THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF. VISITACION M. MERIS, OFFENDED PARTY AND APPELLANT, VS. ASCENCION P. OLARTE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Defendant Ascencion P. Olarte is charged with libel. It is alleged
in the information that “on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 and
subsequently thereafter”, said defendant had wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously written certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous
and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, with evident and malicious
purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into
contempt the good name and reputation” of said complainant.

It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris lodged the
corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan,
who assigned it to an assistant provincial fiscal; that upon the
latter’s advice, on February 22, 1956, she filed with the Justice of
the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for libel
against Ascencion P. Olarte; that the defendant waived her right to a
preliminary investigation, whereupon the justice of the peace court
forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in
which the corresponding information was filed on July 3, 1956; that the
defendant “seasonably moved to quash the information upon the ground of
prescription of the offense; and that, after due hearing, the court of
first instance granted said motion and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.
Hence, this appeal by complainant Miss Meris, with the conformity of
the special counsel of the office of the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan, who represented the prosecution in said court.

Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon
the ground that the brief filed by appellant was prepared, and the
steps leading to its presentation were taken, by the private
prosecutors, not by the Solicitor General, and that, as a consequence,
said brief and steps were allegedly null and void. Upon the filing of
the Solicitor General’s opposition to said motion, this Court resolved
to act upon the same “when the case is considered on the merits”.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General adopted said brief for the appellant
as its own. It appearing from the foregoing that the office of said
provincial fiscal and the Solicitor General had thus acquiesced in and
supported the action taken by the complainant, the motion to dismiss
the appeal is hereby denied.

It is conceded that, as provided in Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, “the crime of libel * * * shall prescribe in two (2) years”,
which, pursuant to Article 91 of the same Code, “shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information * * * .” In an affidavit, attached to
the complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, Miss Meris
stated that one defamatory letter was received by her on February 27,
1954 and that there were other libelous letters, seemingly written
after the first. According to another affidavit, likewise, attached to
said complaint, the subsequent letters were received on or about March
1 and 13, April 26 and May 9, 1954. The issue in the lower court, as
well as in this appeal, is whether the statute of limitations was
suspended by the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace
court on February 22, 1956, as claimed by appellant, or continued to
run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the court
of first instance, as contended by the defendant. His Honor, the trial
judge adopted the latter alternative, and, accordingly, held that the
prescriptive period had expired before the filing of said information.

In support of this view, it is argued that, construing said Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, it was held, in People vs. Tayco (73 Phil., 500, 510):

“* * * it is clear that the complaint or information
referred to in article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court
and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the
offended-party in the City Fiscal’s Office. It is needless to add that
such accusation in the City Fiscal’s Office cannot end there in the
acquittal or conviction of the accused”;

that the “proper court”, for the purpose of suspending the running
of the statute of limitations in libel cases, is the court of first
instance not the justice of the peace court, because Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code originally provided:

“Persons responsible.—Any person who shall
publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the
same.

“The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein
to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

“The
criminal action and the civil action for damages in cases of written
defamation, as provided in this chapter, may be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province wherein the
libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place
where the same was written, printed or composed.

“No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended Party.”

and that, on June 15, 1955, it was amended by Republic Act No. 1289, to read:

“Persons responsible.—The person who shall
publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the
same.

“The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein
to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

“The
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city
where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides at the
time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited
in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended
party resides the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the
court of first instance thereof: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore,
That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not
apply to cases of written defamation, the civil and/or criminal actions
to which, have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of
this law.

“No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.”

Defendant and the lower court deduced from this amendment,
particularly from the substitution of the verb “shall” in lieu of the
term “may”, appearing in the third paragraph of the original provision,
that it is the filing of the information with the Court of First
Instance that interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, not
the presentation of the complaint in the justice of the peace court, or
the receipt in the Court of First Instance of the record forwarded by
said inferior court, because the proceedings in the justice of the
peace court merely seek to ascertain the existence of probable cause,
and the prosecution still has to file an information with the Court of
First Instance, before the latter can proceed with the determination of
the merits of the case. It has, also, been urged, in support of
defendant’s pretense, that the Revised Penal Code, as originally
enacted, as well as amended, would have merely provided that the
criminal and civil actions for written defamation may or should be
filed with the “proper court”, instead of naming, particularly the
“court of first instance”, had the framers of the law not intended to
divest justice of the peace courts of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel. However, the
majority of the members of this Court find the theory of the defense
untenable.

