G.R. No. 13085. December 17, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EXEQUIEL S. VILLALON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
MALCOLM, J.:
judge of first instance, city of Manila, finding that the condition of a pardon
granted by the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, has been violated, and ordering the recommitment of the
accused in Bilibid Prison for the unexpired portion of his original
sentence.
The application of the assistant fiscal of the city of Manila to the Court of
First Instance for the arrest of Exequiel S. Villalon, the accused, and an
investigation of the facts and action thereon, containing as it does the
undisputed facts, is here quoted in full:
“Comes now the undersigned and to this Honorable Court respectfully
states:
“1. That Exequiel S. Villalon about the 5th day of May, 1910, was convicted
and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the crime of
illegal marriage to imprisonment for eight years and one day of prision
mayor, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the
costs;
“2. That on the 17th of November, 1913, the Hon. Francis Burton Harrison,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, pardoned the said Exequiel S.
Villalon as to the unexpired portion of the said sentence on condition that the
accused would not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by
imprisonment for one year or more, a copy of which conditional pardon is as
follows:
” ‘Office of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.—Manila, November
17, 1913. By authority of the President of the United States, the unexecuted
portion of the sentence of imprisonment in the case of Exequiel Villalon,
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of illegal marriage and
sentenced on June 5, 1910, to imprisonment for eight years and one day, is
hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more. Should
the condition stated be violated, Exequiel Villalon will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 1524.
” ‘Upon acceptance of this pardon, Exequiel Villalon will be released from
confinement. Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General.’
“3. That in violation of the conditional pardon above set out, the said
accused Exequiel S. Villalon, on or about the 17th of November, 1915, in the
city of Manila, committed and was charged with the crime of estafa, and
after trial in the Court of First Instance of Manila the said accused was
sentenced on the 25th day of March, 1916, in accordance with article 535,
paragraph 1, in connection with article 534, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, to
imprisonment for six months of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P269.25
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the
costs; and
“4. That the accused Exequiel S. Villalon appealed from said sentence to the
Supreme Court, which court after due hearing affirmed the sentence appealed from
on November 24, 1916.
“Wherefore, the undersigned, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of
Manila, respectfully asks this honorable court to order the appearance of the
accused, Exequiel S. Villalon, before this court; that due investigation be made
of the facts set forth in this petition; that it be declared that the accused,
Exequiel S. Villalon, has violated the conditions of the pardon of November 17,
1913, and that the said accused be reincarcerated to serve the unexpired portion
of his sentence, and further asks whatever else may be deemed proper by this
court in the premises. Angel Roco, assistant prosecuting attorney.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me on June 7, 1917, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, by Angel Roco, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of
Manila. Ramon Avancena, judge, Court of First Instance.”
The assignments of error concern the question of whether or not there has
been a violation of the pardon granted by the Governor-General. The condition of
the pardon is “that he (Villalon) shall not again be guilty of any infraction of
the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more.” Recall here
that Villalon was prosecuted for the crime of estafa, that he was
convicted and sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, etc., and that
the limits of the penalty prescribed by the articles of the Penal Code under
which convicted are two months and one day of arresto mayor to two
years and four months of presidio correctional.
“Punishable” is defined in the dictionaries as “deserving of or liable to
punishment.” The term refers to the possible not to the actual
sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which
is, imposed. Villalon, in committing the crime of estafa and in
receiving sentence for six months, broke the condition of his pardon just as
effectively as if he had been convicted of the same crime and sentenced to two
years and four months imprisonment. The only difference is that the court did
not, in its discretion, find and apply some aggravating circumstance.
Undoubtedly what the Governor-General intended to except as favorable to the
person pardoned were mere convictions for misdemeanors in contrast to what we
may term, broadly speaking, felonies. Since, therefore, Villalon, in committing
the crime of estafa, was liable thereby to imprisonment for more than a
year, he violated both the letter and the spirit of his pardon. The American
authorities are a unit in corroborating” the views here enunciated.
(See U. S. vs. Watkinds [1881], 6 Fed., 152; People
vs. Hughes [1893], 137 N. Y., 29; Benton vs. Commonwealth
[1893], 89 Va., 570; 7 Words and Phrases, PP. 48, 49.)
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. The accused shall be
reincarcerated in Bilibid Prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence
imposed upon him for the crime, of illegal marriage by the judge of first
instance of Nueva Ecija on June 5, 1910; the costs of both instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, and
Avancena, JJ., concur.
STREET, J., dissenting:
It is admitted that the offense of estafa, committed by Exequiel S. Villalon
upon December 17, 1915, and which is alleged to have constituted a breach of the
pardon dated November 17, 1913, was an offense punishable under subsection 2 of
article 534 of the Penal Code. That article permits the application of penalties
in three degrees, consisting of arresto mayor in its medium degree,
arresto mayor in its maximum degree, and prision correccional
in its minimum degree. These penalties, in their complete range, cover a period
from four months and one day to two years and four months. But as the court
found that there were neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances present,
it became necessary to apply the medium penalty, in accordance with subsection 1
of article 81, in connection with paragraph 1 of article 97 of the Penal Code.
Under these provisions it was not possible for the Court of First Instance
lawfully to impose a penalty of imprisonment of greater duration than six
months, or arresto mayor in its maximum degree. The finding that there
was no aggravating circumstance was absolutely determinative on this point; and
the court had no discretion to go beyond that limit. The intimation contained in
the principal opinion that, a court may in its discretion find and
apply an aggravating circumstance is doubtless attributable to oversight.
The word “infraction,” to our mind, is used in the pardon with special
reference to the particular violation of law of which the accused might be
guilty and not in a general sense as referring to the type or class of offense
to which such infraction may belong. The word “infraction” is here apparently as
little liable to be understood in a general sense as any word which could have
been inserted in the pardon; and the fact that such word was used instead of the
more general term “offense” or “crime” strongly argues that the draftsman of the
pardon intended to use the word with special reference to the particular
violation of law of which the accused might be guilty. The opinion of the court
has the effect of construing the language of the pardon as if it read, “shall
not again be guilty of any infraction of law falling within some class of
crime punishable by imprisonment for one year or more.” We think that this
is an illegitimate interpretation of that language.
The question whether the pardon has been violated depends upon the character
of the infraction of which the accused has been convicted. The mere fact that
the defendant was convicted under a complaint which charges estafa—an
offense punishable with penalties ranging over many different degrees—is not
sufficient to establish the breach of the pardon. Nor is the duration of the
penalty which the court actually imposed conclusive as to the fact of the
infringement of the pardon. To determine whether the infraction was punishable
by imprisonment for one year or more it is necessary to look to the finding of
facts upon which the judgment was entered, in this case, that the accused was
guilty of estafa and punishable under a certain provision of the code,
without mitigating or aggravating circumstances. If the court had found the
accused guilty, with aggravating circumstances, the offense would have been
punishable by the imposition of the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum degree; and this would have brought it within the power of the court
in its discretion to impose a penalty of a year or more. That circumstance would
have established the infringement of the pardon though the court might in fact
have imposed imprisonment for only six months and one day.
The American
authorities, it is submitted, in no wise support the conclusion reached by the
court in the principal opinion. In the American penal system the courts have
complete liberty, to consider, in the imposition of penalties, all the
circumstances, whether aggravating or attenuating; and they have entire
discretion in fixing the penalty at any point between the minimum and maximum
permitted by law, just as our courts may use a more limited discretion in
adjusting their penalties within the degrees determined by the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. The American precedents cited in the
principal opinion are therefore not in point.
CARSON, J., dissenting:
I concur in this dissent.