STANDARD-VACUUM OIL CO., PETITIONER, VS. ANITA TAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

On May 3, 1949, Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico, employees of
the Standard Vacuum Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as STANVAC),
were delivering gasoline from a tank trailer to the Rural Transit Co.
at its garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila. While the
gasoline was being discharged to a subterranean tank, the discharge
hose suddenly caught fire. It spread to the rear part of the tank
truck, and as somebody shouted, “Fire, fire!” Sto. Domingo, who was
then busy writing his report inside the cab of the truck, went down to
investigate. He saw that his helper, Rico, had already removed the hose
and closed the cap screw of the tank. Obeying the signal of Rico, who
sustained burns on his face, Sto. Domingo drove out the truck from the
gasoline station compound towards Rizal Avenue Extension. But upon
reaching the street, he abandoned the truck without setting its parking
brake. Consequently, the vehicle continued moving to the opposite side
of the street causing three houses on that side—one of them belonging
to Anita Tan—to be burned and destroyed.

Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were subsequently charged with
arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Both were, however, acquitted after due trial because their
negligence was not proven and nobody knew what caused or started the
fire, it being just “an unfortunate accident.”

Anita Tan then filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against STANVAC, Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico, seeking
to recover the sum of P12,000.00 which was the cost of the construction
and repair of her house, plus legal interests. This complaint was later
amended to ask for actual and moral damages and to include as defendant
the Rural Transit Company. Upon defendants’ motion the complaint was
dismissed. But on appeal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by this
Court only with respect to defendants Sto. Domingo and Rico, and
reversed with regard to the other two defendants. (Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672.)

In the court a quo after the case had been remanded, the complaint
was finally amended to include additional party defendants and to
substitute the name of Rural Transit Co. with Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.,
it having been found that the former was but a garage and gasoline
station owned and operated of the latter.

After the issues had been joined and several hearings held, the
trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:

“In view of all the foregoing considerations, an alternative and conditional judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

“1.
Under the first cause of action for culpa aquiliana, the defendants
Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the Bachrach Motor Company are hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, (a) the
sum of P10,630.80 for what plaintiff has spent in the reconstruction of
her house No. 2540, Rizal Avenue Extension, this City, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from January 6, 1950, the date of
the filing of the original complaint in this case; (b) P2,700.00 for rentals which she failed to receive while said house was under construction; (c) P1,000.00 for moral damages; (d) fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts mentioned in (a), (b) and (c) of this paragraph for attorney’s fees; and (d) to pay the costs;

“2.
Under the second cause of action and in pursuance of the provisions of
Art. 101, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal Code, defendants Pilar T.
Bautista, Milagros G. Tinio, and the Heirs of the deceased Inocencio
Gochangco, to wit, Severina L. Gochangco, Conrado Gochangco, Segundina
Alcazar and Noemi G. Palma (these heirs as one), are hereby ordered to
pay plaintiff the same amounts which appear in No. 1 of the dispositive
part of this decision in proportion to the values of their respective
properties as above set forth but, if this judgment is executed against
them and they do pay, their payment shall be without prejudice to seek
proportional reimbursement from defendants Gloria Posadas Arkonel and
the Bachrach Motor Company, whose properties have also been saved from
the conflagration;

“3. Plaintiff shall not be entitled to
both of the remedies mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 hereof, nor can the
defendants in either number seek reimbursement from those in the other.”

From that judgment, the two defendant companies appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On September 18, 1957, that court rendered its
decision absolving Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., from any liability, but
affirming the appealed judgment with respect to STANVAC, with the
modification that it shall pay plaintiff Anita Tan only the amount of
P13,036.60, plus legal interest, STANVAC in due time filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same having been denied, it filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.

The Court of Appeals in the decision complained of expressly found
that “the record of the case at bar is replete with evidence showing
that if the fire that gutted the house of Anita Tan was not caused by
Sto. Domingo’s and Rico’s criminal negligence, evidently it was so
caused by their fault and lack of equanimity in the presence of the
fire which suddenly and for unknown reasons sparked in the discharge
hose and which could have been put out by the proper and opportune use
of the fire extinguishers with which the tank-trailer was equipped.” It
also found that there was negligence on the part of the employer,
herein petitioner STANVAC itself, in the direction or supervision of
its two employees. To better show the acts or omissions constituting
the fault or negligence of petitioner and its two employees, the
pertinent portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereunder
quoted as follows:

“It is admitted that the Rural Transit Station had a
shaded portion and an open cemented space. The main opening of its
subterranean tank was nearer the shaded part than Rizal Avenue
Extension. It is presumed that during the discharge operation the
tank-trailer was parked in the middle of the open space which had an
area of 65 feet by 55 feet (Exh. ‘Q’). Hence had the tank-trailer truck
been left in that open space, appellee’s house would not have been
burned nor would an explosion of the underground tank have occurred
because, according to Sto. Domingo himself, when he drove the truck out
to the street, Rico had already removed the hose from the opening of
said tank and closed it with the cap screw (t.s.n., p. 100 Santiago).
This conclusion is fully sustained by then Acting Deputy Chief of the
Manila Fire Department, Braulio Aloña who, when asked if the
subterranean tank would have exploded had not the tank-trailer been
removed from the place where it caught fire, categorically answered,
‘No, señor, no explotaria.’ (t.s.n., p. 9—Quimpo.)