Prior to the approval of said Code, on December 8, 1930, the crime
of libel was governed by Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission,
which prescribed therefor, in section 2 therefor, “a fine of not
exceeding two thousand dollars or imprisonment for not exceeding one
year, or both.” Courts of first instance had original jurisdiction to
hear and decide criminal cases for libel, despite the silence of said
Act No. 277 thereon, inasmuch as section 56(6) of Act No. 136 of the
Philippine Commission vested upon said courts original jurisdiction
over “all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months’
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed.”

Pursuant to Act No. 277, civil actions for libel were, however,
within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance,
regardless of the amount involved, despite the provisions of Act No.
136 (section 56 [3], under which said courts had no original
jurisdiction over civil cases, except when “the demand exclusive of
interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to one
hundred dollars or more”. Section 11 of said Act No. 277 provided:

“In addition to the criminal action hereby
prescribed, a right of civil action is also hereby given to any person
libeled as hereinbefore set forth against the person libeling him for
damages sustained by such libel, and the person so libeled shall be
entitled to recover in such civil action not only the actual pecuniary
damages sustained by him but also damages for injury to his feelings
and reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may
think win be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.
Suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties.
The presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses herein
provided for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil
actions under this section.” (Italics ours.)

Thus criminal actions, as well as civil actions, for libel were
originally cognizable by courts of first instance under said Act No.
277. The jurisdiction of such courts over both kinds of action was maintained
by the Revised Penal Code. Although the same repealed Act No. 277,
sections 2 and 11 of the latter were, in effect, incorporated into the
third paragraph of Article 360 of said Code, as originally enacted,
with a qualification only as to venue, namely: “the criminal
action and civil action” for damages in cases of written defamation * *
* may be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.”

Said Article 360 specified the court in which both actions could be
filed, instead of referring merely to the “proper court”, because the
latter expression would have had the effect of amending the
existing law on the authority to hear and decide civil actions for
libel, the same being, pursuant to Act No. 277, within the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance, regardless of the amount
involved, whereas, under the general laws then in force, said courts
had no such jurisdiction over civil actions when the demand, exclusive
of interest, amounted to less than $100.00 As regards the criminal
action for libel, the specific mention of the Court of First Instance
in Article 360 was unnecessary, because the penalty prescribed for
libel in Article 355 of said Code, was prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200 to
P6,000, or both, and, hence, the offense was within the original
jurisdiction of the court aforementioned. The same had to be specified,
however, in said Article 360, inasmuch as both actions were dealt with
therein—unlike Act No. 277, section 2 of which regulated the criminal
action, whereas section 11 governed civil actions—so that there was no
means of saying that the civil action was triable before courts of
first instance, without applying the statement to the criminal action.

At any rate, it is apparent, from a perusal of the three (3)
provisions aforementioned, that the framers of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code intended to introduce no substantial change in the
existing law, except as regards venue, and that, in all other respects, they meant to preserve and continue the status quo
under sections 2 and 11 of Act No. 277. Such was, also, the purpose of
Congress in passing House Bill No. 2695, which eventually became
Republic Act No. 1289. The explanatory note to said bill is too clear
to admit of any doubt about it. It reads:

“Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which permits the offended party to file as many civil and criminal complaints for libel in as many places as
the writing complained of has been circulated, has been abused so as to
harass and indirectly muzzle newspapers, their editors and reporters.
The spectre of having to defend themselves at great expense in time and
money in many courts far away from their place of publication,
has often caused many a newspaper to adopt a less courageous and
militant attitude and to temporize too long before exposing fraud,
corruptions and other venalities in all nooks and corners of our
country.

“It is for the purpose of remedying this anomalous
procedural situation which undoubtedly lessens the effectiveness of our
free press to ferret out the evil and the wrong in our nation that this
accompanying measure is presented. If passed, it would limit the venue
of both civil and criminal complaints for libel to the province or
municipality where any of the accused or any of the offended party
resides.” (Italics ours.)

