PAGKAKAISA SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG SAN MIGUEL BREWERY AT MGA KASANGAY (PAFLU), PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This
is a petition filed by Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa Ng San Miguel
Brewery at Mga Kasañgay (PAFLU), later referred to as Pagkakaisa
(PAFLU), against Judge Juan P. Enriquez, Nagkakaisa Union Ng Manggagawa
ng San Miguel Brewery at Mga Kasañgay, Jose Capino Santos, Alberto
Ignacio, and others, for certiorari with preliminary injunction to
declare respondent Judge Juan P. Enriquez without jurisdiction, to
enjoin him from enforcing his decision dated September 9, 1957, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“Wherefore,
let a writ of permanent injunction be issued in this case enjoining the
respondent San Miguel Brewery, Inc., from making any further deductions
from the salaries of the workers of the petitioners in favor of its
co-respondent ‘Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at
Mga Kasañgay’ (PAFLU). All deductions heretofore made by respondent San
Miguel Brewery, Inc., from the salaries of the workers of petitioners
are ordered returned to the persons or workers from whom the same had
been taken or deducted.” (Annex I)

and to restrain him from entertaining any ancillary proceedings which may be filed thereunder.

At first, this tribunal dismissed the petition for lack of adequate
allegations, but after an amended petition was filed, the resolution of
dismissal was reconsidered and the amended petition was given due
course (Resolution of November 15, 1957). A writ of preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued, ordering the trial court to desist
from entertaining any ancillary proceedings which may be filed under
the original case.

While still affiliated with the
Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas, Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng
San Miguel Brewery, at Mga Kasañgay, a duly registered labor union,
secured a collective bargaining agreement with respondent San Miguel
Brewery, Inc., later referred to as the Company. Later, it seceded from
the Federacion and affiliated itself to the Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) and became known as Pagkakaisa Samahang
Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery (PAFLU). On August 6, 1956, it
obtained an amendatory bargaining agreement with the Company, which
among others provides:

“Sec. 2. The Company
will make payroll deductions of dues and assessment of members of the
union, provided that no deductions shall be made hereunder except as
permitted by law in pursuance of an authorization signed by the
individual worker in the form heretofore agreed to by the parties. * *
*” (Quoted from Decision, Annex I)

Thereafter, Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) prepared a check-off authorization form,
effective for a period of one year or until the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, whichever came later, without any
specification as to the amount to be deducted. The check-off
authorization reads:

“Commencing this
_______ day of ________, 1956, I authorize the company of which I
am an employee, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., to deduct from my salary
every payday, the sum required to be collected from me by the ‘Samahang
Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at mga Kasangay’—PAFLU—of which I am a
member, including donations for deceased, pensioned, or laid off
members, general fund, office fund, union hand-outs, or whatever may be
required to be collected by our union at a general meeting or stated in
the By-laws of the union.

“If, for any reason whatsoever,
any employer is unable to effect collection, I hereby also authorize
the deduction of the necessary amount on the following payday. I agree
that this authorization will be effective without change for a period
of one year from this day, or until the expiration of the present
collective bargaining agreement entered into by the management of my
employer, the San Miguel Brewery, and the acknowledged representative
of our union, or whichever comes later.

“This authority and
notice will continue to have force and effect from year to year after
the date above specified and will continue without change in the coming
years, except should I desire to change the same by means of a formal
letter, within fifteen (15) days before the expiration of this
authorization.

“This authority repeals all other
authorizations I previously consent to with reference to collections,
to be made from me by the union.” (p. 6, Annex C)

The forms were distributed among all the employees within the 17 plants
of the Company. Some of the employees refused to sign the authorization
form while others signed the same. When Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) presented
the form to the Company, the latter refused to entertain the same,
claiming that the irrevocability clause contained therein was illegal
and unenforceable.

Meanwhile, many of those who originally
signed the check-off authorization, numbering about 500, notified the
Company in writing that they were revoking their authorization. The
form of said revocation of authorization reads:

“The Management

San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

Manila

“(Thru the President and the Treasurer, Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at mga Kasangay)

“Dear Sirs:

“I, the undersigned, of the _____________________ SMB, and member of
the ‘Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa San Miguel Brewery at Mga
Kasañgay’, do hereby respectfully request to revoke and declare null
and void any individual authority given to the Management of this
Company to deduct all such sums of money from my salary such as Union
Quota, Salaries of top officials of the Union, etc., with the exception
of other dues that were previously collected. The main reason was that
I was unable to have the full scrutiny and thorough appraisal of the
contents and meaning of the said statements of the authority signed by
me.

“In the interest of justice and freedom of association
guaranteed by our Constitution I pray that this request be given due
consideration.

“Early compliance with this request will be highly appreciated, I remain.”

