G.R. No. 13146. January 30, 1960
VALENTIN CASTILLO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ARTURO SAMONTE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BARRERA, J.:
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (in Civil Case No. 1424), directing
him to reconvey, under the terms of Article 1088 of the new Civil Code,
certain property and pay attorney’s fees to plaintiff-appellee Valentin
Castillo.
Defendant specifically took this appeal directly to this Court
stating in his notice of appeal and prayer for approval of the record
on appeal that “esta apelacion envuelve tan solamente cuestion de
derecho”. In view thereof he is bound by the findings of fact of the
court a quo, and this Court will, therefore, decide this appeal purely on the questions of law raised.[1]
The facts, as found by the trial court, are that Romualda Meneses
was, during her lifetime, the owner of the unregistered residential
land in question located at Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan, with approximate
area of 394 square meters. Upon her demise, she left as compulsory
heirs the plaintiff herein and his brothers and sister Gregorio”
Amando, Jose, and Melencia,[2]
all surnamed Castillo. Said property remained undivided, as the heirs
did not partition the inherited estate either judicially or
extra-judicially. On July 13, 1953, one of the heirs, Gregorio
Castillo, without giving any notice in writing to his coheirs,
including plaintiff herein, sold for P1,000.00 his undivided interest
in the property to defendant who, on July 16, 1953, succeeded in
registering the deed of sale (Exh. 2) with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. Sometime in September, 1956, when the place was surveyed
cadastrally, plaintiff learned for the first time about the sale and
forthwith (on September 15, 1956), he offered to redeem the property
from defendant, but the latter refused to re-sell the same to him.
Plaintiff, therefore, on December 19, 1956, filed a complaint in the
above-mentioned court praying that defendant, be ordered to resell the
property to him.
On September 6, 1957, the court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
“For all the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter to reconvey or transfer the portion of
the property in question to the plaintiff herein, upon the payment by
the latter to the former of the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), which is the consideration of the sale made by Gregorio
Castillo in favor of the defendant; to pay the plaintiff the amount of
two hundred pesos (P200.00) as attorney’s fees, and the costs of this
action.”
Defendant, in this appeal, claims that the court a quo
erred: (1) in not ordering the heir-vendor Gregorio Castillo to be
included either as party plaintiff or party defendant in the case; (2)
in upholding plaintiff’s right to redeem the property subject of the
controversy; and (3) in awarding to plaintiff attorney’s fees.
As to the first assigned error, the trial court had no obligation to
order the inclusion of the vendor either as a party plaintiff or party
defendant in the case, because while he may be a necessary party, still
he is not indispensable in the sense that the matter before it could
not; be completely adjudicated without him. The deed of sale in favor
of appellant clearly state that what is being sold is an undivided 1/5
portion of the land jointly owned by the vendor and his brothers and
nephew. The vendee-appellant is, therefore, conclusively presumed to
know the law that under such circumstances, the co-heirs are entitled
to redeem the portion being sold within 30 days from notice in writing
of the sale, under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code. In effect, he is
a vendee with notice of the right of redemption by the Vendor’s
co-heirs.
Moreover, if vendee-appellant believed he had a claim against the
vendor by reason of the warranty, it was his duty to have filed a
third-party complaint against the latter pursuant to Section 1, Rule
12, of the Rules of Court, which states:
“SECTION 1. Claim against one not a party to an action.—When
a defendant claimed to be entitled against a person not a party to the
action, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, to contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiff’s claim, he may file, with leave of court, against such
person a pleading which shall state the nature of his claim and shall
be called the third-party complaint.”
In respect of the second assigned error, Article 1088 of the Civil Code, provides:
“Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.” (Italics supplied.)
From the facts found by the trial court, it is indisputable that
plaintiff is entitled to redeem the hereditary right over the 1/5
undivided share sold by his brother Gregorio Castillo to herein
defendant-appellant. The only remaining question is whether plaintiff
exercised his right within the period prescribed in the law.
It is admitted that plaintiff, as co-heir, has never been notified in writing
of the sale made by his brother, Gregorio Castillo. Nor were the other
co-heirs. But defendant-appellant argues that the registration of the
deed of sale (Exh. 2) on July 16, 1953, with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan, was sufficient notice of the sale under the provisions of
Section 51 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), which read:
“SEC. 51. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land
which would under existing laws, if recorded, filed or entered in the
office of the register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it
relates shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of the
register of deeds in the province or city where the real estate to
which such instrument relates lies, be notice to all persons from the
time such registering, filing or entering.” (Italics supplied.)
