G.R. No. 130655. August 09, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEO MACALIAG, JESSE TORRE AND JULIVER CHUA, ACCUSED.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Iligan City in Criminal Case No. 5923,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered finding all the accuseds (sic) namely: Leo Macaliag,
Jesse Torre, a.k.a. “Sasot” and Juliver Chua, a.k.a. “Botyok”, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder as the same
is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
sentencing each and every accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for under the law as
well as to pay the cost. They are furthermore ordered to pay the heirs
of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
the death of deceased Brian Jalani and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
and for moral damages.SO ORDERED.[1]
This case originated from the information filed against
accused-appellants Jesse Torre, a.k.a. “Sasot” and Juliver Chua, a.k.a.
“Botyok”, along with co-accused Leo Macaliag which alleged:
That on or about April 16, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, armed with a deadly weapon, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one
Brian Jalani, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical
injuries, to wit:– Cardio Respiratory Arrest
– Hypovolemic Shock, R shoulder
R Infrascapular area, L Lumbar
all penetratingwhich caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation.[2]
The prosecution relied, for the most part, on the testimony of
eyewitness Anacleto Moste who related in open court the relevant
incidents of that fateful night of April 16, 1995. According to him, he
was then watching a political rally at Purok Rosal, Villaverde, Iligan
City on or about 9:30 o’clock in the evening when he heard a certain
David, who was in a state of panic, asking for help because someone was
being stabbed near Baslayan Creek, not too distant from where the rally
was taking place. When he arrived at the scene, he saw three (3) men
attacking a lone victim. He was able to recognize the three (3) accused
as the perpetrators, as well as the hapless victim, one Brian Jalani,
for they were all personally known to him. There was adequate lighting
coming from a nearby lamp post, and witness Moste was only a mere eight
(8) to ten (10) meters away from them. Furthermore, there were no
obstructions to his line of vision. In describing the positions of the
accused relative to the victim, witness Moste testified that accused
Torre was holding the neck of victim Jalani from the latter’s back,
while the other two accused, Chua and Macaliag, were to the victim’s
right and left, taking turns in stabbing him. He shouted at the
perpetrators three (3) times before accused Torre pushed the victim into
the creek, after which all the three (3) accused fled towards the
direction of Purok Gumamela. Moste was about to chase them, but decided
against it when he heard the cries of the victim who was sinking into
the mud and gasping for breath, at the same time bleeding profusely from
his stab wounds. Moste tried to solicit the aid of some onlookers,
shouting for help, as he himself started to drown in the mud while
striving to keep victim Jalani from sinking. Finally, three workers
from Dado Lechon took pity and pulled Moste and Jalani out of the muddy
creek.
After some difficulty in securing a vehicle, the victim was
finally brought to the Dr. Uy Hospital for treatment, but he (Jalani)
succumbed to death shortly thereafter. By then, witness Moste had
already left the hospital to notify Jalani’s mother and to report the
incident to one SPO4 Lubang, who happened to be Moste’s neighbor.[3]
The prosecution also presented Dr. Livey Villarin to identify the
necropsy report. The doctor testified that the victim sustained six
(6) stab wounds in all: three (3) in front and three (3) at his back;
the most fatal of which was the one on the victim’s chest.[4]
The final witness for the prosecution was SPO4 Antonio Lubang who
was, at the time of the incident, the Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigating Unit of Precinct 4 of the Iligan City Police Command. He
testified that at 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of April 17, 1995,
he was awakened by witness Moste and a certain Rene Alasagas who
reported the stabbing incident involving the victim Brian Jalani and the
three accused. He further averred that upon investigation, other
witnesses positively identified Macaliag as one of the perpetrators. He
was also able to interview one Jeffrey Yorong who stated that had he
not been able to escape, he would have been the first victim of the same
perpetrators that night.[5]
There were no immediate arrests since all three accused had fled
the vicinity. It was only on February 1, 1996 or almost ten (10) months
later that accused Juliver Chua was apprehended. The other two
accused, Leo Macaliag and Jesse Torre, were brought under the
jurisdiction of the trial court some four (4) months thereafter. Upon
their arraignment, all three accused pleaded not guilty, interposing the
defense of alibi.
