G.R. No. 13223. May 30, 1960
OSCAR MENDOZA ESPUELAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF BOHOL, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bohol with
the crime of inciting to sedition denned and penalized in article 142
of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, on 22 September 1947 the Court
found him guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 5 years, 4 months and 20 days of prision correccional
as maximum, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. (criminal case No. 576).[1]
He commenced to serve his sentence, but before serving it to its full
extent, on 17 March 1954, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the President of the Philippines granted him conditional
pardon by remitting the unexpired period of his sentence and payment of
the fine of P1,000, “on condition that he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines.” On 25 March 1954 he accepted the
conditional pardon and was released from confinement (Exhibit A).
Sometime thereafter, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, he was charged with the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions defined and penalized in article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act No. 10. After trial, on 29 August 1956 the
Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer 4 months and
1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 2 years, 1 month and 1 day of prision correccional
as maximum, the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. He
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. On 5 July 1957 the
Provincial Fiscal filed a motion stating that one of the important
witnesses for the prosecution was in Manila and could not appear on the
day of the trial (5 July) and praying that the case be dismissed
provisionally and the bond filed for the provisional release of the
petitioner cancelled. On the same day, 5 July 1957, the Court granted
the motion and dismissed the case (Exhibit B). On 8 November 1957, upon
the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President
ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his
sentence (Exhibit 1). On 9 November 1957 the petitioner was arrested by
members of the Philippine Constabulary in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and
confined in the provincial jail. On 20 November 1957 he filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol. After hearing, on 22 November 1957, as stated at the beginning
of this opinion, the Court granted his petition. On 23 November 1957
the respondent has appealed. On the same day, 23 November, the
petitioner filed a bond for his provisional release pending appeal.
The question to determine is whether the President may order the
reincarceration of the appellee, upon violation by the latter of the
terms of the conditional pardon granted to and accepted by him, to
serve the unexpired term or period of his sentence. The Solicitor
General maintains that the President may do so; whereas the appellee
contends that he may not.
In the case of Tesoro vs. The Director of Prisons, 68 Phil., 154, quite similar to the case under consideration, this Court held:
* * * * * * *
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect
that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly
adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under condition No.
2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he “will not commit any
other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner.” (Italics
ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission not his conviction by
court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the
petitioner may be deemed tot have violated his parole. And under
section 64 (t) of the Administrative Code the Chief Executive is
authorized to order “the arrest and reincarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.” (Italics ours.)
* * * * * * *
Under section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is empowered “to
authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” The arrest and
confinement of the appellee were ordered by the President upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole (Exhibit 1). In Sales
vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil., 492; 48 Off. Gaz., 576, and in Infante vs. Provincial Warden, 92 Phil., 310; 48 Off. Gaz., 5228, this Court held:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930,
contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals
among other Acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the
Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above
quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9
expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President by
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of
the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person
who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding
the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this
connection, we observe that section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of
Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon
was liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original
sentence.
* * * * * * *
The condition of the pardon granted by the President to the petitioner
is “that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law.”
Due process is not necessarily judicial.[1]
The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity
to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in
his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he
was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carries with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon
has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government
such power has been entrusted. In Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, supra, this Court held:
* * * where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation
of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of
the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review,
with any of his findings. * * *
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, supra, this Court further held:
* * * * * * *
It is contended by the petitioner that the power vested in the President by section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the arrest and
reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to
the due process of law granted by the Constitution (sec. 1, Article
III). A similar contention was advanced by the petitioner in the case
of Fuller vs. State of Alabama (45 L.R.A., 502), and was
rejected by the Supreme Court of that state, speaking thru Chief
Justice McClellan, in the following language:But it is insisted that this statute, in so far as it undertakes to
authorize the governor to determine that the condition of the parole
has not been complied with and the summary arrest of the convict
thereupon by the direction of the governor, and his summary return or
remandment to servitude or imprisonment under the sentence, is
violative of organic guaranties of jury trial, that no warrant shall be
issued to seize any person without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, etc. This position takes no account of the fact that the
person being dealt with is a convict, that he has already been seized
in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the
witnesses against him, been tried by the jury of his peers secured to
him by the Constitution, and by them been convicted of crime, and been
sentenced to punishment therefor. In respect of that crime and his
attitude before the law after conviction of it, he is not a citizen,
nor entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which hedge about the
citizen’s liberty, but he is a felon, at large by the mere grace of the
executive, and not entitled to be at large after he has breached the
conditions upon which that grace was extended to him. In the absence of
this statute, a convict who had broken the conditions of a pardon
would, if there were no question of his identity or the fact of breach
of the conditions, be subject to summary arrest, and remandment, as
matter of course, to imprisonment, under the original sentence by the
court of his conviction, or any court of coordinate or superior
jurisdiction,—a purely formal proceeding. * * * But the statute
supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the courts in the
premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the
conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of
these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain
contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine
when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises had expressly contracted and
agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated
the condition of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
* * *
The judgment appealed from is reversed, with costs against the appellee.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J.: I dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in cases of Sales vs. Dir. of Prisons and Infante vs. Dir. of Prisons cited in the majority opinion.
Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.
[1]
He appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 23 April 1949 the appellate
court affirmed the judgment. (C.A.G.R. No. 1938-R.) He filed in this
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 46 to review the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. On 17 December 1951, this Court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. (90 Phil., 524.)
[1] The Insular Government vs. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil., 58; Forbes vs. Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell, 27 Phil., 354; De Leon vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil., 60; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218; U.S. vs. Ignacio, 33 Phil., 202; Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil., 188; and People vs. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil., 386.