PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE LOMBOY @ “JOSE”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Lomboy

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Jose Lomboy, known also as Jose. It is a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction. The accused was charged, in two separate informations, with frustrated murder for throwing a hand grenade at Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan on Christmas Day of 1992, and with illegal possession of an explosive, that same hand grenade, under Presidential Decree Number 1866. The case matters because the Supreme Court reverses a conviction that rested on a single eyewitness whose testimony the Court finds contrary to human experience and to the physical evidence, and it restates the rule that acquittal is inevitable where the inculpatory facts admit of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence.

Procedural History

Two informations dated March 26, 1993, were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57. The accused was arraigned on May 26, 1993, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were then heard jointly. On February 14, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and of illegal possession of explosive, and imposing the corresponding penalties. Because the penalty imposed included reclusion perpetua, the appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which decided the case in June 1999.

Facts

In the early hours of December 25, 1992, Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, Barangay Kagawad Marcelino Tapiador, and Mardonio Tampico were walking home from a Christmas dance in Barangay Angatel, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. They saw a man lying face down by the roadside. The man flashed a flashlight at them, and Pidlaoan flashed his own flashlight back. They recognized him as the accused, Jose Lomboy, a barangay mate. Pidlaoan helped him up, asked why he was lying there, and then held him by the back collar of his jacket and pulled him toward the nearby house of Rodolfo Marcelo.

According to the prosecution, a child of Marcelo then warned the barangay captain that the man had a grenade. The accused freed himself, stepped back about three meters, drew a grenade from his jacket, pulled the pin, shouted a curse, and threw the grenade at Pidlaoan. It exploded and Pidlaoan was gravely wounded. He was rushed to a clinic and later to a hospital in Dagupan City. Investigating officers recovered at the scene five empty bullet shells of M-14 and M-16 rifles and a grenade handle.

The defense told a different story. The accused testified that he was in front of Marcelo's house when Pidlaoan and his two companions approached, carrying two long firearms and a grenade. Pidlaoan held his collar and struck him with the grenade, and the three mauled him. He broke free and ran toward the back of Marcelo's house, among banana and coconut trees, while they fired at him. Pidlaoan threw the grenade, but it exploded and hit Pidlaoan himself. The accused hid in the house of his aunt for about a week until he was arrested.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of frustrated murder despite the weakness and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of illegal possession of explosives despite the unreliability of the lone eyewitness testimony.

Applicable Provisions

The first information charged frustrated murder contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 6 defines the stages of execution, and it bears on the case because the conviction for frustrated murder presupposes that the accused performed all the acts of execution that would produce murder but for a cause independent of his will.

Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

The second information charged illegal possession of explosive under Presidential Decree Number 1866, which penalizes the possession of a hand grenade without the necessary permit or license. It bears on the case because the conviction for this offense depends entirely on proof that the accused, and not another, possessed and threw the grenade.

Any person who shall willfully and unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose, sell, keep, possess, transport or use any explosive, incendiary device or similar device, shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. On the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court overlooked circumstances of weight and substance that create reasonable doubt. While the evaluation of witness credibility generally belongs to the trial court, appellate review may correct findings that are arbitrary or that ignore significant facts. The Court finds the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Kagawad Tapiador, dubious. It is unnatural for a man to lie face down by the road at one o'clock in the morning in the cold season for no reason, and the witness himself admitted the accused appeared neither drunk nor engaged in anything illegal. If the accused had evil designs, he would not have flashed his flashlight at his supposed targets and drawn their attention.

The Court also notes that Tapiador insisted he saw no firearms and heard no gunshots, yet the incident was reported over the radio as a shooting, and the investigator recovered M-14 and M-16 bullet shells at the scene. Most tellingly, Tapiador placed the explosion at the front of Marcelo's house, but the investigator testified that the center of the blast was at the back of the house, about a meter from the nearest banana tree, where a carabao was hit. The physical evidence thus scuttles the prosecution's theory. The witness also faltered on cross-examination about the sequence of events after the child's warning. On the second issue, the same doubt that defeats the frustrated murder charge defeats the charge of illegal possession, for the identity of the person who possessed and threw the grenade was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Doctrine

Acquittal is inevitable if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. Conviction must rest on moral certainty of guilt, brought about by the totality of the prosecution's evidence. The testimony of a witness must conform to the knowledge, observation, and common experience of mankind. While the trial court's assessment of credibility is generally accorded great weight, it will be set aside where the court overlooked facts and circumstances of weight and substance. Where the physical evidence contradicts the lone eyewitness, reasonable doubt arises, and the accused must be acquitted on both the frustrated murder charge under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and the illegal possession charge under Presidential Decree Number 1866.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the appeal, reversed the judgment of conviction, and acquitted Jose Lomboy of both frustrated murder and illegal possession of explosive on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Remember This

Memorize the line: acquittal is inevitable where the facts admit of an explanation consistent with innocence. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of evidence, where physical evidence overrides a lone eyewitness, and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.