixing of the period contemplated by the parties in the
said agreement. Plaintiff finally submits that ‘para que se acepte una
mocion de sobreseimiento, el fundamento debe ser indubitable, (Seccion
3, Regla 8 del Reglamento de los Tribunales.)’ and that ‘El hecho de
que este Hon. Juzgado haya denegado ya dos mociones de sobreseimientos,
es la mejor prueba de que su fundamento es—por lo menos muy dudoso’. It
may be gathered from the record of this case that this Court has all
along been inclined to try it on the merits with a view to getting at
the truth and rendering judgment accordingly. However, it now finds
itself, faced with a defense, namely, prescription, so clear and
unanswerable that, to overlook the same, would be to disregard legal as
well as judicial precepts.“Finding defendants’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of the order of this Court dated August 21, 1957 to be
meritorious, the said reconsideration is hereby granted, and plantiff’s
amended complaint is hereby dismissed, with costs against him.“SO ORDERED.”
From the above-quoted order, plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration on October 3, 1957, which was duly opposed by
defendants on October 18, 1957. On October 23, 1957, the court denied
said motion. Hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff claims that the lower court erred in dismissing his
complaint, contending: that (a) the agreement Exhibit A. attached to
the amended complaint and made an integral part thereof, created “un
fideicomiso implicito” or an implied trust, which is not subject to
prescription, and (b) that even admitting the obligation is subject to
a suspensive undetermined period (not condition), the action to have
such period fixed by the court has not yet prescribed.’ In support of
his submission that the agreement created an implied trust,
plaintiff-appellant cites the provisions of Articles 1452 and 1453 of
the new Civil Code which read as follows:
“ART. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase
property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of
one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law
in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each,”“ART.
1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the
grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit
is contemplated.”
The contention is without merit, Article 1452 above-quoted is
inapplicable to this case for the reason that there is absolutely no
stipulation in the contract, Exhibit A, that there would be a joint
purchase of the property and that the legal title thereto was to be
placed in the name of the defendants for the benefit of themselves and
herein plaintiff. The recitals in the contracts preceding the paragraph
containing the obligation assumed by the defendants, merely refer to
the services rendered by the plaintiff as broker who negotiated the
sale of the property to the defendants and which the defendants agreed
to compensate. Nothing contained therein would indicate that the
property was being purchased for the benefit of the plaintiff and the
defendants. The obligation assumed by the defendants is clear and
unequivocal in that:
“por y en consideracion, a los trabajos,
sugestiones, concejos y ayuda hasta ahora prestados por Don Federico
Calero en relacion con la compra de los bienes vendidos a las Sras.
EMILIA CARRION Y STA. MARINA Y MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION Y SANTA
MARINA y a los trabajos y concejos que dicho señor promete seguir dando
a los apoderados de las mismas en relacion con la venta, arriendo,
administracion y mejoramiente de los mencionados bienes, por la
presente, libre y voluntariamente, Don Santiago Carrion, en su
capacidad de apoderado de las mencionadas Da. EMILIA CARRION Y STA.
MARINA y Da. MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION Y SANTA MARINA y de la
manera mas solemne como sea necessario y eficaz en derecho, promete
pagar a don Federico Calero sus sucesores y cesionarios, una cantidad
equivalente a UN VEINTE POR CIENTO (20%) de cualquier contidad que
se obtenga de la venta de los mencionadas edificios y terrenos, despues
de descontar el importe total pagado por las Sras. EMILIA CARRION
Y STA. MARINA Y MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION Y SANTA MARINA a la dueña
de los mismos El Hogar Filipino, entendiendose ademas que este veinte
por ciento sera tomado de la ganancia liquida que les represente a las nuevas dueñas la venta de los bienes mencionados ya sea por mediacion del Sr. Calero o sin ella.” (par. 5 of Exh. A). (Italics supplied.)