Inasmuch as the
framers of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, and those of Republic
Act No. 1298, did not intend to modify the conditions obtaining under
Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, insofar as jurisdiction to
hear and determine criminal and civil actions for libel are concerned,
the issue in the case at bar narrows, therefore, to whether or not
justice of the peace courts had authority to conduct preliminary
investigations of violations of our original libel law allegedly
committed within their respective municipalities.

In this connection, it should be noted that, barely two (2) months
prior to the passage of Act No. 277, or on August 10, 1901, the
Philippine Commission had approved Act No. 194, section 1 of which
vested in “every justice of the peace in the Philippine Islands” the
“authority to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to
have been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and
determine which is by law * * * vested in the judges of Courts of First
Instance.” It will be recalled, also, that Act No. 277 did not
particularize the class of court that would hear and determine criminal
actions for libel. The identity of the court was to be inferred merely
from the penalty prescribed for said offense in Act No. 277, considered
in relation to Act No. 136. The result was that, in view of the nature
of said penalty and the provisions of section 56 of Act No. 136,
criminal cases for libel were—and still are—within the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance. Now, then, can we justly hold
that by fixing for said offense a penalty falling under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance, the framers of section 2 of
Act No. 277 had evinced the intent, either to establish an exception to
the provisions of Act No. 194, authorizing every justice of the peace
“to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been
committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine
which is by law * * * vested in the judges of Courts of First
Instance,” or to divest justices of the peace of such authority, as
regards the crime of libel?

It is obvious to us that such inference is unwarranted. To begin
with, there is absolutely nothing in Act No. 277 to indicate the
aforementioned intent. Secondly, repeals or amendments by implication
are neither presumed nor favored. On the contrary, every statute should
be harmonized with other laws, in the absence of a clear inconsistency
between them. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to
hear and determine criminal actions within the original jurisdiction
thereof is far from inconsistent with the authority of justices of the
peace to make preliminary investigations in such actions. What is more,
this authority has been vested to relieve courts of first instance of
the duty to hear cases which are devoid of probable cause, thereby paving the way for the effective exercise of the, original jurisdiction of said courts and the expeditious disposal by title same of criminal cases which, are prima facie meritorious.

Why, it has been asked, has Republic Act No. 1289 amended the third
paragraph of Article 360—pursuant to which the criminal action and the
civil action for libel “may be filed * * * with the court of
first instance”— to provide that such actions “shall” be filed with the
aforementioned court? Does the substitution of “shall” in lieu of
“may” not show that the criminal action cannot be instituted in any
other court, that a complaint for libel filed with a justice of the
peace court is not the action contemplated in said Article 360, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1289, and that, accordingly, the filing of
said complaint did not suspend the running of the statute of
limitations, despite the provision of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code to the contrary?

The foregoing questions overlook the fact that, under Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment, and even under Act No.
277, which did not name the court that could hear and determine
criminal actions for libel, the same fell under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance. The possession of such
jurisdiction by these courts is due, therefore, neither to said change from “may” to “shall”, nor to the specific mention of said courts in Article 360. The nature of the penalty imposable sufficed to confer said jurisdiction upon courts of first instance, to the exclusion of all other courts.

Moreover, said questions fail to take into account the difference
between jurisdiction to hear and decide a criminal case, on the one
hand, and the authority to make in such case a preliminary
investigation, on the other. Worse still, the questions propounded
assume that the grant to courts of first instance of original
jurisdiction to determine criminal cases for libel, is, not only a denial, to justices of the peace, of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation in such cases, but, also, a withdrawal
of said authority, vested upon justices of the peace by Act No. 194,
insofar as the aforementioned cases are concerned, which is the very
point in dispute. Thus, the aforementioned questions beg the issue,
instead of demonstrating the validity of defendant’s pretense.

