THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MOHAMAD UNGAL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This defendant was charged with the crime of the larceny of large cattle. He
was arrested, tried, found guilty and sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of
one year, one month and twenty-five days of presidio correccional, and
to return to the owner the carabao and the vacuno stolen, or their value fixed
at P80, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this
court.

The complaint alleged:

“That, on or about the 12th of March, 1917, in the sitio of Putat,
municipal district of Pansul, Province of Sulu, Department of Mindanao and Sulu,
P. I., the aforementioned accused did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally,
with intent of gain and without violence or intimidation upon persons, nor force
upon things, take, steal, and carry away with him three cows and one carabao
valued at P140, equivalent to 700 pesetas, Philippine currency,
belonging to the Moro Siba and without the latter’s consent”; acts committed in
violation of law.”

It will be noted that the complaint alleged that the defendant had stolen
three vacunos and one carabao valued at P140. The proof shows that but
one of the vacunos and the carabao were found in the possession of the
defendant. They were duly recovered by the owner. The other two vacunos
had not been recovered at the time of the trial in the lower court.

In addition to the question whether or not the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, the record presents the question, whether or not he must return
the other two vacunos, not recovered, or their value.

That the large cattle mentioned in. the complaint were stolen is clearly
proved by the record. That two of said animals were found in the possession of
the defendant is admitted by him. That his explanation showing how he obtained
possession of said animals is unsatisfactory is shown by the proof. Generally,
one who obtains possession of property rightfully and legally has but little
difficulty in justifying his possession. It is a rule established by an
abundance of jurisprudence, when stolen property is found in the possession of
one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, that
he will be presumed to be the thief. (U. S. vs. Soriano Santillan, 9
Phil. Rep., 445; U. S. vs. Paguia, 10 Phil. Rep., 90; U. S.
vs. Jamero; 10 Phil. Rep., 137; U. S. vs. Soriano and
Villalobos, 12 Phil. Rep., 512; U. S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. Rep., 506; U.
S. vs. Solinap, 18 Phil. Rep., 77; U. S. vs. Divino, 18 Phil.
Rep., 425; U. S. vs. Simbahan, 19 Phil. Rep., 123; State vs.
Weston, 9 Conn., 527; 25 Am. Dec, 46; Jones vs. The State of
Mississippi, 30 Miss., 653; 64 Am. Dec, 175; Commonwealth vs.
Montgomery, 45 Am. Dec, 227; decision of the supreme court of Spain of January
4, 1871, 1 Pantoja, Jurisprudencia Criminal, p. 128.)

It is a well settled rule that the possession of stolen goods is prima
facie evidence that the possessor is the thief, and throws on him the
necessity of accounting for his possession. (State vs. Weston, 9 Conn.,
527; 25 Am. Dec, 46; Jones vs. The State of Mississippi, 30 Miss., 653;
64 Am. Dec, 175; State vs. Raymond, 46 Conn., 345; 2 Wharton’s Criminal
Law, section 1231.)

With reference to the second question above indicated, must the penalty be
fixed upon the basis of the value of the property found in the possession of the
defendant, or must it be fixed upon the amount of property stolen. Generally,
the penalty for larceny depends upon the value of the property stolen (arts.
517-520, Penal Code). The question presented may be made clearer perhaps by a
few examples.— Larceny is committed in a bank. P10,000 is stolen. One peso only
is found in the possession of A. The explanation of his possession of said peso,
which is fully identified by particular marks or otherwise, is not satisfactory.
He is therefore, under the general doctrine, presumed to be the thief. But, the
thief of the one peso only, or of the P10,000? If the presumption of law makes
him guilty of the larceny, of the only property found in his possession, then
the penalty is fixed upon the basis of the value of one peso. If, however, the
presumption makes him guilty of the crime committed, then the penalty
should be based upon the value of the property stolen, or of P10,000. Another
example—Larceny is committed in the house of B. His suit is stolen with a
pocketbook containing P100. The pocketbook was left in the pocket of the suit.
The suit is valued at P20, the pocketbook at P5. The next day C is found in
possession of the suit. His explanation of his possession is unsatisfactory. The
pocketbook and the P100 were never found. C was arrested, tried and found guilty
under the above presumption. How shall the court fix the penalty? Shall it be
based upon the value of the suit, or upon the value of the suit including the
pocketbook and the P100? Putting the question in another form: Does the
presumption which makes the possessor of stolen property the thief, in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, extend only to the property found in his
possession, or does it extend to the crime committed? It seems difficult for the
human mind to follow any course of reasoning which would lead it to any other
conclusion than that the possessor of a part of stolen property is, in fact, the
thief of all of the property stolen at the same time and place.

In discussing the question before us, in the case of the United States
vs. Solinap (18 Phil. Rep., 77), we said, in effect, that when one of
two animals which were stolen from the same corral at the same time is
found in the possession of the defendant, and he is unable to give a
satisfactory explanation of his possession of the same, that fact is sufficient
in itself to sustain a finding that the defendant is guilty of the theft of both
animals. That decision is conclusive of the question before us.

Therefore, the sentence which must be imposed upon the defendant must be
based upon the value of all of the animals stolen. The record shows that the
animals stolen were worth P140 or 700 pesetas; and the penalty must be
based upon the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 518, in relation with
paragraph 4 of article 520, as amended by paragraph 4 of Act No. 2030, of the
Penal Code. Under said provisions, taking into consideration the existence of
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, without any extenuating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is presidio mayor in its
minimum degree.

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby modified; and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the defendant be sentenced to be imprisoned for
a period of six years and one day of presidio mayor, and to return to
the offended person the animals stolen, or to indemnify him for their value, and
to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Street, and Avanceña, JJ.,
concur.

Araullo, J., with whom concurs Malcolm, J., concurring in
part.

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CONCURRING OPINION

ARAULLO, J., concurring:

Even though application to this case be made of the rule laid down by
decisions of this court, as set forth in the foregoing decision, the undersigned
is of the opinion that the accused should not be found guilty of the theft of
the four heads of cattle, charged in the complaint, but only of the two animals
found in his possession and which have already been restored to the owner; and
it is not therefore proper to sentence him to return the two other animals, or
to pay their value of P80, as he was sentenced to do in the judgment appealed
from, inasmuch as, from the result of the evidence adduced and the fact that
only two of the animals were found in the possession of the accused, the two
others having been left where the owner kept them, according to the accused
himself, no recourse can be had to the legal presumption, arising from such
possession, that he is guilty of the theft of the two other animals, as they
could have been stolen by another person. Moreover, if the accused were
sentenced for the theft of these two animals and they afterwards were found in
the possession of another, the accused would have been sentenced then for a
crime which it would evidently be shown that he did not commit, and, following
the rule laid down in this decision, penalty should necessarily be imposed upon
the other person actually possessing such animals. According to the same
decision, legal presumptions may serve as basis for the final findings of facts,
taking into account the circumstances of each case; and in the case at bar, in
view of the circumstances, the fact that the two animals were found in the
possession of the accused does not necessarily lead beyond a reasonable doubt to
the conclusion that he also stole the two other animals.