For his part, accused Juliver Chua argued that he could not have
been in the vicinity of the crime because he was then dancing at a disco
in Tambacan, Iligan City; that he only returned to Villaverde, Iligan
City in the early hours of the morning of April 17, 1995; that he even
met prosecution witness Moste along the way, where the latter allegedly
asked him (Chua) if he knew the whereabouts of Leo Macaliag and Jesse
Torre.
On cross-examination, accused Chua testified that on or about
1:10 in the morning, on his way home from the disco, he met co-accused
Leo Macaliag and Jesse Torre at Aldo Arts and Signs, both of whom
persuaded him to accompany them to Purok Manuang, Mahayahay, Iligan
City. It was there where he first learned that Brian Jalani had been
stabbed to death by Macaliag and Torre, allegedly with the participation
of one Jun Tacastacas and Michael Pato, who were then having a drinking
session. He decided to go home because he was afraid that he would be
implicated in whatever crime Macaliag and the others had committed.[6]
Accused Chua’s alibi was corroborated by his girlfriend, Carla
Garces. She testified that she was with Chua at the disco on the night
of the incident and that they were together the whole time. They left
the disco together at about 1:00 o’clock in the morning, parting ways at
the traffic light at Quezon Avenue.[7]
Next to testify on Chua’s behalf was his mother Antonia Chua, who
related that at 10:00 o’clock in the evening of April 16, 1995, she
went to the disco to fetch her son, but she left him in the company of
his girlfriend Carla Garces who agreed to accompany him home. The elder
Chua further stated that her son arrived home at 1:30 o’clock in the
morning of the following day.[8]
On the part of accused Jesse Torre, his mother, Rosita Torre
testified that at the time of the incident, Jesse was with her at their
home, sleeping until the following morning because he had a fever.
After he recovered from his illness, accused Torre left for Cagayan de
Oro City, where he worked vending peanuts until he and co-accused Leo
Macaliag were arrested in June of 1996.[9]
Accused Jesse Torre reiterated that he was at home, sick with
fever, on the night of the tragic incident. He denied knowing the
victim, Brian Jalani, while averring that he met co-accused Chua for the
first time when both were already incarcerated in the city jail. He
also refuted earlier testimony that he and Macaliag were notoriously
known as partners in crime, saying that they were mere acquaintances.
And contrary to accused Chua’s earlier allegation, Torre said he was not
with the group of Macaliag, Tacastacas, Pato and Chua in Barrio
Manuang, Mahayahay, Iligan City, in the early morning of April 17, 1995.[10]
When it came time for accused Leo Macaliag to testify, he
asserted that at the time of the incident, he was home drinking beer
with his father. He only learned of the incident when accused Chua came
knocking and asked if he (Chua) could hide in the Macaliag house for a
while. He recalled that Chua’s clothes were bloodied and covered with
mud, prompting him to refuse Chua’s request. Shortly thereafter, SPO4
Antonio Lubang and prosecution witness Moste arrived, asking the
whereabouts of Leo Macaliag’s younger brother, Roel, who was then
attending the political rally. He further averred that he stayed home
for several weeks before moving to Cagayan de Oro City, where he also
found a job selling peanuts until he was apprehended.[11]
The last witness for the defense was one Estela Minister, a
neighbor of accused Macaliag, who testified that at 11:00 o’clock in the
evening of April 16, 1995, she was doing her laundry in front of her
house. She corroborated Macaliag’s testimony that accused Juliver Chua
came to the Macaliag residence, but Chua was harangued by Leo’s mother
who scolded him (Chua) and denied him entry. That upon seeing Chua’s
dirty clothes and bloodied hands, she discontinued her washing, fearful
that Chua would return.[12]
After carefully evaluating all the conflicting testimonies and
evidence adduced by the opposing parties, the Regional Trial Court
rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty of the murder of
Brian Jalani.