Apart from the foregoing, the theory of defendant herein is belied
by the history of the legal precepts under consideration. Act No. 277
contained no provision regulating the venue in criminal cases for
libel. Under the pertinent jurisprudence, the same could be brought “in
any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or
circulated, irrespective of where such article was written or printed.”
(33 Am. Jurs. 301.) As regards the suit for damages, it had to be
filed, according to section 11 of Act No. 277, with “any Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of file parties”, that is to say, in the
province in which either of them resided (Section 377, Act No. 190).
Said provision governing civil action for written defamation was
amended by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which
both actions, civil and criminal, “may be filed” with “the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of
the place where the same was written, printed or composed.”

In the course of time, the new policy appeared to be unwise, as
regards newspapers of general circulation. Indeed, under said Article
360, as originally enacted, an offended party residing, let us say, in
the province of Cagayan, could—for the purpose of causing undue
harassment—commence, in the province of Batanes, a civil action against
the publisher of a newspaper edited in Manila. At the same time, said
offended party could institute a criminal action in the Court of first
Instance, in Sulu. To avoid these evils, Article 360 was amended by
Republic Act No. 1289. Pursuant thereto, both actions must be filed with the same
court of first instance, and this must be that of “the province or city
where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides
at the time of the commission of the offense”, unless “the libel is
published, circulated, displayed or exhibited in the province or city
wherein neither the offender nor the offended resides”, in which case
“the civil and criminal action may be brought in the court of first
instance thereof”. That these were the only objectives of Congress in
passing House Bill No. 2695, which later became Republic Act No. 1289,
is manifest, not only from the above quoted explanatory note to said
bill, but, also, from the Congressional Record pertinent thereto. Thus,
Congressman Pedro Lopez, who sponsored the bill in the House of
Representatives, stated on the floor thereof:

“* * * As a fitting, not merely lip service,
contribution that the House could give to strengthen the arm of the
Fourth Estate of our country, it has been suggested that we take up for
consideration on the floor tonight this bill * * * which will help keep
our press unshackled in fulfilling their mission as the eyes, ears,
nose, voice and conscience of our people.

“This amendment
consists in deleting the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code which, under the present law, would permit any offended
party to file as many libel charges in the court of first instance of
any province where the libelous article is supposed to have been
circulated, exhibited or displayed, irrespective of whether it is not
the place where the article was composed, published or printed. This
provision, gentlemen of the House, has in the past been abused in order
to harass and muzzle the free press. It has been abused to stick
an extend that an offended party files it not only in the province
where he lives but also files it in Cagayan up to north, down to Davao
in the south. Under the proposed amendment, it is intended
that this extreme measure against the press be lightened so that the
offended party, while given all due protection under the law in order
to cleanse his name and vindicate himself before our courts, may file
the charges only in the court of first instance where he resides or in
the court of first instance where the accused resides.” (House of
Representatives’ Congressional Record, Third Congress, Second Session
[February 21, 1955], Vol. II, No. 21, p. 598; Italics ours.)

This view was reiterated by his counterpart in the Senate, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, who used the following, language:

“Mr. President, this is a bill amending the present statutory provision on venue of libel cases. At present a civil or criminal action for libel had to be presented in the place where the alleged libel was published irrespective of where it was composed, printed or issued. This
provision in our existing law has oftentimes subjected to harassment or
hardship reporters or publishers of newspapers who are accused of libel
because under the law when an alleged libel in the newspaper which
circulates throughout the Philippines is filed, the action whether
criminal or civil may be presented in any place where the libel was
published and it can well happen that the libel suit whether
criminal or civil may be filed in a province or district far away from
the residence of the accused. It may also happen under our present law
that the alleged offended party may divide his complaint by filing
a criminal action in once province where the libel was published and
then filing a civil action in another province very far away from
the province where the criminal case was filed and this will largely
work hardship and tremendous expenses as well as difficulties to the
accused. And it is for this reason that this bill was originally filed in the Lower House where it has been passed and it is now being submitted to the Senate for favorable action * * *.

* * * * * * *

“* * * if this bill is approved with the
amendment recommended by your Committee the effect will be that in
cases of libel, the place of trial has to be either the residence of
the offended party or the residence of the accused, and if the criminal
action is brought in one province, the civil action has necessarily to
be presented in the same court and in the same province. And if
there are two salas, it is the intention of this bill, as amended, that
the judge who took cognizance of the criminal case should also be the
one to take cognizance of the civil case. Moreover, in case a libel
suit is filed in one court, then the court where that case was first
filed will acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.”
(Senate Congressional Record, Third Congress, Second Session [May 3,
1955], Vol. II, No. 66, pp. 921-922; Italics ours.)