“It is
likewise admitted that the two fire extinguishers which the
tank-trailer carried (appellant’s brief, p. 24), were not detached and
put to use by Sto. Domingo and Rico. Instead, in open violation of
condition No. 8 of the Permit for the Transportation of Combustible by
Tank Truck (Exh. ‘X-2’)—which provides that ‘Whenever refilling or
filling work is conducted, fire extinguisher must be on hand and
readied for fire emergency by an experienced operator until the fill or
discharge operation is completed’—Sto. Domingo went into the cab of the
truck to write his report while Rico watched with empty hands the
unloading of the gasoline. Had both employees of appellant oil company
complied with the condition just quoted by closely observing the
discharge operation with the fire extinguishers in their hands ready
for use, they could have used these instruments instantly and would
certainly have been able to put out the spark that ignited the hose
during the discharge operation—just as the foreman of Rural Transit
Station succeeded in putting out the fire at the mouth of the
underground tank by the proper usage of the station’s only extinguisher.

“The
above transcribed condition speaks of an ‘experienced operator’, who
must use and operate the fire extinguisher. Yet, Sto. Domingo, who,
according to appellant’s evidence, had some training and took periodic
refresher courses on the proper way of making delivery of its highly
inflammable products by means of tank trailer, including the use and
operation of the fire extinguisher, did not personally attend to the
discharge of the gasoline but entrusted this very delicate and most
risky task to Igmidio Rico, who had no training at all—or if he had
some, it was not proven during the trial.

“While the
discharge of the gasoline to the underground tank was undertaken, there
were many persons waiting for the passenger truck ‘about two or three
meters’ from the tank-trailer truck, milling about it (t.s.n., pp. 9
and 10—Garcia). Even Sto. Domingo admitted that when he stopped writing
and turned around because of the shout of ‘fire, fire!’ he saw a woman
at the left side of his truck who ran towards a bus inside the Rural
Transit garage (Exh. ‘N-2’). It was indeed lack of foresight, bordering
on culpable negligence, on the part of Sto. Domingo and Rico to have
allowed many persons to roam around near the tank-trailer while the
discharge of the gasoline was under way, considering the high
volatility and inflammability of this liquid.

“Sixta Lazaro,
who lived directly across the street from the Rural Transit Station,
declared: ‘On May 3, 1949 between 3 and 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon I
was picking clothes stretched under the sun and I heard somebody
shouting “sunog, sunog” (“fire, fire”). When I turned my head to look
at the direction from which the shout came, I saw inside the garage of
the Rural Transit Company a green truck discharging gasoline, with the
rear part already aflame. I went to our bathroom to see better what was
happening. I saw the driver started the truck perhaps to drive it out
from the premises but before the truck reached the street the driver
jump out from his seat. I saw the truck coming right to the direction
of our house so I picked up my boy about two years old and I went
downstairs. We have just reached downstairs when I heard the truck was
jummed at the ditch in front of our house.’ (t.s.n., pp. 21 and 22,
Garcia). According to this witness, after the driver jumped out, ‘the
truck continued in motion’ (.t.s.n., p. 26—Garcia and the flame at the
rear part of the truck was still ‘about one foot high from the bottom
of the tank’, (t.s.n., p. 28—Garcia) in a place marked as circle 1 in
Exhibit ‘D’. Evidently, Sto. Domingo was seized with panic and
abandoned the truck without setting its parking brake and without using
the extinguisher which was ‘placed on the usual place on the side of
the truck’ (t.s.n., p. 25—Garcia). Had he stopped the truck on the
western side of Rizal Avenue Extension and operated the fire
extinguisher instead of running away from the scene of occurrence, most
probably he could have checked the lire and prevented the burning of
appellee’s house, because even at that moment the fire in the rear part
of the tank-trailer was only about one foot high.

“The facts
narrated in the five preceding paragraphs prove that the employees of
appellant oil company did not exercise special care and diligence
required by the exceptional character of the work they were undertaking
on May 3, 1949, in the ordinary course of their employment in the
service of appellant oil company.

“Another equally
unmeritorious contention of appellant oil company is that the trial
court erred in holding that this appellant was negligent in not having
appropriately instructed its employees.

