THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY CASINGAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Casingal

The Case

This is People versus Casingal, a criminal appeal decided by the Supreme Court in August 2000. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Zaldy Casingal for the killing of Diosdado Palisoc on election night in May 1995, and separately for illegal possession of the carbine used in the killing. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee should hold onto. First, it teaches that positive identification does not require an eyewitness to the very act of shooting; circumstantial evidence, taken as an unbroken chain, may identify the author of the crime. Second, it applies the rule that under the amendatory firearm law, the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing is no longer a separate offense but a special aggravating circumstance, and that this amendment is favorable to the accused and therefore retroactive.

Procedural History

Casingal was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, in two separate criminal cases: one for murder under the Revised Penal Code, and one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under the presidential decree on firearms. He pleaded not guilty to both, and trial proceeded. The trial court rendered a Joint Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both murder and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. It refused to apply the 1997 amendatory law retroactively, reasoning that to do so would prejudice the accused and violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Casingal appealed to the Supreme Court on the lone assignment that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

On the evening of the May 1995 local elections, at about a quarter past eight, Edgardo Mula Cruz was near the gate of the Sawat Elementary School in Barangay Sawat, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, waiting for Diosdado Palisoc, who had gone home to fetch food for the two of them. Cruz was facing the road when he saw Palisoc approaching. He heard a gunshot. When he turned his head toward the sound, he saw Palisoc facing the accused and falling to the ground. Carrying a carbine, the accused ran toward the house of Francisca Galpao. The area was lit by an electric bulb near the school gate, and Cruz stood about seven meters from both the victim and the accused, whom he knew personally as a neighbor. Cruz sought help from the policemen assigned to the school for the elections; Palisoc was brought to the hospital but died in the operating room from the gunshot wound to his chest. The next day, Cruz executed an affidavit narrating the shooting.

An investigation team found bloodstains, a fired bullet, and a fired cartridge at the scene. The accused was arrested the following day in the house of Mimi Payaoan. Pursuant to a search warrant, a carbine with a long magazine and thirty rounds of live ammunition was seized in the house of Francisca Galpao. Ballistic examination showed that the cartridge and slug found at the scene came from that carbine. A paraffin test on the hands of the accused and on the carbine yielded positive results.

The defense rested on the sole testimony of the accused. He did not dispute that the victim was shot that night with that carbine, nor did he deny his presence at the scene. He claimed, however, that Ernesto Payaoan was the triggerman: that Payaoan had him clean and test-fire the carbine, revealed his plan to kill Palisoc, shot the victim, and then handed him the firearm and ordered him to run and bring it to the house of Francisca Galpao. Payaoan testified in rebuttal that he was on election duty at the regional command in San Fernando, La Union, on those dates, supported by a certification. A jail officer denied that the accused had confided in him.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused may be convicted of murder and illegal possession of firearm as two separate offenses, or only of a single crime with illegal possession of firearm as a special aggravating circumstance.
• Whether or not the accused was positively identified as the assailant despite the absence of an eyewitness to the actual shooting.
• Whether or not the killing was qualified to murder by treachery and evident premeditation.
• Whether or not the prosecution proved the crime of illegal possession of firearm, specifically the absence of a license or permit.

Applicable Provisions

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, on the retroactive effect of penal laws, provides:

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as hereinafter defined, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

This is the basis for applying the 1997 firearm amendment retroactively, since it favors the accused.

Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the best evidence rule, provides:

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases.

This governs the prosecution's photocopied certification that the accused held no firearm license, which the Court refused to give evidentiary value.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code, on exemplary damages, provides:

In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

Since no aggravating circumstance was proven, the award of exemplary damages could not stand.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in convicting the accused of two separate offenses. The 1997 law amending the firearms decree provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered a special aggravating circumstance. The effect is twofold: the use of the unlicensed firearm is not a separate offense but a special aggravating circumstance, and only one penalty is imposed. The Court ruled that this amendment is favorable to the accused and must be applied retroactively, so the crime for which he may be charged is murder aggravated by illegal possession of firearm.

On the second issue, the Court held that positive identification requires proof of identity, not necessarily an eyewitness account of the very act. A witness may identify the perpetrator through circumstantial evidence, which, taken together as an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. The Court laid down the requisites for conviction through circumstantial evidence: there must be more than one circumstance; the inference must be based on proven facts; and the combination of all circumstances must produce a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. Cruz's testimony, found direct, frank, and straightforward, with no showing of improper motive, was given full faith and credit. It was corroborated by the seizure of the carbine in the house where the accused fled, the positive paraffin test, and the ballistic match. The Court rejected the defense's attempt to pin the killing on Payaoan as incredible, reasoning that it defies reason and common sense for the accused to take hold of the carbine in full view of people near the scene, mindless of the danger of self-incrimination.

On the third issue, the Court held that treachery was not proven. To prove treachery, two things must be shown: the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and the deliberate and conscious adoption of those means. Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Cruz testified only to what happened immediately after the killing; he had no knowledge of the circumstances before the shooting or of the shooting itself. There was no proof that the victim was unarmed or had no opportunity to defend himself, and no evidence that the means of execution was deliberately adopted. Evident premeditation likewise failed, because the accused's testimony attributed the planning to Payaoan, and there was no proof of when the accused conceived his own plan to kill. Without any qualifying circumstance, the killing was only homicide, and the penalty was lowered to reclusion temporal in its medium period, with the indeterminate sentence law applied.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the absence of a license. It presented only a photocopy of a certification from the firearms unit, and under the best evidence rule the original must be produced; the certification fell under no exception. Nor did the prosecution present a representative of the firearms unit to testify that the accused was unlicensed. This omission was fatal, so the crime could not be qualified as committed with an unlicensed firearm. Consequently, the fine and the exemplary damages were deleted, while civil indemnity, moral damages, and funeral expenses were affirmed.

Doctrine

First, positive identification does not require an eyewitness to the very act of the crime; circumstantial evidence may establish the identity of the perpetrator when it forms an unbroken chain pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, provided there is more than one circumstance, the inference rests on proven facts, and the combination produces conviction beyond doubt. Second, the use of an unlicensed firearm in homicide or murder is not a separate offense but a special aggravating circumstance, and the amendatory law is favorable to the accused and thus retroactive under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Third, treachery must be proven by the manner of attack; absent proof that the victim had no opportunity to defend himself and that the means were deliberately adopted, the killing is only homicide. Fourth, the absence of a firearm license must be proven by the original certification or by competent testimony, consistent with the best evidence rule.

Disposition

The Supreme Court modified the trial court's Joint Decision, finding the accused guilty only of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, while affirming the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and funeral expenses.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: positive identification requires proof of identity, not an eyewitness to the act, and the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing is a special aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Examiners like to use this case on circumstantial evidence as a substitute for eyewitness testimony, on the retroactive application of the firearm amendment, and on the best evidence rule as applied to a photocopied certification of no firearm license.