Indeed, the deliberations in Congress were replete with statements
of members thereof, indicating, in the most indubitable manner, that,
in approving said House Bill No. 2695, they were concerned with no
other matter than the “place” where the civil and criminal actions for
written defamation may or should be filed (House of Representatives’
Congressional Record [Feb. 21 and 22, 1955], Third Congress, Second
Session, Vol. II, Nos. 21 & 22, pp. 598-602, 618-624; Senate
Congressional Record [May 3, 1955], Vol. II, No. 66, pp. 921-924, and
926). Their attention was so focused on this subject that a member of
the Lower House had occasion to remark: “We are now talking about venue, not jurisdiction” (House of Representatives’ Congressional Record, supra,
p. 601). What is more, a member of the Upper House sought to amend the
Bill, with a view to providing for the case when the amount involved in
the civil action was less than that which is within the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance. He, however, made the
following significant observation, upon being informed by Senator
Sumulong that, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, courts of
first instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions for
libel, regardless of the amount of the demand: “If that is the present law, then I withdraw my amendment.” (Senate Congressional Record, supra, p. 922.) In short, Congress did not intend to disturb the status quo
as regards jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions for libel. This
being the case, we can not see how Republic Act No. 1289 could be
construed as depriving justices of the peace of their authority, under
Act No. 134, as well as under the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296, sec. 87, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613),
to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense alleged to have
been committed within their respective municipalities, without regard
to the limits of the imposable punishment.

Again, most of our legislators have consistently been Members of the
Bar, and, as such, were and are familiar with pertinent jurisprudence
and the practice prevailing in this jurisdiction. In U.S. vs. Lazada (9 Phil., 509, 511), this Court said:

* * * It appears, however, that the complaining
witness reported the incident to the justice of the peace on the day of
its occurrence, and that the preliminary proceedings upon which the
information filed in the Court of First Instance was based were had
within sixty days after the commission of the offense; it can not be
said, therefore, that the time of the prescriptive period has
extinguished the penal liability of the accused because the
prescriptive period was interrupted by the institution of criminal
proceedings, and suspended during the continuance thereof. (Penal Code, Art. 131.) (Italics ours.)

This doctrine was even broadened in People vs. Parao (52 Phil., 712, 715), in which it was declared that the “steps taken by the municipal president”—pursuant
to his authority, under Section 7 of Act No. 2041, to conduct
preliminary investigations in the absence of the justice of the peace
and the auxiliary justice of the peace—”directed towards the
investigation of the crime and the apprehension of the criminals, partakes of the nature of a judicial proceeding” which interrupts the running of the statute of limitations. In People vs. Joson (46 Phil., 380, 385), this Court held that “the filing of the complaint * * * had the effect of interrupting, the running of the prescriptive period”,
so that an information was not necessary therefor. If our lawmakers
intended to change the laws, the jurisprudence and the established
practice concerning preliminary investigations in criminal actions for
libel and the interruption of the period of prescription for said
offense, they would have enacted a provision analogous to that of
section 187 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code), reading:

“Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.—The Court of First Instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations,
issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal action or
proceeding for violation of this Code. From its decision an appeal
shall lie as in other criminal cases.” (Italics ours.)

Apart from the fact that Republic Act No. 1289 contains no such
provision, the comments made in Congress during the discussion of said
law leave no room for doubt that its framers did not have the aforesaid
intent.

Needless to say, the Tayco case, cited by the defendant, is not in
point. The offended party therein merely lodged an “accusation” with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, without a complaint,
in the sense in which this term is used in the Rules of Court (Rule
106, section 2), and said accusation was not filed with a court of justice. In the case at bar, there was a formal complaint, and the same was filed with a justice of the peace court.

