G.R. No. 13134. February 13, 1960
MARIA C. ROA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SEGUNDA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Instance of Pampanga dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for damages upon
defendants’ motion on the ground that it was barred by prior judgment.
The facts are not disputed. In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the court
below, Segunda de la Cruz, one of herein defendants, was charged with
serious oral defamation. The offended party, herein plaintiff Maria C.
Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve her right to institute
it, but intervened through counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
After trial, the court on April 30, 1957 rendered a decision finding
the defendant Segunda de la Cruz guilty of slight slander and
sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00. It, likewise, ordered her to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs, but
made, no award as to damages.
About a month later, or on May 28, 1957, the offended party Maria C.
Roa filed the present action in the same court below against Segunda de
la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas to recover moral and exemplary
damages. The cause of action was based on the defamatory remarks which
were the subject matter of the criminal action against Segunda de la
Cruz. The aggregate amount sought to be recovered, including attorney’s
fees, was P28,000.00.
Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that it was barred by prior judgment and
that it did not state a cause of action. Sustaining the motion on the
first ground, the court below dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff in due
time filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was, denied.
Hence, this appeal.
Article 33 of the new Civil Code provides:
“Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”
Under the above provisions, independently of a criminal action for
defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom
may be brought by the injured party. It is apparent, however, from the
use of the words “may be”, that the institution of such suit is
optional. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R. C.
Puno, Vol. I, p. 54.) In other words, the civil liability arising from
the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings
if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant.[1] (Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25] 4633.)
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C.
Roa—upon whose initiative the criminal action for defamation against
the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed—did not reserve her right to
institute an independent civil action. Instead, she chose to intervene
in the criminal proceedings as private prosecutor through counsel
employed by her. Such intervention, as observed by the court below,
could only be for the purpose of claiming damages or indemnity, and.
not to secure the conviction and punishment of the accused therein as
plaintiff now pretends. This must be so because an offended party in a
criminal case may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense, only if he has not waived the civil action
or expressly reserved his right to institute it, subject, always, to
the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in
connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan vs.
Yatco, 94 Phil., 197.) The reason of the law in not permitting the
offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had
waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by
such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its
prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.
(Gorospe, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52
Off. Gaz., [5] 2526.) The rule, therefore, is that the right of
intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of
enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of
demanding punishment of the accused. (People vs. Orais, 65 Phil., 744; People vs. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People vs. Flores et al., G. R. No. L-7528, December 18, 1957; see also U. S. vs. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U. S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600.)
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense
charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention as
private prosecutor, we hold that the final judgment rendered therein
constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based upon
the same cause. (See Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.)
“* * * A judgment upon the merit bars a subsequent
suit upon the same cause, brought in a different form of action, and a
party, therefore, cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated.” (Francisco vs. Bias, et al., 93 Phil., 1.)
The fact that there is no claim or allegation of damages in the
complaint or information is of no legal consequence. Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code.) It has, therefore, been held that even if the
complaint or information is silent as to damages or the intention to
prove and claim them, the offender is still liable for them, and the
offended has the right to prove and claim for them in the criminal
case, unless a waiver or the reservation of the civil action is made,
(People vs. Oraza, 83 Phil., 633; 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. No. 11,
p. 86.) As already stated, herein plaintiff not only did not waive or
reserve her right to file a separate civil action but actually
intervened in the criminal action.
The criminal court, it is true, did not enter a judgment for
indemnity when it was duty bound to do so because of the intervention
of the offended party. (See People vs. Ursua, 60
Phil., 253.) It would appear, however, that plaintiff failed to submit
evidence of her damages. For such failure, she has only herself or her
counsel to blame. Of course, she could have still filed a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But this she failed
to do, thus allowing the decision to become final and executory. Under
the principle of res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as
to future proceedings at law not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose.
(Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil., 526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366; NAMARCO vs. Judge Macadaeg, 98 Phil., 185; 52 Off. Gaz. 182.)
In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J., reserves vote.
[1] The case of Reyes vs.
de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by plaintiff
in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code
the injured party is not required to reserve her right to institute the
civil action, is not applicable to the present case. There was no
showing in that case that the offended party intervened in the
prosecution of the offense, and the amount of damages sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a
reservation of the civil action was useless or unnecessary.