Not satisfied with the decision rendered by the trial court,
accused Jesse Torre and Juliver Chua filed the instant appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that –
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.III
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS INDEED KILLED THE VICTIM,
THEN THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF
MURDER INSTEAD OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE.[13]
In support of the first and second assigned errors, the
accused-appellants argued that while it is the rule that conclusions and
findings of fact of the trial court are binding and are generally not
disturbed on appeal, said rule is not without exception, such as when
the trial court ignored and overlooked facts of such weight and
influence which could alter the result if considered.[14]
The appellants submit that their case is an exception to the general
rule, for the trial court overlooked and ignored the fact that the
testimony of the alleged eyewitness Anacleto Moste was patently
incredible and sadly lacking in truth, candor and spontaneity.[15]
In particular, the accused-appellants found it hard to believe
that Moste, knowing that the assailants were supposedly “police
characters”, could summon the courage to shout at them, and even
contemplate running after them. To the accused-appellants, such a show
of bravery runs counter to the ordinary course of human experience.
Secondly, they pointed out that Moste’s testimony did not agree with the
medical findings that the victim sustained only six (6) stab wounds,
which in their opinion was too few considering that some amount of time
had elapsed since a certain David first witnessed the stabbing until
Moste’s arrival at the scene. Furthermore, Moste’s testimony that there
were no policemen or bodyguards during the political rally at Purok
Rosal is not to be believed since it is public knowledge that there are
always bodyguards or police escorts protecting the candidates during
rallies.
The accused-appellants’ contentions are bereft of merit. The
trial court based its judgment on the credible and overwhelming evidence
presented by the prosecution. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the
conclusions or findings of fact of the trial court. First, the bravery,
or even heroism, of eyewitness Moste should not be belittled by the
appellants’ apparent lack of faith in the inherent goodness of human
beings. While it cannot be denied that not all men are heroes, neither
are all men cowards. Besides, what was in Moste’s testimony that was
unbelievable? He admitted that his initial reaction was fear, but such
fear did not paralyze him to inaction or apathy. Instead, the better
and more compassionate part of his being drove him to perform a civic,
if not moral duty. Eyewitness Moste is not a stranger to violence or
civic duty. He was once a member of the Philippine Constabulary
assigned in Lanao del Sur[16] and later with the PNP[17]
and as such, he must have witnessed countless violent acts while
relying on inner courage to preserve the life and limb of others. Given
the circumstances as well as the character and experience of eyewitness
Moste, we find nothing incredible in his reaction to the incident and
his consequent testimony. While witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience which draws varying reactions from different people, it is
well-established that there can be no clear cut standard form of
behavior or response that can be expected.[18]
Fortunately for the prosecution, eyewitness Moste is possessed of
better qualities than most men. No amount of nonchalance or even
condescension on the part of the accused-appellants can diminish
eyewitness Moste’s apparent selflessness, as well as credibility.
The fact that the victim sustained only six (6) stab wounds
considering the amount of time that had elapsed is irrelevant to Moste’s
credibility as a witness. The length of time that a crime takes to
accomplish is never an indication of the number or severity of the
wounds that the perpetrators can inflict on a victim. It is sufficient
that eyewitness Moste saw and recognized the appellants while they were
engaged in the dastardly deed of stabbing the victim. Besides, the
victim also sustained abrasions apart from the multiple stab wounds, as
testified to by the doctor who conducted the autopsy.[19]
It could even be concluded that said injury was sustained while the
victim tried to fight off his assailants. The victim’s resistance
obviously slowed down the accused-appellants in the perpetration of
their crime. Be that as it may, this supposed inconsistency is too
minor and insignificant to affect the credibility of Moste as a witness.[20]
Besides, such a perceived inconsistency makes Moste’s testimony
even more credible. The rule is well-settled that inconsistencies and
contradictions which are minor, trivial and inconsequential cannot
impair the credibility of the witness. On the contrary, they only serve
to strengthen the veracity of his categorical, straightforward and
spontaneous testimony.[21]
Consequently, it is of no moment that eyewitness Moste did not
see any policemen or bodyguards of the candidates at the political
rally. This argument is too trivial to be entertained. It has no
bearing at all on the crime committed, and it is obvious that the
accused-appellants are merely clutching at straws to bolster a very
tenuous attack on the eyewitness’ credibility.