The case of People vs. Felisa Te, et al., 107 Phil., 355;
60 Off. Gaz. (25) 3590, involved a libelous article which was published
on August 12, 1954. A complaint for libel was filed with the Justice of
the Peace Court of Balayan, Batangas, on March 4, 1955, and the
corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Batangas on July 8, 1955; but, prior thereto, or on May 18, 1955,
another information for the same offense had been filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila, where the writer of the article, as well
as the offended party, resided. The Court of First Instance of Batangas
dismissed the case, on motion of the accused, for lack of venue,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1289, none of the parties being a resident
of Batangas. Inasmuch as the proceedings began in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Balayan, Batangas, on March 4, 1955, the issue hinged on
the applicability of Republic Act No. 1289, approved on June 15, 1955,
which inserted, at the end of the third paragraph of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, a proviso to the effect that such
amendment “shall not apply to cases of written defamation, the civil
and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time
of the effectivity” thereof. This question was resolved in the
affirmative, upon the ground that the phrase “have been filed in
court”, contained in said proviso, referred to the filing of the civil
and criminal actions with the court of first instance, mentioned in the
opening sentence of said paragraph, as amended.

The doctrine laid down in that case has no bearing on the question
whether the filing of a complaint with a justice of the peace court
interrupts the running of the period of prescription in cases of
written defamation. The same was neither decided nor in issue in the Te
case, which does not constitute, therefore, a precedent insofar as the
aforesaid question is concerned. It is argued that the proceedings in
the justice of the peace court in said case were, in effect, regarded
therein as an absolute nullity, and that, accordingly, said court had
no authority whatsoever to entertain the aforementioned complaint.
Neither such authority, nor the validity of said proceedings, was,
however, assailed in the Te case, or sought to be determined therein.
Moreover, the aforementioned argument is refuted by the very language
of our decision in said case, in which we declared that “the justice of
the peace merely conducted, as it was his duty, the
preliminary investigation whose purpose was to determine whether or not
there was reasonable grounds for proceeding formally against the
accused.” Obviously, it could not have been the duty of the
justice of the peace to conduct said investigation if—as contended by
the defendant herein—said officer, not only had no authority, but, was
also, not allowed by Republic Act No. 1289, to undertake said
investigation. Hence, the Te case, in fact, acknowledges the power of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases.

The statement in said decision to the effect that “the filing of the
complaint * * * for purposes of preliminary investigation by the
justice of the peace can not be said to be the commencement of the
criminal action”, must be read in relation to the institution of the
action as contemplated in the aforementioned proviso, which
was the object of our interpretation, and had reference, not to the
prescription of offenses or to the interruption thereof, or even to
jurisdiction or to venue, but to the retrospective operation of Republic Act No. 1289.
Then, again, under the American law, upon which our system of criminal
procedure is based, the preliminary investigation is not strictly a
“judicial” proceeding, but, more of a quasi-judicial one, oftentimes
conducted before a grand jury, which is neither a court nor part of the
judiciary. From the legal viewpoint, therefore, said investigation does
not mark the commencement of a criminal “action”, in the sense that an
“action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong,” as defined in Rule 2, section
1, of the Rules of Court. Although the Philippine laws have vested the
power to conduct preliminary investigations in justices of the peace,
which are part of our judicial system, as well as upon city and
provincial fiscals, which belong to the executive department, still
such investigations are not part of the action proper, as this term is
used in said Rule, it being merely a step preliminary to the
proceedings for the redress of a wrong, and, hence, neither the
government nor the offended party may secure such redress in the course
of said investigation. As a consequence, the same does not place the
accused in jeopardy of punishment, thus retaining the essence of its
American counterpart.

In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the
filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court of
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running of the statute of
limitations, as regards the crime of libel with which defendant herein
is charged, and that said crime has not been extinguished, therefore,
by prescription, for which reason the order appealed from is reversed,
and the records of this case are hereby remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, conformably to law. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Endencia, J., took no part.

---

PARAS, C. J.:

The question of whether or not the criminal action has prescribed
depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of law involved.

It will be remembered that the original jurisdiction in civil cases
of the Justice of the Peace Court and that of the Court of First
Instance are defined in Sec. 88 and Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, respectively. Their
respective original jurisdiction to try criminal cases is provided for
in Sec. 87 and Sec. 44, of the same Act. Their respective venue is
determined in Rule 4, Sec. 2, and Rule 5, of the Rules of Court.