“It is of common
knowledge that gasoline is a highly volatile and combustible liquid.
For this reason, aside from the requirements that-tank-trailers should
have drag chains or other flexible metallic devices long enough to
reach the ground; that it should use only electric lights with fuses or
automatic circuit breakers; that smoking is absolutely prohibited
during deliveries or when the tank is being filled; and others (Exh.
‘K—2′), the owners or sellers of said liquid must properly instruct
their laborers and’ employees charged with the delivery or handling of
the liquid on how to manipulate the fire extinguishers so that they may
instantly put out any spark. They should likewise be given the location
of the nearest fire alarm for immediate notification of the fire
department if the spark assumes proportions greater than can be
extinguished by the small hand apparatus. It has not been shown that
Igmidio Rico received any such instruction or training from appellant;
and Julito Sto. Domingo, who underwent some training, testified that
during his training period and three years of service, he was not
instructed on the usage and shown the locations of the fire alarms in
the vicinity of the stations where he used to deliver gasoline, neither
was he given by appellant any sketch or map to show the location of
said fire alarms (t.s.n., pp. 31 and 32—Boaquina). Thus, he was not
able to locate any fire alarm during his ten-minute laborious search.
Had an early warning from Sto. Domingo been received by the fire
department, the destruction of appellee’s house might have been
prevented by the prompt action of the firemen.

“On the other
hand, appellant oil company knew of the practice of Sto. Domingo of
writing his reports in the cab of the truck during discharge
operations, and yet appellant oil company did not advise him against
it, nor prohibit him from doing it (t.s.n., pp. 60, 63 and
64—Santiago). Had appellant ordered Sto. Domingo to stop this practice
and instructed him to personally attend to the discharge of the
gasoline with the fire extinguisher ready, he would indubitably hare
been able to check the fire at its inception, taking into account his
special training which Rico did not have.

“Obviously, those
considerations frustrate appellant’s attempt to exculpate itself, under
the last paragraph of Article 1903 of the old Civil Code, by trying to
futilely prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage to appellee’s property.”

Counsel, for petitioner STANVAC contends that since its employees
Sto. Domingo and Rico had previously been found by competent court to
be not negligent—referring to the court acquitting them in the criminal
case for arson thru reckless imprudence—said petitioner cannot now be
held liable for damages. The contention, in our opinion, cannot be
sustained. It is admitted that respondent Anita Tan sought to hold
STANVAC liable under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
law in force at the time the fire in question occurred. Under those
articles, the liability of the employer is primary and direct, based
upon his own negligence (culpa aquiliana) and not on that of his
employees or servants. (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38
Phil., 768.) The present proceeding, therefore, is entirely unrelated
to the judgment in the criminal case where petitioner’s two employees
were acquitted because their criminal negligence was not proved and the
cause of the fire could not be determined. Parenthetically, after the
trial court had ordered the dismissal of respondent Anita Tan’s
complaint, this Court on appeal reversed that order as to STANVAC and
authorized the proceedings against said company, which was sued “not
precisely because of the negligent acts of its two employees but
because of acts of its own which might have contributed to the fire
that destroyed the house of plaintiff (herein respondent Anita Tan).”
Continuing, this Court further observed that—

“* * * The complaint contains definite allegations
of negligent acts properly attributable to the company which if proven
and not refuted may serve as basis of its civil liability. Thus, in
paragraph 5 of the first cause of action, it is expressly alleged that
this company, through its employees, failed to take the necessary
precautions or measures to insure safety and avoid harm to persons and
damage to property as well as to observe that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demanded,
thereby causing the gasoline they were unloading to catch fire. The
precautions or measures which this company has allegedly failed to take
to prevent fire are not clearly stated, but they are matters of
evidence which need not now be determined. Suffice it to say, that such
allegation furnishes enough basis for a cause of action against this
company. * * *.”

Taking great pains in minutely scrutinizing the allegations in the
complaint, counsel for petitioner avers that STANVAC was merely
referred to therein as the employer and was not at all charged with
negligence. Be that as it may, it is undisputed that no objection was
made to the presentation of evidence as to the negligent acts of
STANVAC during the trial of the case. As a matter of fact, it even
tried to overcome that evidence by introducing evidence of its own
tending to show that it had employed the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. The issue, therefore, regarding the
negligence of petitioner STANVAC—even assuming that the complaint does
not really contain allegations of negligent acts properly attributable
to it—must be considered as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And
the Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are final and conclusive
upon this Court, having found that petitioner company did fail to take
necessary precautions or measures to prevent fire, and that the fire
that destroyed respondent Anita Tan’s house could have been avoided had
petitioner exercised due care in the supervision or control of its
employees, the appellate court’s ruling on its liability cannot now be
disturbed.

In view of the foregoing, the decision sought to be reviewed is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.