BAYANI M. ALONTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Alonte versus Savellano

The Case

This is the case of Alonte versus Savellano. Bayani Alonte, then the incumbent mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and his co-accused Buenaventura Concepcion, stood charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court. After the private complainant executed an affidavit of desistance, the trial judge, without conducting a full trial on the merits, convicted both accused. Alonte went to the Supreme Court by a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and Concepcion filed his own petition for certiorari and mandamus. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest reminder that the order of trial in criminal cases is mandatory, and that due process cannot be satisfied by a short-cut, however heinous the charge.

Procedural History

An information for rape was filed against Alonte and Concepcion before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, and raffled to one of its branches. The private complainant, through counsel and the Office of the State Prosecutor, then filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a petition for change of venue, asking that the case be transferred to Metro Manila. While that petition was pending, the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance. The Supreme Court granted the change of venue and ordered that the case be raffled to a branch in Manila, and that the judge to whom it would be assigned resolve the complainant's motion to resume proceedings and determine the voluntariness and validity of her desistance in light of the public prosecutor's opposition. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, presided over by Judge Maximo Savellano Jr.

After arraignment, where both accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution presented the complainant and her parents, who affirmed the desistance, and the public prosecutor moved to dismiss the case. The trial judge instead submitted the case for decision, and on the scheduled date of promulgation convicted both accused of rape. Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration and, without awaiting its resolution, filed his petition with the Supreme Court; Concepcion later filed his own. The Court consolidated the two petitions and, in view of the circumstances, disregarded their prematurity.

Facts

On or about the twelfth of September 1996, according to the information, Alonte, after giving the complainant drinking water that made her dizzy and weak, had carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent, while Concepcion allegedly brought her to Alonte's rest house and left her alone with him after receiving one thousand pesos. An information for rape was filed on the fifth of December 1996.

On the twenty-fifth of June 1997, the complainant, then seventeen years of age and assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. In it she did not disavow the truth of her complaint; she asked instead to be allowed to withdraw it, citing the slow movement of the legal process, the loss of two semesters of schooling, and the disruption of her family's life, and stating that she wished to live elsewhere with her family and start anew.

When the case reached Branch 53 in Manila, the trial judge found probable cause and issued warrants of arrest. Alonte voluntarily surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation, and Concepcion posted bail. At the hearing after arraignment, the complainant affirmed the voluntariness and validity of her desistance and said she had no intention of testifying against the accused. Her parents and the assistant provincial prosecutor likewise affirmed the affidavit. The public prosecutor then manifested that the State had no further evidence and moved to dismiss. The trial judge submitted the case for decision, and on the eighteenth of December 1997 promulgated a judgment of conviction for rape, sentencing each accused to reclusion perpetua. Alonte's repeated motions for bail and for early resolution were never acted upon.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in convicting the accused without affording them their constitutional right to due process of law.
• Whether or not the trial judge violated the mandatory provisions on the order of trial in criminal cases under Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in rendering judgment on the basis of affidavits that were neither marked nor offered in evidence, and without giving the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in rendering a decision without conducting a trial on the facts establishing the guilt of the accused.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Article III of the Constitution provides:

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

This is the constitutional bedrock of the ruling: the presumption of innocence and the right to be heard require a real trial before condemnation.

Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order: (a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. (b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case. (c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. (d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda. (e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.

This is the rule the trial judge skipped: the accused were never directed to present their defense, and no rebuttal stage was ever set.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that due process in criminal proceedings requires that the court be clothed with judicial power, that jurisdiction over the accused be lawfully acquired, that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard, and that judgment be rendered only upon lawful hearing. These postulates are mandatory and indispensable, and procedural due process cannot be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

On the second issue, the Court found undue precipitancy in the proceedings. The Solicitor General had aptly discerned the deviations: the accused were never directed to present evidence to prove their defenses, no dates were set for that purpose, the parties were never given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence, and the accused never admitted the act charged so as to justify any modification of the order of trial. The Court held that there can be no short-cut to the legal process, and no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that the right to cross-examine had been waived by mere silence. The existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated, and the standard requires that it not only be voluntary but knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right is not a waiver, and courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the case must be remanded for further proceedings, carefully avoiding any statement that might be misconstrued as a prejudgment of the case. It also stressed that the affidavit of desistance did not disavow the veracity of the complaint but merely sought to withdraw it for other reasons, and that all related proceedings, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

Doctrine

Due process in criminal cases requires a lawful hearing before judgment; the order of trial under Rule 119 is mandatory, and a judgment of conviction rendered without giving the accused the opportunity to present his defense is void for grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional presumption of innocence and the right to be heard cannot be satisfied by a proceeding limited to determining the voluntariness of an affidavit of desistance. Waiver of the right to cross-examine must be positively demonstrated as voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; mere silence is not waiver, and every reasonable presumption is indulged against it. An affidavit of desistance that does not disavow the truth of the complaint does not by itself extinguish criminal liability, since the prosecution of criminal actions lies within the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

Disposition

The petitions were granted in substance: the judgment of conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with the petition for bail and all related matters left to its proper disposition.

Remember This

Memorize the line: there can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory order of trial under Rule 119, the requisites of a valid waiver of the right to cross-examine, and the limited effect of an affidavit of desistance that does not disavow the complaint.