From the beginning, the crime of libel has merited special
consideration. So much so that Act No. 277 (libel Law), Sec. 14,
provided:

“All criminal actions under the provisions of this Act shall be begun
and prosecuted under the sole direction and control of the ordinary
prosecuting officers, anything in the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding.” (Emphasis added.)

It will be observed that as a general rule, the law, in defining
crimes, does not mention or make reference to the court where the case
should be filed.

In the case of libel, however, aside from the definition, the law
expressly indicates the court wherein the criminal and civil actions
are to be filed. Article 360, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

“The criminal action and the civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided in this chapter, may be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited,
regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or
composed. (Emphasis added.)

After the amendment of the said article by Republic Act No. 1289, the third paragraph reads:

“The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended
parties resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided, however,
That where the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited
in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended
party resides the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the
court of first instance thereof: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa. Provided, furthermore,
That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts; And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not
apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal
actions to which, have been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this law.”

The crime of libel is transitory and in accordance with the old
laws, the criminal action could be filed in any place where there had
been publication. If the Justice of the Peace Courts had jurisdiction,
at least for the purposes of preliminary investigation and issuance of
warrant of arrest, the action could be filed in ANY of the
several Justice of the Peace Courts of any province. This could no
doubt lead to undue harassment of the defendant and when it is likewise
considered that under the old laws many of the Justices of the Peace
were not lawyers, the conclusion is inevitable that the framers of the
Revised Penal Code did not want the intervention of said Justice of the
Peace. Thus the Revised Penal Code expressly provides, in the case of
libel, (and contrary to its other provisions) that the complaint must
be filed, not in any Justice of the Peace Court, BUT in the Court of First Instance.

The majority believes that the reference to the Court of First
Instance in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code is unnecessary. If
that were so, I see no reason for them to express the conviction and
admit that a civil suit for the recovery of damages involving a small
sum of money, like for instance P50.00, is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Now, would the filing of the criminal complaint for libel in the
Justice of the Peace Court be considered the commencement of a case so
as to interrupt the period of prescription? Ordinarily, it would be so
considered. But where as in the case of libel the statute clearly and
specifically provides that said complaint must be filed in the Court of
First Instance, then only said court has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case and the filing of such a complaint in said
court only can be considered as the commencement of the action that can
interrupt the period of prescription. We clearly so held in the case of
People vs. Feliza Te (107 Phil., 355).

In this case of Felisa Te, a complaint for libel was filed by one of
the offended parties in the Justice of the Peace Court of Balayan,
Batangas, on March 4, 1955. In the same month it was forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Batangas (Balayan Branch) after a
preliminary investigation. However, the fiscal filed the information
only on July 8, 1955. In the meantime, one of the offended parties
filed a complaint for the same libel with the City Fiscal of Manila who
filed the corresponding information with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on May 18, 1955.

Upon a motion to dismiss, the Court of First Instance of Batangas
dismissed the information, founded upon a prior case having been filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila and the provision of Republic
Act No. 1289, that the court where the criminal action of libel is
first filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Former Justice De Joya, counsel of the aggrieved party in the case,
stressed in his brief the importance of the decision on the controversy
for the guidance of lawyers. His main contention was that the filing of
the complaint with the Justice of the Peace Court which had the power
to conduct the preliminary investigation, a few months ahead of the
approval of Republic Act No. 1289 took the case out of the operation of
said Act, and concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the
action filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.^[1] In resolving the case, this Court said:

“* * * The phrase ‘have been filed in court’ as
employed in the proviso, contemplates of the filing of the criminal
and/or civil action with the court of competent jurisdiction,
that is to say, court which has the power to try and decide it.
Certainly the justice of the peace court of Balayan where the complaint
was filed was not the proper court, as it could not have tried and
decided the case, it being cognizable and triable only by the court of
first instance. In fact, the justice of the peace merely conducted, as
it was his duty, the preliminary investigation whose purpose was to
determine whether or not there were reasonable grounds for proceeding
formally against the accused (People vs. Peji Bautista, 67 Phil., 518; U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209; People vs.
Medted 68 Phil., 485.) The filing of the complaint in this case for
purposes of preliminary investigation by the justice of the peace
cannot be said to be the commencement of the criminal action, as the
said complaint could as well be lodged with the provincial fiscal
himself who, under Republic Act 732, could also conduct such
preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the formal
charge or information before the competent court. The information in
this case having been filed on July 8, 1955, or after Republic Act
1289, had become operative, the present case necessarily comes under
its provisions and must be governed thereby.”