But the above-quoted provision of the statute applies only to registered lands,
and has no application whatsoever to the instant case, for the reason
that the property herein involved is, admittedly, unregistered land.[3] In this connection, the court a quo
correctly observed that “Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil
Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice
specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of
notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of the law
had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have
been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New
Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old
law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient.”[4]
It is nevertheless urged by appellant that since appellee admits
having learned about the sale in September, 1956, and filed his
complaint only in December of the same year, or after a lapse of three
months, his action has already prescribed, arguing that actual
knowledge constitutes and supplies the written notice required by
Article 1088 of the new Civil Code. In the view we take in this case,
we need not now decide whether actual knowledge will dispense with the
notice in writing mentioned in the law. Suffice it to note that herein
appellee, upon learning of the sale in September, 1956, within 30 days
thereafter (specifically on the 15th of the same month), offered to
repurchase the property from the appellant. This, in our opinion
established his right to redeem and he could bring an action in court
to enforce the right of redemption at any time thereafter, provided it
is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Interpreting a similar provision in Article 1524[5] of the old Civil Code, this Court hold that the same was not a prescriptive period, and stated:
“* * * the right of legal redemption and the right
to commence actions are of an entirely different nature. The first
creates a substantive right which, in the absence of the article, would
never exist; the second restricts the period in which a cause of action
may be asserted.” (Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil., 1, 3).
To the same effect is the case Villasor vs. Medel, et al. (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. 10] 344, 348) where this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason further stated:
“* * * An action seeks to assert a fundamental,
primary right of which the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived, or
to redress a wrong which has been inflicted; legal redemption is in the
nature of a mere privilege created by law partly for reasons of public
policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner,
to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient
association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th ed., 317)”
It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the
purchaser within the period of one month from the notice in writing is
a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of
legal redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to
enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses the redemption. The
first must be done within the month-period; the second within the
prescriptive period provided in the Statute of Limitations. If a
redemptioner, therefore, has offered to redeem the property within the
period fixed, he has complied with the condition prescribed by the law
and may, thereafter, bring an action to enforce the redemption. If, on
the other hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the right is made
use of, then the action to enforce the redemption will not prescribe
even if brought within the ordinary prescriptive period.[6]
The case of Asuncion vs. Jacob, et al. decided by the Court
of Appeals (48 Off. Gaz., 2786) and cited by defendant-appellant is not
authority to support his submission that the complaint for redemption
must be filed within the one month period, especially where it appears
that such a statement was a mere obiter not supported by the
finding that the complaint in that case was filed after a lapse of
fourteen (14) years from the time the redemptioner was informed of the
sale.
Regarding the last assigned error, defendant cites as authority the case of Jimenez vs.
Bucoy (103 Phil., 40). In said case, as in the instant case, the lower
court awarded attorney’s fees to plaintiff without explaining why it
made the award. Disapproving said award, on appeal, we stated as
follows:
“Under the new Civil Code, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded in this case if defendant acted
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff’s
plainly valid, just and demandable claim’ or where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney’s fees be recovered. (Art 2208, Civil
Code). These are—if applicable—some of the exceptions to the general
rule that in the absence of stipulation no attorney’s fees shall be
awarded.“The trial court did not explain why it ordered
payment of counsel fees. Needless to say, it is desirable that the
decision should state the reason why such award is made, bearing in
mind that it must necessarily rest on an exceptional situation.
Unless of course the text of the decision plainly shows the case to
fall into one of the exceptions, for instance in actions for legal
support, when exemplary damages are awarded, etc. * * * If the trial
judge considered it just and equitable’ to require payment of
attorney’s fees because the defense * * * proved to be untenable in
view of this Court’s applicable rulings, it would be error to uphold
his view. Otherwise, every time a defendant loses, attorney’s fees would follow as a matter of course.
Under the article above cited, even a clearly untenable defense would
be no ground for awarding attorney’s fees unless it amounted to ‘gross
and evident bad faith.'” (Italics supplied.)
In conformity with the above ruling and, since in the instant case,
it does not appear that defendant had acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing plaintiff’s offer to redeem the property in question,
or that there are in the text of the appealed decision reasonable or
equitable reasons for allowing the award of attorney’s fees to
plaintiff, we are constrained to disallow the same.
Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the judgment of the court a quo is affirmed in all respects, with costs against the defendant appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
[1] Sec. 3, Rule 42, Rules of Court; Millar vs. Nadres, 74 Phil., 307.
[2] Now deceased and represented by her only son Gregorio Asuncion.
[3] There is no registration of title to speak of relative to such land of lands. (Ventura, Land Titles and Deeds [4th Ed.] 270.)
[4] Art. 1067, old Civil Code; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 32 Phil., 214.
[5] Now Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
[6] V. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (1959 Ed.,), 163, 164.