JOSE V. LORETO, IN REPRESENTATION OF HIS MINOR CHILD JOSE P. LORETO III, PETITIONERS, VS. RENATO BRION, RODOLFO BUTALID AND REYNALDO ATIENZA, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN AND M…

Loreto versus Brion

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Jose Loreto the Third, in representation of his minor child, against Renato Brion, Rodolfo Butalid, and Reynaldo Atienza, in their capacity as chairman and members of the Board of Election Supervisors of the Pambansang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan of Baybay, Leyte Chapter. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to reverse the dismissal of his petition for mandamus, which sought to compel the Board to proclaim him as the winner of the federation elections. The case matters because it settles, once more, a question that recurs in every election bar examination: when the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified by final judgment, does the second placer take his place? The Court answers with a firm no.

Procedural History

The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, sitting in a special civil action, to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to direct the local election committee to proclaim him as President. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had lost in the elections and that the later disqualification of the winning candidate did not entitle a second placer to be proclaimed. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, raising what he described as a pure question of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Facts

On the fifth of July, 1996, elections were held for President of the Pambayang Federasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan of Baybay, Leyte Chapter. Jose Loreto the Third ran for that office, together with Paul Ian Veloso and Ruphil Bañoc. Two days before the elections, a pre-election protest had been lodged against Veloso before the Board of Election Supervisors for violation of the rules prohibiting certain acts of campaigning in the Sangguniang Kabataan Pederasyon elections.

In the elections, Veloso obtained the highest number of votes, but his proclamation was suspended because the evidence of his guilt in the pre-election protest was strong. The petitioner garnered the second highest number of votes. On the sixth of August, 1996, the Board promulgated a resolution disqualifying Veloso and ruling that the elected Vice President of the chapter should assume the office of President. That resolution became final and executory.

The petitioner took his oath of office and discharged the duties and functions of President of the federation, but he could not collect the salaries pertaining to the office because the required proclamation papers were absent. He therefore went to court to compel the Board to proclaim him.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court was correct in declaring that the petitioner, a mere second placer to a disqualified winning candidate, was not qualified to assume the presidency of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chapter of Baybay, Leyte.
• Whether or not the votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate should be treated as stray, void, or meaningless, such that the second placer should be deemed the winner.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Republic Act Number 6646, the provision on which the petitioner relied, provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.

The petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the votes cast for Veloso should be treated as stray or invalid, and that the disqualification retroacted to the filing of the protest.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court was correct. The doctrine is not new. As early as Geronimo versus Ramos, the Court had ruled that the fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared disqualified does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. The Court restated the principle in this wise:

The rule therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The rationale is that to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over despite his rejection by the electorate would disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and would undermine the people's right to elect officials of their choice. The Court added, in the language of Aquino versus Commission on Elections, that the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained the majority or plurality of votes cast where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes. The Court found no cogent reason to reexamine or disturb this firmly settled rule, and held that the second placer lost the elections and was repudiated by the voters.

On the second issue, the Court likewise ruled against the petitioner. It held that the contention that the votes cast for Veloso should be treated as stray, void, or meaningless, and that the disqualification should retroact so as to invalidate those votes, was squarely rejected in Reyes versus Commission on Elections, where it was pointed out that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified.

Doctrine

The ineligibility or disqualification of a candidate who received the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes cast for a disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was qualified, and they are not treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The disqualification does not retroact so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. This rule is tied to Section 6 of Republic Act Number 6646, which speaks only of not counting the votes cast for a candidate disqualified by final judgment; it does not authorize the proclamation of the second placer.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the trial court was affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the second placer is not the winner when the winning candidate is disqualified, because the votes for the disqualified candidate are presumed cast in the belief that he was qualified. Examiners use this case to test the rule on second placers in disqualification cases, often paired with Geronimo versus Ramos, Labo versus Commission on Elections, and Reyes versus Commission on Elections.