As has been intimated, nowadays the municipal mayor and the
provincial fiscal are also authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations (Sec. 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court, and Republic Act 732,
respectively). Will it be seriously contended that the filing of the
complaint for libel with either one would interrupt the period of
prescription?

If the circumstances of dates and places in the case of Felisa Te, supra,
were present in the instant case, and the question of prescription has
been raised, under the majority view, we would have the peculiar
situation that the filing of the complaint in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Balayan interrupted the period of prescription, but the case
had to be tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

It is interesting to note that in the whole Revised Penal Code and
other statutes prescribing penal provisions, there is no mention of the
court wherein a case should be filed, inasmuch as there is a general
law on the matter, with the notable exceptions of those relating to the
violation of the provisions of (1) the Election Code, (2) the Copyright
Law, (3) the Land Registration Act and (4) the crime of libel.

The crime of libel being transitory as stated above, amendments have
been made regarding venue. The reason for the amendment is, as stated
by the authors thereof, to avoid harassment specially to newspapermen
and to foster the freedom of the press. These objectives must have
prompted the exception in the law confining to the Court of First
Instance original exclusive jurisdiction over said cases for the
legislature must have believed that there was no sufficient guaranty in
the fairness of proceedings when the preliminary investigation was not
to be conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance. It is true
that in the debates, the sponsors of the bill numbered later as
Republic Act No. 1289 declared that the amendment on Article 360
referred to venue. But it should be observed that the matter of
jurisdiction provided for in the original provisions of Article 360 has
been reiterated in the aforesaid Republic Act with the only difference
that more emphasis has been given to it by the substitution of the word
“may” with “shall”.

Gutierrez David, J., concurs.

---

^[1]
Former Justice De Joya advanced his views, thus:

“To
show that the new law does not necessarily refer to cases already filed
in the Court of First Instance, and that it refers to cases not only in
said court, but also to cases pending preliminary investigation in the
justice of the peace courts, attention is respectfully invited to the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Court:

”
‘(The term provided for the prescription of the criminal action and the
extinguishment of the penal liability by the lapse of a fixed period
after the commission of the offense, is interrupted by the commencement
of the proceedings and suspended during the continuance thereof (U.S. vs. Lazada, 9 Phil., 509; Cabunag vs. Jocson, 35 Phil., 220).

“Whether
they were justice of the peace court cases or Court of First Instance
cases, they were considered court actions, and while pending, they
interrupted the operation of the corresponding prescriptive period.”

“Rule 106, Section 1, expressly provides:

“‘Section
1. Commencement of criminal action.—All criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People
of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible
therefor.’

“The above legal provision does
not mention the court where the complaint or information may be filed,
whether in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First
Instance.

“On the other hand, Rule 108, Sections 1 and 4 provide as follows:

”
‘SEC. 1. Preliminary investigation—Preliminary investigation is a
previous inquiry or examination made before the arrest of the defendant
by the judge or officer authorized to conduct the same with whom a
complaint or information has been filed imputing the commission of an
offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance, for the purpose of
determining whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the defendant is probably guilty
thereof, so as to issue a warrant of arrest and to hold him for trial.’

* * * * * * *

”
‘Sec. 4. Investigation by the judge of the Court of First
Instance.—Upon complaint or information filed directly with the Court
of First Instance, the judge thereof shall conduct a preliminary
investigation in the manner provided in the following sections, and
should he find a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has
committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest
and try the case on the merit.’

“It is a legal aphorism that when the law does not make any distinction, we have no right to make any distinction.

“There
was absolutely nothing to prohibit or prevent the offended party to
file his complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, which
could have also conducted the preliminary investigation in this case;
and in the eyes of the law there would be no difference whatsoever as
to the validity or legality of said proceedings.” (Brief for the
plaintiff-appellant, pp. 70-72.)