Given the weakness of the accused-appellant’s arguments impugning
the credibility of eyewitness Moste, the trial court did not err in
giving full weight and credence to his testimony. The factual findings
of the trial court based on eyewitness Moste’s testimony deserves the
respect of this Court and must be accorded finality.[22]
In the absence of any indication that the trial court overlooked some
material fact or gravely abused its discretion, we see no compelling
reason to interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the eyewitness’
credibility.[23]
In the second assigned error, accused-appellants contend that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This
contention is equally without merit. Even though Moste is the lone
eyewitness to testify, his testimony is sufficient to convict the
accused since his testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity,
spontaneously and naturally delivered in a straightforward manner.[24]
Besides, the accused-appellants never questioned eyewitness Moste’s
motives for testifying against them. There was no indication that
Moste’s motives were improper, such that he would be driven to falsely
testify against the accused-appellants under solemn oath. It would run
counter to the natural order of events and of human nature, and contrary
to the presumption of good faith, for a prosecution witness to falsely
testify if the accused is truly innocent.[25]
Moreover, the lone testimony of eyewitness Moste, having been
found credible and positive, is sufficient to convict the appellants for
the truth is established not by quantity, but by the quality of his
testimony.[26]
Be that as it may, the accused-appellants argue that there was
reasonable doubt because their defense of alibi was supported by candid
and credible testimony. While admitting that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak, such defense was sufficiently proven by the
accused-appellants and their witnesses.
The required elements for alibi to be appreciated are: (1) to
prove the accused’s presence at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (2) to demonstrate that it would thus be
physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.[27]
Accused-appellant Juliver Chua claimed that he was at a disco with his
girlfriend at the time of the stabbing incident. His corroborative
witnesses were his girlfriend, Carla Garces, and his mother, Antonia
Chua. Accused-appellant Jesse Torre claimed that he was at home, sick
with fever, a declaration which his mother, Rosita Torre, confirmed. An
examination of the accused-appellants’ defense of alibi reveals the
same to be self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law. The
appellants failed to present other witnesses to substantiate their
alibi. Thus, their alibi was not sufficiently proven in the absence of
credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses.[28]
It is a well-entrenched rule that when an accused’s alibi can
only be confirmed by his relatives and friends who may not be impartial
witnesses, his denial of culpability of affirmative testimony merits
scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimony of
an eyewitness as to the accused’s presence in the crime scene.[29]
It has been uniformly held time and again that alibi and denial is
worthless and cannot prevail over positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness.[30]
Moreover, since the accused-appellants’ alibi was established
only by themselves, their relatives and friends, their denial of guilt
should be treated with the strictest scrutiny.[31]
While they claimed that the accused-appellants were at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, they could not prove that it
was physically impossible for the accused-appellants to be at the scene
of the crime. As found by the trial court, to wit:
There exists no physical impossibility in instances where it would
take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle or
some one and a half hours by foot to traverse the distance between the
place where the accused allegedly was at the time of the commission and
the scene of the crime. Recently, the highest Court has ruled that
there can be no physical impossibility even if the distances between the
two places is merely two (2) hours by bus. (People vs. Abuyan Jr.,
G.R. No. 95254-55, July 1992; People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687).The testimony of accused Juliver Chua’s mother (Antonia Chua) and
his sweetheart (Carla Garcia) are bereft of any proof that accused
Juliver Chua could not have been at the scene of the crime on the said
date at around 9:30 in the evening.[32]
We note that when faced with the indubitable evidence of the
prosecution, it became “every man for himself” for the
accused-appellants. Juliver Chua testified that it was Macaliag and
Torre who killed Jalani, while Macaliag countered by testifying that it
was Chua who did the victim in. As most guilty conspirators are prone
to do, when caught between a rock and a hard place, they turn on each
other in the vain hope that blame is shifted to someone else. All these
accusations and counter-accusations only tend to prove that they had
personal knowledge of the crime. It is clearly a desperate ploy to
escape culpability. It is not too difficult to see this tactic as a
last-ditch attempt to pin the guilt on the other accused to bolster a
sagging defense. The courts are not easily swayed by such conflicting
testimonies, especially when the obvious motive is to distort the truth
and frustrate the ends of justice.
