HONOR P. MOSLARES, PETITIONER, VS. THIRD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO ROSARIO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 66, MAKATI; TOYOTA BEL-AIR, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Honor P. Morales seeks to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. SP No. 40086, dismissing his
petition for review and affirming the order dated September 13, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati
City, Branch 66), declaring petitioner to have waived his right to
present evidence, and affirming too the decision of the same regional
trial court dated October 26, 1995 finding petitioner guilty of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Criminal Case No. 22-0099) which
decision was promulgated in absentia. Likewise, petitioner seeks to
nullify respondent appellate court’s resolutions dated April 11, 1997
denying his petition for bail.

The antecedental facts may be chronicled in the following manner:

On February 19, 1991, petitioner purchased three units of Toyota
Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc which were thereupon registered
under his name, under the name of Manila Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes
Inc. In payment thereof, petitioner issued Philippine Bank of
Commissions Check No. 841644 dated May 24, 1991 in the amount of
P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said check was dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, petitioner was
charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for Estafa.

The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at
the instance of the petitioner or the prosecution, or motu proprio by
the court. On Septmenber 13, 1995, the scheduled date of the
presentation of evidence by petitioner, he failed to appear, but was
represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who
claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not
yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial court set the
promulgation of the decision on October 30, 1995.

On October 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for
Recorsideration/Re Trial. However, on October 26, 1995 the trial court
issued its assailed decision, portions of which read:

The record shows that accused Honor Moslares did not attend during
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense.
The Court set the presentation of evidence for the defense nineteen (19)
times four (4) of which were cancelled on the ground that there was a
typhoon and the public prosecutor was ‘indisposed’. But the accused did
not even testify and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila.
Subject cases were submitted for decision four (4) times for failure of
the accused to present evidence but was lifted in the interest of
justice upon motion of the accused. He changed his lawyer four times
everytime the Court ordered the case submitted for decision for failure
of the accused to present his evidenced inorder to gain a delay.

x x x

x x x

x x x

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-0099 finding accused Honor
Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and the Court hereby sentences Honor Moslares to suffer an
imprisonment of one year (1) year.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-0100 finding accused Honor
Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Bilang 22
and the Court hereby sentences Honor Moslares to suffer an imprisonment
of one (1) year.

(pp. 111-112; 114, Rollo.)

On October 30, 1995, the trial court proceeded to promulgate in absentia the October 26, 1996 decision.

On November 14, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of appeal which
was denied due course by the lower court in its assailed order dated
dated February 1, 1996. The lower court, relying on the case of People
vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79[1991]), considered petitioner to have waived
his right to appeal.

On February 14, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for relief from
judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On March 14,
1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
which treated the petition as one for certiorari. Petitioner also filed
on October 3, 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented.

On November 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post
bail. Motions for reconsideration subsequently filed by petitioner were
denied.

Hence, the instant recourse, with petitioner contending that the Court of Appeals erred:

I. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DECLARING THAT
THE PETITIONER HAD WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE BY NUMEROUS
POSTPONEMENTS THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

II. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH WAS
PROMULGATED IN ABSENTIA WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN OPPURTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS DEFENSE.

III. IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NO VALID DEFENSE.

IV. IN SUSTAINING ACTION OF LOWER COURT DISMISSING APPEAL THEREBY DENYING HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

V. IN DENYING PETITIONER’S APLLICATION FOR BAIL.

(p. 10, Rollo)

Anent the first and second which are related, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that petitioner should be considered to have
waived his right to present further evidence because of his repeated
failure to attend scheduled hearings.

While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived
expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that petitioner had waived
said right in this case. The postponement sought by petitioner and
counsel appear to be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive as
borne by the record of the case. The intention and the willingness of
petitioner to present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had
already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for
presentation, although this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons,
such as illness of the petitioner and his counsel, petitioner’s
confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and
substitution of counsel.

The rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the
fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by himself
and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution
itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to make
sure that justice is done to the accused.

Further, the constitution right of the accused to be heard in his
defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right (People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515 [1982]).