Sometime in November, 1956, those employees who refused to sign the
check-off authorization, as well as those who revoked their
authorization, formed the respondent union, Nagkakaisa Union ng
Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at mga Kasañgay (FTF), later referred
to as Nagkakaisa (PTF), which was registered with the Department of
Labor on December 7, 1956.

Because the Company refused to
honor the check-off authorization and withheld some collections already
made pursuant thereto, the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) filed against the Company
a petition for declaratory relief with the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) on November 26, 1956, to determine the right of
Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) to compel the company to make the deductions. The
CIR, presided by Judge Martinez, declared itself without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case; but upon the agreement of the
Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) and the company (the latter waiving its
jurisdictional objection), Judge Martinez consented to act as
arbitrator, this by his order of March 6, 1957. Later, on March 9,
1957, he issued an order in his supposed capacity as an arbitrator,
holding that “the effectivity of check-off provisions in collective
bargaining agreements should be no less than one year from the time of
the execution of said agreements, or beyond the termination of the
latter, whichever occurs the sooner.” The dispositive part of his order
reads:

“Wherefore, it is hereby declared
that notwithstanding the revocation made by the employees of the
respondent Company who have authorized the petitioner union for the
checking-off of both the regular membership dues and other assessments,
the check-off provisions contained in the ‘Collective Bargaining
Agreement’ entered into by and between the parties in this case on
August 6, 1956 is still existing, with full force and effect up to the
time of its expiration date. Consequently, the money that has been
withheld by virtue of the revocation should be turned over to the
union.”

The reason in support of the view taken by Judge Martinez is contained in the following paragraph of his order:

“It
is an admitted maxim that any contract of agency is revocable and any
power of attorney for that matter is likewise revocable. It would not,
however, be in consonance with the spirit of Industrial Peace should a
matter of this kind just be set aside after the members of a union
should come out to undo what at the beginning they voluntarily
committed themselves to do. Change of affiliation or of membership
and/or refusal to pay union dues to the union for one reason or another
does not augur well for healthy unionism, in any sense of the word. An
obligation to the State in the form of taxes is no more sacred and
wholesome as dues are to the union. By all means, this Court should
strive to indoctrinate to the union members their obligation to pay
union dues especially after their union has done its level best, to do
what the members expect to be done. To me, the obligation of the
members in the case at bar has become a lien more so, if they have
already received parts of the benefits earned for them by the union.
There cannot be any worse undertaking for workers than to accept the
benefits from the toils of the union and deny it the very means
necessary for its existence. This, it is believed, is more fundamental
than what the union would profit from the contribution itself.”

Upon receipt of the above-mentioned order, the Company advised each of
the employees who had revoked their authorization that it would comply
with the said order. The advice reads as follows:

“Please
be informed that by order of Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated March 9, 1957, in Pagkakaisa Samahang
Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery at mga Kasañgay versus San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. Case No. 1040-V (CIR) submitted for arbitration to
the aforesaid Court, this Company has been required to give effect to
check-off authorizations with an irrevocability clause. Therefore, we
regret to advise that we are compelled to disregard the revocation,
which you submitted subsequently.

“Consequently, commencing
March 31 and on every payday thereafter until expiration of your
original authorization to check-off, we shall deduct from your salary
in favor of the union such amounts as are required to be withheld in
accordance with such authorizations.”

Because of the insistence of the Company in making the deductions,
herein respondents Jose Capino Santos, Alberto Ignacio, Cristino
Ballesteros, Gregorio Sayo, and Prospero Aguilucho, allegedly in
representation of 500 other interested employees, affected by the
deductions, and their labor union, Nagkakaisa (FTF), filed a petition
against the Company and the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) for a writ of permanent
injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by
herein respondent Judge Juan P. Enriquez, to restrain the Company from
making any deductions on their salaries in favor of the Pagkakaisa
(PAFLU). In their petition, they claimed that the authorization
previously signed by them while still members of the predecessor of
Pagkakaisa (PAFLU), namely Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel
Brewery at mga Kasañgay (Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas), had
already been revoked by them when they disaffiliated with or were
considered separated from Pagkakaisa (PAFLU), and since they were
already members of the Nagkakaisa (FTF), they were no longer under any
obligation to pay dues to the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU). On the other hand,
Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) in its answer invoked the irrevocability of the
check-off authorization which had already been favorably indorsed by
the CIR through Judge Martinez, and that the said CIR having first
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter involved, all other
actions pertaining thereto should be brought before said court (CIR);
and that the petition for injunction in effect was an attempt to modify
or set aside the order of the CIR.