Finally, the accused-appellants assail the trial court’s finding
that the offense was committed with treachery as manifested by their
taking advantage of their weapon and superiority in number. The
accused-appellants contend that the trial court should not have
convicted them for murder considering that the lone eyewitness did not
see how the fatal incident started.
It is well-established that treachery, to be considered a
qualifying circumstance, must be proven as clearly and indubitably as
the crime itself,[33] and it may not be simply deduced from presumption.[34]
In the instant case, the trial court based its conclusion that there
was treachery on the mere fact that there were three perpetrators as
against a lone victim, and that a bladed weapon was used to execute the
crime. The lower court, however, failed to consider that the lone
eyewitness did not testify as to how the stabbing incident commenced,
for indeed, said eyewitness would have no knowledge thereof. He arrived
at the scene some time after the stabbing started and thus, he could
not testify as to whether or not there was provocation on the part of
the victim.
This Court has uniformly ruled that treachery cannot qualify a
killing to murder if the solitary eyewitness did not see the
commencement of the assault. In the absence of indubitable testimony on
the manner in which the aggression was commenced, treachery cannot be
reasonably appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.[35]
Thus, since the eyewitness failed to witness the initial attack
inflicted on the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot
be applied.[36]
In the recent case of People v. Cario,[37] this Court ruled that:
“Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Thus,
where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression
was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, treachery can in no way be established from mere
suppositions, drawn solely from circumstances prior to the killing. x x
x. The crime thus committed is only homicide, not murder as held by the
trial court.”
And in the case of People v. Parras,[38] this Court had occasion to rule that:
“Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as
conclusively as the killing itself. x x x. In this regard, the
prosecution failed to definitively establish the manner in which the
initial assault against the deceased victim was committed to justify the
appreciation of treachery. This hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence
cannot be substituted by mere suppositions as what the trial court
apparently did. It is a well-settled rule that in order to appreciate
treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in
this case, the same must be shown present at the inception of the
attack. Absent any showing therefor, treachery as a qualifying
circumstance may not be considered.”
Consequently, the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants
guilty of the crime of murder and penalizing them under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. Under the circumstances, they can only be
convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the crime was attended by the
presence of an aggravating circumstance. It was committed with apparent
abuse of superior strength. The victim was clearly overwhelmed by the
combined efforts of all three (3) accused who not only enjoyed
superiority in number, but also of weapons.[39]
The records reveal that the defenseless victim was held back by accused
Torre, while co-accused Chua and Macaliag took turns in stabbing him.
There was obviously abuse of superior strength since all three (3)
accused acted in concert to accomplish their felonious designs against
the unarmed victim. They purposely took advantage of their superior
number and combined strength and force which was grossly out of
proportion to whatever means of defense was available to their victim.[40]
Meanwhile, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be
considered since the records reveal that the scene of the crime was
well-lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Nocturnity does not become a
modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted, and thus could no
longer insure the offender’s immunity from identification or capture.[41]
There being only one generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposed must be that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.[42]
Based on all the foregoing, it is clear that the
accused-appellants can only be found guilty of the crime of homicide and
the appropriate penalty thereof is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The other co-accused, Leo Macaliag, who did not join the
appellants in this appeal, shall also benefit from this judgment insofar
as it is favorable and applicable to him.[43]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellants Juliver Chua and
Jesse Torre, including co-accused Leo Macaliag, are found GUILTY of
Homicide and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with costs
against said accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 32.
