THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TEODULO ROGADO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
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People versus Rogado
The Case
This is a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Teodulo Rogado, also known as Commander Sulit, and several companions for the killing of a farmer named Salvador Areza. The accused were members of the Hukbalahap organization who, while lost in the mountains of Lilio, Laguna, seized Areza, tortured him, and beheaded him with his own bolo because he refused to serve as their guide. The case matters to a reviewee because it settles two questions that examiners love: first, whether obedience to a superior's order and fear of retaliation exempt a soldier or subordinate from criminal liability; and second, whether a killing committed by rebels is absorbed by the crime of rebellion or must be prosecuted separately as murder.
Procedural History
The accused were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and all pleaded not guilty. During trial, upon motion of the fiscal, Francisco Racoma and Conrado Devesa were excluded from the information so they could testify as government witnesses. Also upon motion of the fiscal, the charge was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence as to Nemesio Arsolacia, Maximo Cerebo, and Pedro Merin. The remaining accused moved to dismiss on the ground that the killing was done in furtherance of the Huk movement, but the motion was denied. Teodulo Rogado and Pio Mercurio then moved for a separate trial on the ground that their defense was incompatible with that of their co-accused, and the motion was granted. After trial, the court found Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo, and Arsenal guilty as principals and sentenced them to death, found Pio Mercurio guilty only as an accomplice and sentenced him to a range of penalties, ordered the principals to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of 6,000 pesos and the accomplice in the sum of 2,000 pesos, and ordered all to pay their proportionate share of the costs. Because the penalty imposed on the four principals was death, the case came to the Supreme Court on automatic review. Pio Mercurio did not file his brief, so the review concerned only Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo, and Arsenal.
Facts
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer of Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying a bolo in its scabbard to gather firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return, his wife Lydia Nudal searched for him with armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer. They found his decapitated body in an uninhabited place about half a kilometer from the road, his hands tied together and his head totally severed. The health officer, Dr. Dominador Gomez, found the body in a state of decomposition and concluded that death had occurred three to five days earlier. Areza's bolo and scabbard were found near the body.
It appears that on that same day, Rogado and his group were traveling from barrio Santa Lucia, Nagcarlan, toward Lilio, Laguna, and lost their way. Looking for someone to give them information, they met Areza, who told them they were in barrio Bubukal, that an army camp was nearby, and that soldiers occasionally patrolled the barrios. The information was reported to Commander Sulit, who ordered that Areza be brought to him. Rogado asked Areza to lead the way, but Areza refused, saying he had much work to do and had a carabao with him. After conferring with Orenia, also known as Commander Lawin, Rogado told Racoma that they were taking Areza along and that if he refused, he should be tied. When Areza refused to go, Mercurio dragged him along, and Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun. Mercurio then tied Areza's hands behind him, and when Areza protested that he had done nothing wrong, Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach.
After walking some distance, the group stopped upon hearing a command. Racoma told Rogado that they should release Areza at night, but Rogado said Areza should be killed. Racoma then found Areza being assaulted by Orenia and Golfeo, and heard Rogado say in the vernacular, kill him now so we can proceed. Areza was taken to a secluded place in thick forest twenty or thirty meters from the group, and there Golfeo ordered him to lie face down. Ignoring his plea for mercy, Golfeo struck him on the neck with his own bolo, and Arsenal then gave another blow with the same bolo that completely severed the head from the body. Merin, Golfeo, and Arsenal later gave sworn statements admitting their participation and claiming they merely obeyed the order of Commander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed. The other appellants contended that the killing was done in furtherance of the Huk rebellion.
Issues
- Whether or not the accused Golfeo and Arsenal may be exempted from criminal liability on the ground that they acted in obedience to the order of a superior and under the pressure of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear.
- Whether or not the killing of Areza was absorbed by the crime of rebellion, such that the present prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.
- Whether or not the qualifying and aggravating circumstances found by the trial court justify the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Applicable Provisions
The decision applies the rule on obedience to a lawful order, which the Court states as a well-settled principle:
Obedience to an order of a superior will only justify an act which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a lawful purpose.
This rule defeats the defense of Golfeo and Arsenal, because the order to kill an innocent farmer was plainly not for a lawful purpose.
The decision also applies the rule on exemption from criminal liability by reason of uncontrollable fear, as embodied in the Revised Penal Code:
Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability.
The Court measures the claim of Golfeo and Arsenal against this standard and finds that no such compulsion or fear existed in the circumstances.
Finally, the decision applies the rule on the absorption of crimes by rebellion, as settled in the Hernandez and Geronimo cases:
There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter offense is absorbed by the former, however, if the killing is inspired by personal motive such killing is not absorbed by the rebellion but may be the subject of separate prosecution.
This distinction is decisive, because the killing of Areza sprang from a personal motive and not from the political purpose of the rebellion.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the defense of Golfeo and Arsenal is clearly untenable. Obedience to a superior's order justifies an otherwise criminal act only when the order is for a lawful purpose, and the order to kill Areza was not. Neither was there uncontrollable fear. Golfeo was armed with an automatic carbine and could have protected himself from any retaliation by his superiors. Moreover, Areza was brought to a secluded place far from where the superiors were, so Golfeo and Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to avoid their ire. The fact that Golfeo carried out the order although his superiors were at a distance, and struck his victim in Kempetai fashion without pity, showed that he acted of his own free will and with the desire to collaborate in the criminal design of his superiors. Arsenal stood in the same situation, for it was he who delivered the fatal blow that completely severed the head from the body. Both were therefore correctly held liable as co-principals by direct participation.
On the second issue, the Court rejected the claim of double jeopardy. While the Hernandez case held that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder because murder is absorbed by rebellion, the Geronimo case distinguished the situation where the killing is inspired by personal motive, in which case it is not absorbed and may be the subject of a separate prosecution. The Court also found that the acts charged were not included in the information for rebellion, which merely accused the appellants of rising and taking up arms against the government without specifying particular acts against private persons or civilians. The pretense that the killing was in furtherance of the rebellion was preposterous, since Areza was a mere farmer with no connection to any law enforcement agency. As the trial court observed, the killing was done solely to satisfy the anger of Rogado, who could not tolerate Areza's refusal to obey, and the rebellious movement had nothing to gain by his death.
On the third issue, the trial court found treachery, aggravated by abuse of superior strength and the fact that the killing happened in an uninhabited place. While some members of the Court agreed that these circumstances existed, others doubted whether they could be entertained against appellants who, rightly or wrongly, believed they were justified because Areza had committed something inimical to the purposes of their organization. The requisite number of votes for the supreme penalty not having been obtained, the Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine
First, obedience to an order of a superior justifies an otherwise criminal act only when the order is for a lawful purpose. An order to kill an innocent person is unlawful, and the subordinate who carries it out remains criminally liable.
Second, the exemption based on irresistible force or uncontrollable fear requires that the fear be real, imminent, and of equal or greater injury, and that no avenue of escape exists. Where the accused is armed, is separated from his superiors, and could have fled or protected himself, the defense must fail.
Third, rebellion absorbs murder only when the killing is committed in furtherance of the political purpose of the rebellion. Where the killing is inspired by personal motive, such as anger or the desire to punish a refusal, it is not absorbed and may be the subject of a separate prosecution for murder.
Disposition
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in all respects, except that it reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, with costs against the appellants.
Remember This
Memorize this line: obedience to a superior's order excuses only when the order is for a lawful purpose, and a killing inspired by personal motive is not absorbed by rebellion. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the justifying and exempting circumstances and the absorption doctrine in rebellion cases.