After hearing, the Court
of First Instance of Manila held that the order of Judge Martinez,
acting as arbitrator, could not bind the members of the Nagkakaisa
(FTF), specifically, those who prior to said decision had separated
from the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) and revoked the check-off authorization
signed by them, as well as the former members of the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU)
who refused or failed to sign any cheek-off authorization, on the
ground that they were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

Petitioner Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of Judge Enriquez, but said motion for reconsideration was
denied for failure to set the same for hearing as required by the rules
of court and to serve copy thereof to the other party, he calling it “a
mere scrap of paper”.

Petitioner Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) contends that:

“(1)
That respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
entertaining the petition and proceeding with the case where the Court
of Industrial Relations under an arbitration contract first acquired
jurisdiction.

(2) That the respondent judge’s decision has
rendered nugatory and ineffective the award made by Judge Arsenio
Martinez in his capacity as arbitrator; and

(3) That there
is no appeal or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law from the said decision except by petition for
certiorari.”

The claim of petitioner that
respondent Judge should not have entertained the petition for permanent
injunction for the reason that the Industrial Court had first acquired
jurisdiction over the case, and therefore it excluded the jurisdiction
of other courts, particularly, the court presided by respondent Judge,
is untenable. According to the very record of the case, the Industrial
Court never acquired jurisdiction and as a matter of fact, it declared
itself without jurisdiction, but that Judge Martinez supposedly took up
the case and decided it as a mere arbitrator. This appears in his first
order of March 6, 1957:

“After a careful
study and mature consideration of the respective contention of the
parties anent the questions at issue, this Court is of the opinion and
so holds that it is without jurisdiction on the instant petition filed
in this case.

“However, it appearing from the record that
both parties are agreed to have this Court act and proceed as an
arbitrator in resolving the second issue above-mentioned, on the basis
of the facts set forth in their respective pleadings and the arguments
given in support thereto, and believing that it would be more in
consonance with the declared policy in the Magna Carta of Labor to
avoid or minimize differences which arise between the parties to
collective bargaining, the same will be undertaken. * * “

It is therefore clear that it was Judge Martinez who took up the case
and assumed jurisdiction over it and not the Industrial Court which
declared itself to be without jurisdiction, this assuming that Judge
Martinez himself could act as he supposedly did act as arbitrator.

The whole theory of and case for the petitioner Pagkakaisa (PAFLU)
would appear to be vulnerable in several respects. Even assuming for a
moment that the irrevocability of the authorization signed by the
respondents-laborers and employees for check-off within a period of one
year is valid, a point which we do not now decide, it seems that said
authorization to deduct from their pay and wages was good only as long
as they remained members of the union Pagkakaisa (PAFLU), because as
such members, they were supposed to pay dues and assessments to the
Union. However, the moment that they separated from and left that union
and joined another labor organization, then they were no longer obliged
to pay said dues and assessments; naturally, there would no longer be
any reason or occasion for the Company to continue making deductions.

It would appear that a member of a labor union may leave and cancel his
membership with the same at any time. When a laborer or employee joins
a labor union, he does not make any commitment or assume an undertaking
to continue his membership therein for any fixed period of time, much
less indefinitely. In this respect, he is a free agent. It may be that
his separation from the union will not and could not affect any
bargaining agreement entered into by the union and management while he
was a member of said union, as to working conditions, wages,
privileges, etc.; but as to his right to separate from a labor union
and join another, it seems there can be no question. In the present
case, since there was a rule or practice of petitioner Pagkakaisa
(PAPLU) that those members of the union who refused to sign the
authorization for check-off and, naturally, those who signed the
authorization but later cancelled or revoked the same, were considered
automatically expelled from the union. So, petitioners even assuming
that they did not of their own volition leave the petitioner Pagkakaisa
(PAFLU) to join respondent union Nagkakaisa (FTF), as they did, they
automatically ceased to be members of the former. And being no longer
members, they were not obliged to continue paying dues and assessments,
and as a result, the Company could no longer make deductions of said
dues and assessments from their wages.

Another point of
vulnerability is that we are not sure that Judge Martinez who issued
the order of March 9, 1957 was fully authorized to entertain, hear and
decide the case as an arbitrator and that the order or decision
rendered by him was valid and effective. Republic Act No. 876 regarding
arbitration requires that the parties to an arbitration must enter into
a written contract or agreement signed by them to submit their case to
arbitration and designate the arbitrator or arbitrators. It is not
shown that said requirement of the law had been complied with. It would
appear that the Arbitration Law, Republic Act No. 876, contemplates
persons, not courts, to act as arbitrators. However, from the heading
and title of the order issued by Judge Martinez, it seems that he acted
as a Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, at least he signed the
order as Associate Judge, and the case is numbered as a case of the
Industrial Court. And yet, as already stated, the CIR itself, thru
Judge Martinez disclaimed jurisdiction.

