FAUSTINO IGNACIO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND LAUREANO VALERIANO, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a
parcel of land.

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an
application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove),
situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square
meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that
he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the
application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo
Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition.
The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of
the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his
predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having
acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or
by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26,
1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged that he was holding the land by
virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on
January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.

It is not
disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the
applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free
patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in
question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which borders it on the southwest. Applicant
Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it
with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been
continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said
possession was disturbed by oppositor Valeriano.

On the
other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is
foreshore land% covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore,
formed part of the public domain.

After hearing, the trial
court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of
the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors:

“I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho
an accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to
him but forms part of the public domain.

“II. Granting that
the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court
nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the property of the
applicant-appellant, the said land not being necessary for any public
use or purpose and in not ordering at the same time its registration in
the name of applicant-appellant in the present registration proceedings.

“III.
The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now
belongs to the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain
and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.

“IV.
The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of
Lands is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land
of the public domain.”

Appellant contends
that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been
formed by gradual deposit Inaction of the Manila Bay, and he cites
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which
provides that:

“To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in
the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.

Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters
are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea,
and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said
contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere
indentation of the same:

“Bay.—An opening
into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a
river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.” 7
C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water
Rights p. 6)

Moreover, this Tribunal has in
some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay.
(See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732,
involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it
was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of
the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505,
involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).

Then the applicant
argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the
public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should
have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or
purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private
ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:

“Art.
4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused
by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are
no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.”

Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:

“Article
4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the
shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it
to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make
the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
domain.” (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phi]., 134, (cited in Velayo’s Digest, Vol. I, p. 52).

“*
* * is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon,
nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to be
used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.”

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government,
through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that
the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for
public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.

Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question
through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over
ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain
is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular
Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, this Court said:

“The
occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by
accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities,
although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen
years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere
detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce;
it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and
for the benefit of those who live nearby.”

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.