The terms of the contract admit no doubt that the 20% to be paid the
plaintiff is of any amount which may be obtained by the sale of the
property after deducting the purchase price thereof, which shall be
taken from the liquidated benefit obtained by the owners out of the
sale of the said property.
Neither is Article 1453 applicable, because there is absolutely
nothing in the agreement which even remotely indicates that the
property was conveyed to the defendants in reliance upon their declared
intention to hold it for, or transfer it to, another or the grantor.
Even the very allegations of plaintiff’s complaint clearly reflect
the true nature of the agreement. It appears therefrom that although
the original proposal was for the parties to purchase the property
jointly (plaintiff to contribute P10,000.00 and the defendants to put
up P15,000.00 on account of the down payment of P25,000.00), the same
was abandoned and the parties subsequently agreed that the defendants
would buy the property exclusively in their name and for their own
account because “era muy complicado constituir una comunidad de bienes
en esa finca, pues habria necesidad de rendir cuentas mensuales, y
consultares en caso de reparaciones, mejoras, etc.” and that the
plaintiff “acepto esa proposicion, en el bien entendido de que la finca
seria vendida tan pronto como se encontrara un comprador por una
cantidad no menor de P300,000.00” “con la obligacion (on the part of
the defendants) de pagar al demandante el veinte por ciento (20%) de
los beneficios, cuando se vendiera la finca”, and that, lastly, “el
demandado acepto esa proposicion, como ya se ha dicho, y las partes
otorgaron el dia 28 de marzo de 1937, un contrato formal en el cual se
hizo constar el ultimo convenio celebrado por las partes, es
decir, que a la venta de la finca situada en la Plaza Santa Cruz, las
demandadas pagarian al demandante,
‘una cantidad equivalente a un Veinte Por Ciento (20%) de cualqier cantidad que se obtenga de la venta
de los mencionados edificios y terrenos, despufts de descontar el
importe total pagado por dichas demandadas.'” (See paragraphs 3, 6, 7,
8 and 9) of the amended complaint.)
Plaintiff-appellant next contends that the lower court also erred in
dismissing his complaint on the finding that plaintiff’s right of
action to have the period fixed for the sale of the property had
already prescribed. It is urged that the time for enforcing their right
of action to have the period judicially determined did not begin to run
until the defendants had been formally demanded and they refused to
sell the property. It was only then, it is argued, that the period of
prescription started to run. This seems to be illogical. Before the
period is fixed, the defendants’ obligation to sell is suspended and
they, therefore, can not be compelled to act. For this reason, a
complaint to enforce immediately the principal obligation subject to
the suspensive period before this is fixed, will not prosper. But this
is not to say that the plaintiff has no cause of action. His cause of
action under the agreement is to have the court fix the period and
after the expiration of that period, to compel the performance of the
principal obligation to sell. And this right to have the period
judicially fixed is born from the date of the agreement itself which
contains the undetermined period. Extrajudicial demand is not essential
for the creation of this cause of action to have the period fixed.[1]
It exists by operation of law from the moment such an agreement subject
to an undetermined period is entered into, whether the period depends
upon the will of the debtor alone, or of the parties themselves, or
where from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it can be
inferred that a period was intended.
This is the dear intendment of Article 1197 of the New Civil Code as
well as Article 1128 of the Spanish Civil Code and the applicable
doctrine laid down by this Court.[2]
And since the agreement was executed on May 28, 1937 and the complaint
to have the period fixed was filed on December 21, 1956 or after almost
20 years, plaintiff’s action is clearly and indisputably barred under
the Statute of Limitations.
Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
[1] Plaintiff, in paragraphs
13 and 14 of his amended complaint alleges that since 1937 he had
requested (made offers to) defendants to sell the property, but they
refused. Based on plaintiff’s theory, prescription started to run from
said year, 1937.
[2] Gonzales vs. De Jose, 66 Phil., 369; Osorio vs. Tan, 98 Phil., 65, 51 Off. Gaz., 6221; Seone vs. Franco, 24 Phil., 309.