Again Section 23 of
the Arbitration Law provides for the confirmation of the award given by
an arbitrator within one month after said award was made, by the court
having jurisdiction. It does not appear that the order or award by
Judge Martinez was ever confirmed by a competent court. Still another
point of vulnerability of the theory or case of petitioner is that the
respondents laborers and employees of the Company who had revoked their
authorization for check-off were never made parties to the case of
declaratory relief submitted to and decided by Judge Martinez as
arbitrator, this despite the fact that they were vitally interested in
and affected by the result of said case. Not being parties thereto,
they could not be bound by the order or award. How could the order or
award declare that despite the revocation of the authorization for
check-off, the latter was still valid and that the Company could
continue making deductions of the dues and assessments from the wages
of the respondents-laborers and employees when the latter were not
parties to the case and were given no opportunity to be heard and so,
were not bound by the said award?

“bb. Strangers or Third Persons

“Arbitrators
have no power to direct things to be done which require the consent or
action of strangers to the arbitration proceedings.

“Since
the arbitrators have no power over strangers to the submission, they
usually cannot direct things to be done which require action or consent
on the part of strangers.” (6 C. J. S. p. 225)

In his decision, Judge Enriquez found that under the constitution and
by-laws of Pagkakaisa (PAFLU), any member who shall join any other
organization of workers in the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. shall be deemed
automatically separated from the union from the date of his affiliation
with such other organization. So, he held that under the provision of
the said constitution and by-laws, the members of Pagkakaisa (PAFLU)
who affiliated themselves with the Nagkakaisa (FTF) since November
1956, were no longer members of the former, some four months before the
decision of Judge Martinez was handed down. Naturally, no longer being
members of Pagkakaisa (PAFLU), they did not have to pay any dues or
assessments to it, and deductions of said dues and assessments from
their salaries should not be made.

As to the reason why Jose
Capino Santos, Alberto Ignacio and 500 others revoked their
authorization for the check-off, Judge Enriquez in his decision found
that:

“The constitution and by-laws,
Exhibit Q, of the Pagkakaisa, provides for the collection from each
member of P1.20 every six months, or a total of P240 every year, which
was to be given to the mother union, the Federacion del Trabajo de
Filipinas and that the officers would not receive compensation;
however, after obtaining the amendatory agreement, the officers and
directors of the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) in violation of the constitution
required the members to pay the sum of P2.00 each every fifteen days or
P48.00 yearly, part of which was payable to PAFLU and the rest to
defray the salaries of the president, secretary and treasurer of the
union who then went, and are still, on leave.”

Under the circumstances, was a member of the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) who
signed the authorization form prepared by the said union, which form
did not state the amount of dues and assessments to be paid either
monthly or yearly, but which he understood from the constitution and
by-laws to be only P2.40 a year, justified in revoking said
authorization when learning later that said dues had been increased to
P48.00 a year, without his knowledge or consent? At least Judge
Enriquez thought so.

The foregoing are some of the reasons
and considerations which would and could militate against the granting
of the present petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of
respondent Judge. However, the majority of the members of this Tribunal
preferred and have decided to deny the present petition on the grounds,
first, the failure of petitioner to give an opportunity to the
respondent Judge to correct any error he may have committed in his
decision, by filing a valid motion for reconsideration. True,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before respondent Judge,
but the latter refused to entertain it, called it a mere scrap of paper
for not complying with the legal requisites, and denied it, and
petitioner instead of correcting its error and filing another and
proper motion for reconsideration, came directly to us on certiorari.

“Moreover,
the error, if in truth it was one, perhaps might have been corrected by
a motion of reconsideration, even after the denial of petitioner’s
motion for a new trial, if the latter had so desired; but the fact
remains that he did not avail himself of said remedy. He did not follow
what this court said in the case of Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (25 Phil., 245). It was stated is said case and reiterated in Uy Chu vs.
Imperial and Uy Du (44 Phil., 27), that a writ of certiorari will not
issue unless the error or irregularity complained of has been brought
to the attention of the inferior court through a motion for
reconsideration.” (Vicencio vs. Sison, 62 Phil., 300, 306).

Second, because there was an adequate remedy or relief which was by appeal.

“This
remedy, by its very nature, lies only when, the necessary facts
warranting it being present, an appeal is not available because such
remedy does not lie, or does not exist, or is not permitted by law, nor
is there any other speedy and adequate remedy. (Sections 217 and 514,
Act No. 190; In re Prautch, 1 Phil., 132; Arzadon vs. Chanco and Balduega, 14 Phil., 710; De Cacho and Morales vs. Justice of the Peace of Bocaue, 33 Phil., 595; Mayol vs. Blanco, 61 Phil., 647; etc)” (Vicencio vs. Sison, supra).

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied, with costs
against petitioned. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is
dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., took no part.