It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of
Appeals had it ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the
reception of petitioner’s evidence. Granting that petitioner had sought a
number of postponements, the requirements of substantial justice
mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant of a
reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to
ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case, but
at the expense of a fundamental right.

Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with
the promulgation of decision on the premise that petitioner had waived
his right to appear in court to present his evidence. Likewise, the
Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its
discretion as it sustained a decision of the lower court rendered in
violation of the right of petitioner to due process. As enunciated in
the case of Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma (254 SCRA 565 [1996]), the most basic tenet of due process is the right to heard.

As regards the third assigned error, the Court of Appeals held
that the defense sought to be established by petitioner would not, even
if considered by the court, exonerate him from his criminal liability
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. This disclaration seems to be no less
than, and is tantamount to, prejudging the nature of the testimony of
petitioner and his witnesses.

It is worthy to note that the alleged criminal liability of
petitioner stems from his being the signatory of the questioned check
and his being an officer of the corporation, the actual purchaser of the
cars. As mentioned by the Solicitor General in his Manifestation, and
citing the case of Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA
572 [1997]), an officer of a corporation is not to be held criminally
liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for signing a bum check,
upon which premise, the Solicitor General concludes and recommends that
petitioner be given his opportunity to present his evidence.

With respect to the fourth error, the lower court, in denying
petitioner’s appeal, considered him to have waived his right to appeal
because of his failure to be present during the promulgation of the
judgment on October 30, 1995, despite due notice to him and his bondsman
or counsel.

We do not agree.

The last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 states that:

… If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused’s failure to
appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the
arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

This means that whether or not the absence of the accused during
promulgation is justified, the right to appeal is not lost, the only
requirement being that the notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days
notice of the judgment.

The Mapalao ruling (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), upon h the
lower court and the court of Appeals based their denial of petitioner’s
appeal, does not appear to be applicable herein, as the facts of the two
cases differ. In Mapalao, the accused escaped from detention and trial in absentia
continued against him. He remained at larged even at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, and thus, was deemed to have waived his right
to appeal. In the instant case, however, petitioner is not a fugitive
from justice. On the contrary, petitioner has been seeking redres under
the law as evidenced by the various pleadings and motions he has filed
with the courts. Petitioer, therefore, cannot be considered as one who
has lost his standing in court and thus, cannot be deprived of his right
to seek judicial relief.

Inasmuch as petitioner’s appeal was perfected within the 15-day
reglementary period, the samemust be given due course. To deny
petitioner’s appeal is tantamount to denying him due process. Although
the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it is an
essential part of the judicial system and courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative, but instead,
afford every party-litigant the amplest oppurtunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, freed from the constrainsts of
technicalities (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 623 [1996]).

On the matter of bail, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion to post bail on the bail on the ground that the decision of the
lower court had become final and executory, inasmuch as the petitioner’s
appeal has also been denied.

The following provision of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, are pertinent:

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right. – All persons in custody
shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua of life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule.

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary – Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the
accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail prebe cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions
of his bail without valid jurisdiction;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole or under conditional pardon

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.

Petitioner was not convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment where bail is not matter of right on the part of
petitioner nor of discretion on the part of the Court. Neither has he
been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment of six to twenty
years where bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion and may be
denied if any of the circumstances aforementioned are present. Rather,
petitioner was convicted erroneously – it is to be hastily added – of
offenses punishable only by imprisonment of one year each. In this
light, petitioner’s admission to bail becomes imperative and
indispensable, moreso because of petitioner’s deteriorating health.

The right to bail is a constitutional guaranty which every person
under legal custody may invoke, except those qualified under the law.
Petitioner does not fall under these exceptions and must, therefore, be
duly accorded such right. Verily, it was patent error for the respondent
Court of Appeals to deny petitioner of said right.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari
is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1996
affirming the October 30, 1996 decision of the lower court, as well as
said latter decision, are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings whereat, petioner may be
given an opportunity to post bail. For this reason, respondent court’s
resolution dated April 11, 1997 and May 19, 1997 denying petitioner’s
petition for bail are likewise set aside. No special pronouncement is
made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.