CARMELINO MENDOZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSEFINA DE CASTRO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, denying a petition for the
reconstitution of a supposed decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch IV, dated June 27, 1944 and signed by Hon. Gervasio
Diaz, Judge.

Inasmuch as the appeal was made directly to this Court and the
parties do not question the findings of fact of the court below but
only the legal conclusion contained in said decision, the decision is
reproduced below:

“This is a petition for reconstitution of the
decision in a divorce case between plaintiff and defendant allegedly
prosecuted in Manila in September 1943 and decided on or about June 27,
1944. A copy of the alleged decision is attached to the petition. The
petition is based on the provision of Section 7, of Act No. 3110, which
reads as follows:

“If a civil case has
already been decided, the decision shall be reconstituted by means of
an authentic copy. In case an authentic copy cannot be found, the Court
shall make a new decision as if the case had never been decided.”

The law provides that “the decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy.
The copy presented at the hearing by the plaintiff, Exhibit A, is a
simple copy of the alleged decision dated June 27, 1944. There is no
evidence, tending to establish the authenticity of this copy. It bears
no initial of the stenographer or of the judge, or any seal or mark of
the court. It is a simple copy without any sign that it came from the
court. Authentic copy, as the court understands the term, is a copy
officially served upon a party by a messenger employee, or sheriff of
the court, with the date of service appearing thereon.

According
to the testimony of the plaintiff, this Exhibit A was handed to him by
the stenographer after the hearing of the case and after the decision
was dictated by Judge Gervasio Diaz and the notes transcribed by the
stenographer. Such procedure is quite irregular and not in conformity
with practice, for the reason that copies of decisions are served upon
the parties formally after the decision has been filed with the clerk
of court and duly stamped and sealed by him the seal of the court. The
defendant Josefina de Castro on the other hand testified that the
petition for divorce was filed in Diliman, Quezon City and that she
received from Judge Gervasio Diaz a copy of the decision in the City
Hall of Manila in April, 1944. The Court takes judicial notice that all
branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila were in Intramuros in
April, 1944, and were moved to the City Hall after the first bombing of
Manila on September 21, 1944. Furthermore, the alleged copy of the
decision is dated June 27, 1944 and could not have been handed to her
by Judge Diaz in April, 1944. It is also very strange that the judge
himself personally would deliver to her a copy of the decision. This
defendant also stated that she married for the second time on April 14,
1944 which was more than two months before the decision or decree of
divorce, dated June 27, 1944.

In the absence of an authentic
copy, the law provides that “the court shall make a new decision as if
the case had never been decided.” There is no record of the said case
in the Court of First Instance of Manila nor is there means for the
parties to reconstitute said record. Hence the decision, if any, cannot
be reconstituted.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for reconstitution is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.”

In the appeal before this Court, it is argued that as no authentic
copy of the decision sought to be reconstituted can be found, the court
below should have made a new decision as if the case has been newly
decided. The futility of the argument becomes apparent if we consider
that the court below did not believe the testimonies of both plaintiff
and defendant as to the supposed divorce proceedings and judgment
because of certain minor details in their testimonies which belie their
claim that a case was presented and a decision therein rendered. Among
these are: the fact that defendant supposedly received copy of the
decision Exhibit “A” from Judge Diaz himself sometime in April, 1944 at
the City Hall of Manila, when the judge below knew that the Courts of
First Instance of Manila held sessions in Intramuros at that time and
moved to the City Hall only after the first bombing of Manila on
September 21, 1944. The Court also noted their claim that Judge Diaz
personally handed them the copy of the decision, which is not the
practice of courts; and that defendant married for the second time in
April 14, 1944 when the supposed decision is dated June 27, 1944.

The other evidence submitted does not help the case of the
appellant. During the Japanese Occupation, a peculiar way of numbering
cases was adopted, but this peculiarity does not appear on the face of
the supposed copy of the decision. The certificate of the Clerk of
Court of Manila merely states that the supposed record of the case
cannot be found. If the record is not available, what about the docket,
which would have disclosed if a case had really been filed and decided.
The existence of the supposed case is questionable, the simple copy of
the decision presented by the plaintiff not bearing the seal of the
court which issued it or the signature of the clerk who supposedly gave
it. We agree with the trial court that the parties have not
satisfactorily proved that the divorce case had been actually presented
and decided by the court, hence the petition for reconstitution of the
decision under Section 7 of Act No. 3110 cannot be granted.

Wherefore, the decision of the court below should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.