[2] Rollo, p. 9.
[3] TSN, May 21, 1996, pp. 6-21.
[4] TSN, September 3, 1996, pp. 12-18.
[5] TSN, July 17, 1996, pp. 8-9.
[6] TSN, November 20, 1996, pp. 21-38.
[7] Id., pp. 3-10.
[8] Id., pp. 11-20.
[9] TSN, November 21, 1996, pp. 3-13.
[10] Id., pp. 15-25.
[11] TSN, February 6, 1997, pp. 3-15.
[12] TSN, March 11, 1997, pp. 2-5.
[13] Rollo, p. 57.
[14] People v. Ganan,
Jr., 265 SCRA 260, 279 (1996) citing People v. Aguilar, 222 SCRA 394,
405 (1993); People v. Frago, 232 SCRA 653 (1994); People v. Dismuke, 234
SCRA 51 (1994); People v. Pastores, 227 SCRA 424 (1993).
[15] Rollo, p. 63.
[16] TSN, May 21, 1996, p. 6.
[17] TSN, September 3, 1996, p. 5.
[18] People v. Laceste, 293 SCRA 407 (1998); People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 220 (1998).
[19] TSN, September 3, 1996, p. 15.
[20] People v. Gargar, 300 SCRA 542, 553 (1998); People v. Grefaldia, 298 SCRA 337, 347 (1998).
[21] People v. Ibalang,
286 SCRA 387, 399 (1998); People v. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353, 363 (1998);
People v. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124, 140 (1998); People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA
559, 569 (1998).
[22] People v. Manuel, 298 SCRA 184, 194 (1998).
[23] People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751, 781 (1998).
[24] People v. Burce, 289 SCRA 445, 463 (1998); People v. Cabebe, 290 SCRA 543, 555 (1998).
[25] People v. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384, 395 (1998).
[26] Bautista v. CA,
288 SCRA 171, 178 (1998); People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679, 689 (1998);
People v. Daraman, 294 SCRA 27, 44 (1998).
[27] People v. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96, 101 (1998); People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 271 (1998).
[28] People v. Cabanela, 299 SCRA 153, 163 (1998).
[29] People v. Mendoza, 292 SCRA 168, 179-180 (1998); People v. Araneta, 300 SCRA 80, 95 (1998).
[30] People v. Bibat,
290 SCRA 27, 39 (1998); People v. Ravanes, 284 SCRA 634, 639 (1998);
People v. Siguin, 299 SCRA 124, 139 (1998).
[31] People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393, 402 (1998).
[32] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[33] People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129, 155-156 (1998).
[34] People v. Demonteverde, 290 SCRA 175, 185 (1998); People v. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349, 358 (1998).
[35] People v. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, 515 (1998); People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529, 541 (1998).
[36] People v.
Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638, 653 (1998), citing People v. Salvador, 224
SCRA 819 (1993) and People v. Cordero, 217 SCRA 1 (1993).
[37] G.R. No. 123325, 288 SCRA 404, 419-420 (1998).
[38] G.R. No. 114263-64, 255 SCRA 514, 529-530 (1996).
[39] People v. Araneta, supra.
[40] People v. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474, 491 (1998); People v. Castillo, supra, People v. Solis, supra.
[41] People v. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151, 170 (1998); People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411, 429 (1998).
[42] Article 64, Section 3, Revised Penal Code.
[43] People v.
Caballes, 274 SCRA 83, 100 (1997), citing Section 11, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court; Ladino v. Garcia, 265 SCRA 422, 427-428 (1996); People
v. Ganan, Jr., supra.